Excerpt from document summary
(C) Two of President Michel Sleiman's Senior Advisors who
accompanied him on his first official trip to the United
States reported that the President was pleased with his
visit, and with the clear message he received of continuing
U.S. political and military support for Lebanon.

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E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/28/2018
TAGS: PREL, PGOV, PTER, PINR, UNSC, MARR, MOPS, SY, LE
SUBJECT: LEBANON: PRESIDENT SLEIMAN PLEASED WITH U.S. VISIT

Classified By: Charge d'Affaires a.i. William Grant for reasons 1.4
(b) and (d).

SUMMARY AND COMMENT
----------------------

1. (C) Two of President Michel Sleiman's Senior Advisors who
accompanied him on his first official trip to the United
States reported that the President was pleased with his
visit, and with the clear message he received of continuing
U.S. political and military support for Lebanon. The
advisors mentioned the "differences" on the issue of
Hizballah's arms. Sleiman reportedly was "satisfied" with
President Bush's assurances that the U.S. would continue to
support the creation of a Palestinian state, which eventually
should be the home to Lebanon's Palestinian refugees, and
welcomed the President's news that the U.S. would provide
$850,000 in new funding for demining efforts in Lebanon.

2. (C) Sleiman's being received as he was, in our view,
helped restore the role of the Lebanese president, placing
him on par with other world leaders. Putting Lebanon's
national interests first was a dominant theme of the visit,
one which allowed Sleiman to avoid upsetting either his
Syrian neighbors or U.S. hosts by appearing to favor one side
over the other. To convince Sleiman that the U.S. also has
Lebanon's best interests at heart, now is the time to
accelerate U.S. assistance. Although Sleiman did not return
to Lebanon with attack helicopters in his pocket, as many had
speculated, expectations are high that an announcement soon.
End summary and comment.

3. (C) Charge Grant, accompanied by Pol/Econ Chief, met with
President Sleiman's Diplomatic Advisor Ambassador Naji Abi
Assi and Political Advisor Nazem Khoury on September 27 and
September 29, respectively. Both accompanied Sleiman on his
recent trip to New York to attend the UN General Assembly and
to Washington and participated in the meetings with President
Bush and Secretaries Rice and Gates. Sleiman also held 18
bilateral meetings on the margins of UNGA, where, according
to Abi Assi, he received much personal support.

STRONG U.S. SUPPORT FOR LEBANON;
SLEIMAN PRESSES NATIONAL AGENDA
--------------------------------

4. (C) Both advisors painted a positive picture of the visit,
relaying Sleiman's personal satisfaction as well. The U.S.
demonstrated its clear political and military support for
Lebanon, as well as for the new Lebanese President, they
said. Abi Assi noted that all of Sleiman's interlocutors,
including members of Congress, thanked him for his efforts to
restart the National Dialogue. Khoury deemed it "a very
positive visit on all levels."

5. (C) Abi Assi said Sleiman stressed three points in his
meetings with U.S. officials: 1) Lebanon and the U.S. share
the same values, including democracy and respect for human
rights; 2) both countries face the same fight against
terrorism; and 3) Lebanon will seek friendly relations with
Syria if (and only if) it is in Lebanon's national interests.
Both advisors stressed that Sleiman had only Lebanon's
interests at heart. For this reason, Khoury noted, Sleiman
did not always say exactly what his interlocutors wanted to
hear. Khoury said this was a "new approach" aimed at
promoting a purely Lebanese national agenda, whether in
talking to Washington, Damascus, or Tehran.

GOOD CHEMISTRY WITH POTUS
-------------------------

6. (C) Abi Assi said there was "good chemistry" between the
two Presidents, adding that there was no tension in the
meeting with President Bush, unlike Sleiman's August meetings
with Syrian President Asad. President Bush reportedly
stressed the need for the Syrian regime to change its
policies, but said he was not against Asad, whom he said he
did not know personally. Abi Assi's impression was that
President Bush was not "100 percent negative" on the Syrian
leader because he refrained from using the "usual language"
about Syria's role in facilitating terrorism.

7. (C) Abi Assi also confirmed that Sleiman raised the issue
of Palestinian refugees in Lebanon. President Bush
reportedly shared U.S. concerns about the plight of the
refugees and agreed with the need to find a solution.
According to Abi Assi, President Bush said the U.S. therefore
supported the creation of a Palestinian state to which the
refugees could return. Khoury said Sleiman was "satisfied"
with President Bush's "clear statement" on the Palestinian
issue, on which there was a "frank and straightforward"
discussion.

8. (C) Both Abi Assi and Khoury said President Bush also
informed Sleiman about $850,000 in new funding for demining
projects in Lebanon, in addition to continuing support for
Lebanon's security forces.

HIZBALLAH'S ARMS, SUPPORT FOR LAF
DOMINATE DISCUSSION WITH SECRETARY GATES
----------------------------------------

9. (C) According to Abi Assi, Secretary Gates told Sleiman he
was "the right man, at the right place, at the right moment."
The only issue of contention was Hizballah, which Sleiman
said Lebanon did not consider a militia. This was nothing
new, Abi Assi stressed; Sleiman himself had said this before,
as had Prime Minister Siniora. Khoury said once again
Sleiman was telling it like it was: the Lebanese could not
consider Hizballah a militia since it was part of the
government, parliament, and society.

10. (C) According to Abi Assi, Sleiman told Secretary Gates
that Hizballah's weapons were an issue for dialogue and
therefore an issue that could be addressed, but stressed that
the arms should not be used. According to Khoury, Sleiman's
argument was that while the "resistance" could not become the
state, the state should become the "resistance." Secretary
Gates reportedly wished Sleiman good luck in this effort,
albeit "in a nice way."

11. (S/NF) In response to Sleiman's request for more U.S.
assistance to the Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF), Abi Assi said
Secretary Gates replied that the answer would be forthcoming
at the October 5-6 Joint Military Commission in Beirut.
Khoury said Gates had said the LAF would receive helicopters
in a few weeks, a misconception the Charge quickly corrected,
adding that the issue probably would be discussed at the JMC.
Secretary Gates reportedly made it a point to praise Defense
Minister Elias Murr and newly appointed LAF Commander Jean
Kahwagi quite strongly in front of Foreign Minister Salloukh,
Abi Assi added.

WITH IRAN, SYRIA, SLEIMAN LOOKS OUT
FOR LEBANON'S NATIONAL INTERESTS
-----------------------------------

12. (C) In his bilateral meeting with Iranian president
Ahmajinedad, Sleiman stressed the need for reconciliation
among Lebanon's various sects, and Hizballah's need to be
mindful of the importance of Christian support. The
indirect message to Ahmajinedad, Abi Assi explained, was that
Iran should support reconciliation efforts in Lebanon (i.e.,
via Hizballah).

13. (C) According to Abi Assi, Syrian Foreign Minister
Moallem promised that there would be diplomatic relations
between Syria and Lebanon before the end of the year. Abi
Assi speculated that Deputy FM Faisal Muqdad, a former Syrian
PermRep to the UN, might be Syria's choice for Ambassador to
Lebanon.

SLEIMAN'S NEXT STOPS:
SAUDI ARABIA, MONTREAL,
ROME, IRAN, EGYPT, GERMANY
--------------------------

14. (C) According to his advisors, Sleiman next will travel
to Saudi Arabia October 12-13, a trip Abi Assi predicted
would be "more difficult" that the U.S. trip because of
ongoing tensions between Riyadh and Damascus. The President
will then attend the October 16-17 meeting of the
"Francophonie" in Montreal, where he also will meet with
French President Sarkozy, Egyptian President Mubarak, and
Algerian President Bouteflika. On October 30-31, Sleiman
will travel to Rome, where he is scheduled to meet with the
Pope. (Note: Abi Assi said former LAF G-2 Intelligence
Director and Ambassador-Designate to the Holy See George
Khoury was waiting for agrement, which, due to a Papal
conclave October 5-26, he probably would not receive in time
for Sleiman's visit. End note.)

15. (C) Both Abi Assi and Khoury were vague on dates for
Sleiman's planned trip to Iran, stating only that it would
occur in November, followed by a visit to Egypt in December.
Khoury added Germany to the list of upcoming presidential
trips.

COMMENT
-------

16. (C) It seems that Sleiman clearly was pleased with his
first official visit to the United States. In addition to
securing continuing U.S. political and military support for
Lebanon, its institutions, including the Presidency, and
himself personally, he made his case regarding Palestinian
refugees in Lebanon and reportedly was satisfied with the
response.

17. (C) His visit also reinvigorated the role of the Lebanese
President, not to mention his own personal stature, on the
world stage. Sleiman had been apprehensive about traveling
to Washington, presumably for fear of upsetting pro-Syrian
political actors in Lebanon. However, by raising issues such
as Hizballah's arms and the Palestinian refugees, and putting
them in the context of "national interest," it seems to us
that he managed to maintain the balance between the two
political blocs he has sought since becoming President. In
other words, his trip to the U.S. did not weaken his position
among the pro-Syrian opposition.

18. (C) We must continue to follow through with tangible
military, economic, and political assistance to convince
Sleiman that the U.S. -- unlike Syria and Iran -- has
Lebanon's best interests at heart. There was speculation in
the media and even among some of our pro-majority contacts
that Sleiman would return from Washington with an
announcement on attack helicopters. Since he did not, there
likely will be increased expectation for an announcement of
some sort of enhanced military assistance at the October 5-6
Joint Military Commission meeting. End comment.
GRANT