08ALGIERS793 Date14/07/2008 04:59 OriginEmbassy Algiers
(S/NF) In response to reftel, according to available
information the Armed Islamic Group (GIA) has not been
involved in terrorist activity during the period 2003-2008.
Algerian sources share GRPO analysis that the GIA no longer
has a formal leadership structure; however, they tell us that
GIA elements and some of its former leaders are still alive,
active and as yet unaffiliated with Salafist Group for
Preaching and Combat (GSPC) or Al-Qa'ida in the Lands of the
Islamic Maghreb (AQIM).
Full Document
ClassificationSECRET//NOFORN Header
P 141659Z JUL 08
FM AMEMBASSY ALGIERS
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 6116
Content
S E C R E T ALGIERS 000793
NOFORN
FOR S/CT - TDROZDENKO
E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/14/2033
TAGS: PTER, PGOV, ASEC, PREL, KCRM, KJUS, AG
SUBJECT: FOREIGN TERRORIST ORGANIZATION LISTING - ARMED
ISLAMIC GROUP (GIA)
REF: SECSTATE 71361
Classified By: Charge d'Affaires, a.i. Thomas F. Daughton;
reasons 1.4 (b) and (d).
1. (S/NF) In response to reftel, according to available
information the Armed Islamic Group (GIA) has not been
involved in terrorist activity during the period 2003-2008.
Algerian sources share GRPO analysis that the GIA no longer
has a formal leadership structure; however, they tell us that
GIA elements and some of its former leaders are still alive,
active and as yet unaffiliated with Salafist Group for
Preaching and Combat (GSPC) or Al-Qa'ida in the Lands of the
Islamic Maghreb (AQIM). A large portion of the GIA was
absorbed into the GSPC when it was founded in 1998 in an
attempt to steer away from the stigma associated with the
GIA's practice of indiscriminate killing. The GSPC distanced
itself from the GIA's tactics in an effort to regain the
support not only of the Algerian population, but also of
international terrorist groups. Some GSPC elements
subsequently allied with Al-Qa'ida in 2006 to form AQIM.
2. (S/NF) Although liaison contacts share our assessment that
the GIA per se has not been responsible for any acts of
terrorism during the period 2003-2008 and that it currently
lacks a formal structure, they also believe that de-listing
the GIA would be premature, given the fact that former GIA
elements are still unreconciled and unaffiliated. Evidence
suggests that many if not all of the former GIA members who
continue to conduct terrorist activities have "rebranded"
themselves and are doing so as part of GSPC/AQIM rather than
as GIA. From our conversations with GOA contacts as well as
our own assessment, we conclude that de-listing the GIA at
this time would be premature and could have a negative effect
on our relationship with host country services, as it would
not be consistent with their assessment of the GIA.
DAUGHTON