Excerpt from document
(C) SUMMARY: The Algerian police have provided Embassy
with specific and credible information concerning a possible
imminent suicide vehicle-borne improvised explosive device
(SVBIED) attack against the U.S. or French embassies in
Algiers. The EAC convened twice on December 22 to review the
information, police activities in response, and appropriate
changes to Embassy security posture. As a result, the
Embassy reconfigured its observance of the Christmas holiday
to conform with Department guidance in ref B, and will
consequently be closed for the holiday from December 23-26.

Full Document
ClassificationSECRET//NOFORN Header
O 221723Z DEC 08
FM AMEMBASSY ALGIERS
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 6775
INFO AMEMBASSY PARIS IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY RABAT IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY TUNIS IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY NOUAKCHOTT IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY BAMAKO IMMEDIATE

Content
S E C R E T ALGIERS 001329

NOFORN

DEPT FOR DS/IP/NEA, S/CT, DS/ICI/CI, NEA/EX AND NEA/MAG

E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/16/2033
TAGS: ASEC, AMGT, KMSG, AG
SUBJECT: POTENTIAL SVBIED ATTACK AGAINST U.S. OR FRENCH
EMBASSIES IN ALGIERS

REF: A. TD-314/089151-08
B. STATE 133222

Classified By: Ambassador David D. Pearce for reason 1.4 (g)

1. (C) SUMMARY: The Algerian police have provided Embassy
with specific and credible information concerning a possible
imminent suicide vehicle-borne improvised explosive device
(SVBIED) attack against the U.S. or French embassies in
Algiers. The EAC convened twice on December 22 to review the
information, police activities in response, and appropriate
changes to Embassy security posture. As a result, the
Embassy reconfigured its observance of the Christmas holiday
to conform with Department guidance in ref B, and will
consequently be closed for the holiday from December 23-26.
The EAC will review the situation December 26 to determine if
non-holiday closure to the public is warranted. The EAC
concluded that no public announcement is appropriate at this
time, and that the no-double-standard policy is being duly
observed. End Summary.

2. (C) On December 22, DCM convened the Algiers EAC to review
the Embassy's security profile in light of credible
and specific threat information provided by host government
law enforcement to RSO. Local police informed RSO the
morning of December 22 that they had indications of a
possible SVBIED attack against the U.S. or French embassies.
Police said they were actively searching for a red Peugeot
205 bearing Algerian registration tags 14207-19016. RSO
informed the EAC that, after receipt of the information, all
entrances to the Embassy had been blocked with old
fully-armored vehicles. Guards and PSU personnel were also
instructed to put on their protective equipment and to be on
the lookout for any suspicious-looking vehicles. The
Embassy's principal vehicle entrance (Main CAC) was closed to
vehicular traffic. In addition, spike strips and a blocking
vehicle were placed at the rear service entrance to the
Chancery. The EAC concurred that the security measures taken
were appropriate in light of the information received, but
agreed to reconvene later in the day following additional
investigation by RSO.

POLICE BRIEFING/ACTIVITY
------------------------

3. (C) RSO met with local police at 1230 on December 22 to
seek additional information regarding the threat and the
police ability to counter and respond. Local police informed
RSO that the threat was an AQIM plan they considered to be in
the "execution" phase, and that their information was "100
percent reliable" and based on an inside source within the
terrorist group. The attack plan allegedly includes the use
of an SVBIED carrying a bomb of between 200 and 500 kg of
"TNT" (Comment: Local authorities customarily refer to the
car bombs used by AQIM as carrying TNT, though in fact most
if not all use ammonium nitrate-based explosives. End
Comment.) The police told RSO that two occupants, a male and
female, would be in the vehicle. The police stated they
suspect the two occupants were being used to "trick" the
police into thinking they were a family and thus more likely
to pass through police checkpoints. Although they had a
suspected license plate number, the police acknowledged the
plate could be changed, and therefore checkpoints and other
security elements were watching for any red Peugeot 205.
Police further stated that the SVBIED originated from either
Tizi Ouzou or Boumerdes provinces (both just east of
Algiers). Police did not know if the SVBIED had already
entered the city of Algiers or was even yet en route, but
were actively searching for it in and around the city in a
combined police/gendarmerie/military operation. RSO was
informed that the increased security posture in the areas
around the U.S. and French embassies would remain in effect
until January 2 or until the threat was neutralized.

4. (C) Separately, RSO surveyed changes to the security
presence in the larger area around the two embassies. The
police presence around the Hydra neighborhood (site of the
French embassy and west of the U.S. Embassy compound) had
been increased significantly and police were observed
stopping vehicles and interviewing passengers. In general,
the police presence in the streets around the Embassy is the
most extensive we have observed since just after the December
11, 2007 bombing of the UN and the Constitutional Court in
Algiers. All existing police checkpoints have been augmented

and the police appear to be actively searching all vehicles.

SECOND EAC
----------

5. (S/NF) The Ambassador chaired a follow-up EAC meeting the
afternoon of December 22 to review the additional information
obtained. RSO provided a summary of the police information.
GRPO reported no additional information from liaison or other
sources. The EAC took note of the fact that the threat
information was specific to the U.S. and French embassies and
did not involve other American interests. Given the ongoing
police effort to interdict the suspected would-be bombers,
the EAC agreed that it would be prudent to rearrange the
upcoming holiday schedule to conform to Department guidance
(ref B). Embassy had originally planned for operational
reasons to observe the holiday December 24-27. The EAC
agreed that the Embassy would instead observe the Christmas
holiday from December 23-26. The EAC also agreed to
reconvene on December 26 to review whether the threat
information warrants closing to the public on Saturday,
December 27.

6. (C) Since the threat information was specific to the
Embassy, the EAC agreed that a warden message was not
necessary or desirable (see below). The EAC also concluded
that the no-double-standard policy was not violated by the
decision to alter the holiday schedule. The Ambassador
informed the Embassy community (USDH and LES) of the change
and of the existence of threat information at a meeting that
followed the EAC. The RSO also shared the essential threat
information with colleagues at the French embassy during the
course of the day.

7. (C) COMMENT: It is virtually unprecedented for the
Algerian police to provide us threat information this
specific and detailed. The fact that they took the
initiative to do so is a major positive step in our
cooperation and an additional impetus for us to take this
threat information very seriously, especially in light of the
aggressiveness of the police response. At the same time, the
EAC is cognizant of the need not to compromise the
information by unnecessary publication of the details of the
threat or the police response to it. The altering of our
holiday observance, in accordance with existing Department
guidance, provides us with a four-day period of closure
during which we hope the police can apprehend the would-be
bombers. The EAC will keep the situation under close review,
and will meet again not later than December 26. End Comment.

8. (U) Point of contact for this report is DRSO Miguel A.
Eversley
PEARCE