Excerpt from document
(C) Summary: During a May 8-10 visit, S/CT Deputy
Coordinator Virginia Palmer and senior Moroccan officials
discussed the GOM's holistic approach to combating terrorism
and countering extremist ideology as well as ways to enhance
CT efforts. The Moroccans welcomed Palmer's visit in the
context of continued strong bilateral CT cooperation with the
United States.

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RR RUEHBC RUEHDE RUEHKUK RUEHROV
DE RUEHRB #0890/01 1381630
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
R 181630Z MAY 07
FM AMEMBASSY RABAT
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RUEHCL/AMCONSUL CASABLANCA 3050
Content
S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 03 RABAT 000890

SIPDIS

NOFORN
SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/15/2017
TAGS: PTER, PREL, KISL, ASEC, MO
SUBJECT: S/CT DEPUTY COORDINATOR PALMER VISITS MOROCCO

Classified by DCM Wayne Bush for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d).

1. (C) Summary: During a May 8-10 visit, S/CT Deputy
Coordinator Virginia Palmer and senior Moroccan officials
discussed the GOM's holistic approach to combating terrorism
and countering extremist ideology as well as ways to enhance
CT efforts. The Moroccans welcomed Palmer's visit in the
context of continued strong bilateral CT cooperation with the
United States. Among the specific ideas discussed for
expanded cooperation were potential "brainstorming" sessions
on TSCTP activities and increased collaboration with
Morocco's Ministry of Interior to expand the GOM's border
control capabilities. The Mission's CT Working Group briefed
Palmer on an ATA program activity that will provide Morocco
with K-9 bomb detection capabilities and a proposal for a new
project to include a $249K package of equipment that would
lay the foundation for a modern bomb response unit for the
police. End summary.

-------------------
A Holistic Approach
-------------------

2. (C) Ambassador Yousef Amrani, Director-General of
Bilateral Affairs at the Moroccan MFA, received S/CT Deputy
Coordinator Virginia Palmer, CT officer Patrick Worman, and
Deputy Polcouns in his office on the morning of May 8.
"Fighting terrorism is no longer an issue for intelligence
agencies only," Amrani asserted. In tandem with operations
identifying and dismantling specific terrorist cells, the GOM
is pursuing the struggle against terrorism on three fronts:
First, through advancing political reform and respect for
human rights; second, through economic development programs
targeting marginalized youth; and third, through religious
education programs led by the Ministry of Islamic Affairs to
"confront the culture of hate.... Our main battlefield is
ideological." A settlement of the Arab-Israeli conflict, and
an end to the fighting in Iraq, are essential to stabilizing
the entire Middle East and North Africa region, Amrani
underscored. Amrani suggested that the emergence of AQIM was
due primarily to Government of Algeria "failures." Palmer
replied that in some senses the GSPC was forced to associate
with AQIM because of the GOA,s success in marginalizing it
within Algeria.

3. (C) Amrani said "Salafiya Jihadiya" (the GOM's catch-all
term for violent jihadists) is made up of numerous small (and
mainly autonomous) cells in Morocco. They are driven by
ideology to carry out or prepare to carry out suicide attacks
in the country and have become a key threat. Marginalized
youth are especially vulnerable to infection from this strain
of thought, he added. Asked about possible Saudi connections
to the spread of Jihadist ideology in Morocco, Amrani
observed that the Saudis are suffering as much as any other
country from this ideology, yet they remain largely in denial
that much of this thought is propagated from within their own
borders. He conceded that the GOM has never raised the
problem of extremist ideology with the SAG: "They will never
accept this," he asserted.

------------------------
CT at the Regional Level
------------------------

4. (C) Confirming his general familiarity with the U.S. Trans
Sahara Counterterrorism Partnership concept, Amrani said
Morocco shared the U.S. concerns that remote, ungoverned
regions of the Sahara/Sahel region were already being
exploited as safehavens by extremist groups such as the GSPC.
"The corridor between Sudan and Mauritania is especially
vulnerable," Amrani observed. He proposed that senior U.S.
and Moroccan officials meet for a "brainstorming session" on
ways the U.S. and states of the region can work together to
combat this threat.

5. (S/NF) At a meeting at Morocco's foreign intelligence
agency, the DGED (The Directorate Generale des Etudes et
Documentation), senior officers gave Palmer an extremely
candid overview assessment of the terror threat inside
Morocco and in the broader region, outlining AQIM leadership
in eight regions within Algeria and a ninth "Trans Sahelian"
cell. They noted the convergence of smuggling, crime and
terrorist networks in the Saharan border regions and
characterized Moukhtar BelMoukhtar as primarily a
logistician. They opined that BelMoukhtar was not planning
attacks against Mali because that was his base of operations.
Noting that AQIM aimed to create "a sense of tension in the
Saharan region, building on instability in the Ivory Coast
and elsewhere." DGED officials downplayed potential schisms
between residual GSPC elements and AQIM. Technical
cooperation and information exchange with the U.S. is one of

RABAT 00000890 002 OF 003

the pillars of Morocco's CT program, they emphasized.

---------------------------------------
Extent of Domestic Threat Still Unknown
---------------------------------------

6. (S/NF) DGED officers asserted that the second cell they
wrapped up after the April 15 attack had no ties to Senior Al
Qaida leadership. They were candid about their lack of
understanding about what had motivated the brother of the
first suicide bombing to also participate in suicide attack.
The government had not asked the parents of the bombers to
speak out against those that lured their sons to suicide,
because of "Moroccan respect for families," they said.

7. (C) In a separate meeting May 9, the head of the Moroccan
Insititute for Stategic Studies and a social scientist from
Mohammed V University noted that many of those involved in
the cells recently discovered had been detained after the
2005 Casablanca bombings. Based on detailed case histories
(but not detainee interviews), both professors noted links
between "violations" including rape that the men had endured
while in detention.

-------------------------------
Borders are a Front Line for CT
-------------------------------

8. (C) Khalid Zerouali, the senior Ministry of Interior
official in charge of the country's border security regime,
discussed with Palmer the links between illegal migration,
narcotics smuggling, and terrorist activity. All three
categories exploit the same weaknesses to evade government
authority, and measures taken against one will benefit the
fight against the other two. All transcend national
boundaries and require efficient regional coordination to
counter them effectively. Zerouali boasted that the GOM had
achieved a 40 percent reduction in domestic cannabis
production in 2006. He bristled at reported USG statements
citing Algeria as a model for CT efforts in North Africa.
Morocco is much more stable and secure he asserted, whereas
"I cannot travel from Algiers to Oran without fear."

9. (C) Zerouali said that although Morocco is not in the
African Union, the Moroccan MOI provided technical assistance
to police and security forces in various African states
including "thousands of scholarships" for Africans to
Moroccan Police Academies and civil defense institutes. A
graduate of the University of Texas, Zerouali said he had led
several MOI delegations to the U.S. in recent years to make
contacts and gather ideas for reinventing Morocco's border
control system. He said they had particularly benefited from
interactions with the U.S. border patrol and had adapted
their handbook for use in Morocco. Palmer encouraged
Zerouali to work with the U.S. Embassy in Rabat to identify
opportunities for more U.S. training and technical assistance
for the MOI. Zerouali pledged he would do so.

--------------
ATA Activities
--------------

10. (C) The U.S. Mission's CT Working Group (RSO, LEGAT, RAO,
DAO, ODC and POL) briefed Palmer on the overall threat
environment and the positive and collaborative relationship
the U.S. enjoys with the GOM on CT issues. Among the
specific assistance activities noted was a project underway
and funded by the Anti-Terrorism Assistance program which
will provide the national police (DGSN) with advanced K-9
bomb detection capabilities.

11. (C) LEGAT and ARSO described the poor state of Moroccan
DGSN bomb investigation units. LEGAT is circulating a list
of equipment prepared by the FBI Laboratory which includes
protective suits, explosive detection devices, and a robot,
that would form the basis for a state of the art bomb
response and disposal unit for the police (the DGSN). The
package, valued at approximately $249K, is badly needed by
poorly equipped Moroccan explosives technicians and is based
on an assessment by an FBI bomb expert. Follow on training
for personnel would be a desirable compliment to the
equipment. The K-9 program is already funded and will begin
to bear fruit later this summer. Funding for the bomb
response unit package has not yet been identified.

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