From: <a href="http://www.aftenposten.no/spesial/wikileaksdokumenter/article3973884.ece">Aftenposten</a><br>
Date: 17.9.2009

<pre>
UNCLAS SECTION 
01 OF 07 STATE 096526 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: MARR, PREL, EZ 
SUBJECT: U.S. MISSILE DEFENSE POLICY AND EUROPE

1. (U)
This is an ACTION REQUEST. Please see paragraph 3. ALL
MATERIALS IN THIS CABLE ARE TO BE EMBARGOED FOR RELEASE UNTIL
AFTER THE PRESIDENTIAL STATEMENT IS RELEASED ON SEPTEMBER 17,
2009, AT 9:55 A.M. (EASTERN DAYLIGHT TIME - WASHINGTON, D.C.)

2. (SBU)
BACKGROUND: The White House is expected to announce a
Presidential decision at approximately 9:55 a.m.(Washington,
D.C.) on September 17 regarding a U.S. European-based BMD
adaptive regional architecture, which is significantly
different from the Bush Administrations plan to deploy 10
ground-based interceptors in Poland and a BMD tracking radar
in the Czech Republic. END BACKGROUND.

3. (SBU)
ACTION REQUEST: Posts at their discretion may deliver the
talking points in paragraph 4 on Thursday, September 17, as a
non-paper, but only after the Presidential statement is
released at approximately 9:55 a.m. (Washington, D.C.). Posts
may draw upon the Questions and Answers in paragraph 5 for use
with Host Governments, as Posts determine appropriate but
these Questions and Answers should not/not be handed over to
Host Governments. Materials for public diplomacy (e.g., Fact
Sheet, Questions and Answers, and POTUS statement) will be
provided to Posts septel. END ACTION REQUEST.

4. (U)
BEGIN TEXT OF TALKING POINTS: 
U.S. MISSILE DEFENSE POLICY - EUROPEAN DECISION 
- The White House announced that the President has approved
Secretary Gates and the Joint Chiefs of Staffs unanimous
recommendation for improved missile defenses in Europe against
the threat from Iran to our forces and families deployed to
the region and to our Allies.
- Iran already has hundreds of ballistic missiles that can
threaten its neighbors in the Middle East, Turkey, and the
Caucasus and it is actively developing and testing ballistic
missiles that can reach more and more of Europe.
-- Our concern regarding Iranian missile capabilities is
further increased by the fact that our Intelligence Community
continues to assess that Iran, at a minimum, is keeping open
the option to develop nuclear weapons.
- The new "Phased, Adaptive Approach" recommended by Secretary
Gates updates and revises the previous program for missile
defense in Europe based on two key findings of the DoD review:
-- First, the threat from Irans regional ballistic missiles
has developed more rapidly than previously expected. At the
same time, the threat from potential Iranian intercontinental
ballistic missiles (ICBMs) has been slower to develop than we
previously expected.
-- Second, our missile defense capabilities and technologies
have advanced significantly. Improved interceptor
capabilities, such as the currently deployed Standard
Missile-3 (SM-3) interceptor and advanced variants that are
already in development, permit a more flexible and capable
architecture.
- Therefore, the President has approved a Phased, Adaptive
Approach that is responsive to the current threat, but also
can incorporate new technologies quickly and cost-effectively
to adapt as the threat and our technologies continue to
change. It will unfold in phases:
-- The first phase will speed protection of U.S. deployed
forces, civilians, and families and our Allies in Europe
against the current threat from Iran by deploying proven
systems by 2011 - about six or seven years earlier than the
previous program.
-- Subsequent phases will add advanced variant sea- and
land-based versions of the SM-3 and cover additional territory
in Europe should the Iranian threat expand.
-- In the fourth and final phase we will anticipate augmenting
our existing capabilities to defend the United States against
potential advances in Irans ICBM capability with advanced
versions of the SM-3. This would be a similar capability to
that provided in the program of record.

STATE 00096526 002 OF 007 

- This improved approach removes the need for a Ground Based
Interceptor field in Poland and features a distributed
interceptor and sensor architecture that does not require the
single large, fixed radar originally planned to be located in
the Czech Republic.
-- Under the new approach, land- and sea-based missile defense
interceptors and sensors offer some flexibility to be
redeployed as the regional ballistic missile threat dictates.
This distributed network approach also will increase the
survivability of the system and provide more opportunities for
collaboration with Allies and partners.
-- We are beginning consultations with Poland, the Czech
Republic, and other Allies on the new approach, and will work
with our NATO Allies on determining locations for the sensors
and interceptors, and on integrating the Phased, Adaptive
Approach with their missile defense capabilities and with the
emerging NATO command and control network.
- Strong missile defenses will strengthen our efforts to find
a solution that brings Iran into compliance with its
international obligations: the more we can diminish the
coercive value of Irans missiles, the less Iran stands to gain
by continuing to develop these destabilizing capabilities.
- This set of recommendations comes from an ongoing
Congressionally-mandated review that is taking a comprehensive
examination of our global approach to missile defense and is
consistent with the Defense Departments budget choices for
fiscal year 2010:
-- For example, we added additional funding to field more
systems such as Aegis BMD ships and SM-3 interceptors.
END TEXT OF TALKING POINTS.

5. (U)
BEGIN TEXT OF QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS: 

1. What is this new "phased" approach? Details? 
- We will pursue a Phased Adaptive Approach to missile defense
in Europe, which will improve the collective defense of the
United States and Europe. The first elements of this approach
will be available to defend portions of Europe six or seven
years earlier than would have occurred under the previous
plan.
- Our proven regional missile defense capabilities, including
the Aegis Weapon System and the Standard Missile 3 (SM-3)
interceptor, and Army-Navy TPY-2 forward-based radar can be
deployed initially, to address the current Iranian short- and
medium- range ballistic missile threat.
- As our missile defense technology improves and is tested,
the architecture also will evolve and become more capable.
- For example, we also can leverage our advanced regional
missile defense development programs such as the land-based
SM-3s with advanced SM-3 interceptor capability and advanced
sensors in subsequent phases.
- This approach provides many opportunities for allied
participation, and we have begun engaging our NATO Allies to
discuss these.
- The phased approach will enable us to provide protection to
U.S. deployed forces, civilian personnel, and their
accompanying families, and NATO Allies at risk to current and
emerging Iranian missile threats.
- We anticipate that this plan can augment missile defense of
the United States against a potential future Iranian ICBM. In
the meantime, we will invest in the continued improvement of
Ground Based Interceptors now based in the United States.

2. What are you doing about the program of record? 
- Based on our updated understanding of the threat and our
more advanced capabilities and technologies, we believe the
best course of action no longer involves the single GBI field
in Poland or the single large, fixed European radar originally
planned to be located in the Czech Republic.
- The Czech Republic and Poland are steadfast Allies of the
United States, and we appreciate their willingness to

STATE 00096526 003 OF 007

take a leadership role in NATO on missile defense. We
discussed this announcement with them earlier today and
communicated our gratitude.
- The United States remains committed to the security of its
NATO Allies, including Poland and the Czech Republic. The
indivisibility of Allied security and Article 5 of the North
Atlantic Treaty are cornerstones of that commitment.

3. What nations will host this architecture?
- Some of the assets will be sea-based, which allows them to
be moved quickly to meet new or unexpected threats. Other
parts of the defensive architecture - sensors and interceptors -
could also be land-based and potentially be deployed in
northern or southern Europe to provide coverage of Allied
territory and populations.
- One benefit of the phased approach is that there is a high
degree of geographic flexibility; for example, there are many
potential locations for any land-based interceptor sites.
Moreover, some of the land-based elements will be relocatable,
so we can adjust as appropriate if circumstances change.
- I would prefer not to get into specific issues related to
hosting this equipment at this time. We are engaging at NATO
with Allies on those questions.

4. What has changed since Secretary Gates made the Program of
Record decision?
- Both our assessment of the Iranian missile threat and the
technical capabilities of U.S. missile defense have evolved.
- The growing numbers of Iranian short- and medium-range
missiles pose an increasingly important near-term challenge to
U.S. forces, allies, and friends in multiple regions.
- The threat from Iranian short- and medium-range missiles has
developed more rapidly than anticipated.
-- Iran already has fielded hundreds of ballistic missiles
that can threaten neighbors in the Middle East, Turkey, and
the Caucasus.
-- Iran is actively developing ballistic missiles that can
reach beyond its neighbors and deeper into Europe.
- Irans successful space launch (the Safir) in February 2009
demonstrated progress in longer-range ballistic missile
technologies.
- In addition, new options for missile defense capabilities
now exist in our missile defense development program that were
not previously available.
--Improved interceptor capabilities, including new versions of
the SM-3, offer a more flexible and capable architecture for
the defense of Europe, and indeed of other regions.
--We also have made progress with sensor technologies that
offer an increasing variety of options to detect and track
enemy ballistic missiles and provide that data to an
interceptor.

5. Does this weaken our protection of the homeland against
missile attacks?

- To the contrary: The phased approach develops the capability
to augment our current protection of the U.S. homeland against
long-range ballistic missile threats.
-- In the later phases, a new variant of the SM-3 interceptor
in development could eventually provide a capability against
Iranian ICBM threat to the United States. Because it uses a
different approach and different technology than the GBIs
deployed in the United States, it offers the opportunity for
layered defense of the United States.
-- In all phases, the GBIs deployed at Fort Greely, Alaska,
and Vandenberg Air Force Base, California, are available to
protect the United States from an incoming ICBM.
- As we move forward, we will be better positioned to
accelerate development and deployment of system elements

STATE 00096526 004 OF 007 

if needed - this flexibility is a key benefit of this approach
compared to the previous program.
- We are committed to missile defense for the U.S. homeland.
By the end of 2010, the U.S. will have 30 ground-based
interceptors (GBIs) deployed in Ft. Greely, Alaska, and
Vandenberg AFB in California.
-- This is more than enough to defend against an ICBM attack
from Iran or North Korea that we may face in the foreseeable
future.
-- We will continue to maintain and improve our GBI
capabilities to ensure they are available when needed and
could combat an evolving threat.

6. If our current missile defense capabilities (GBIs) for
defending the homeland are more than sufficient, why do we
need the European architecture for homeland defense?
- The current force of 30 GBIs is sufficient to meet the
long-range threat we face today from rogue countries. If the
threat grows in number or complexity, or if the threat
originates from another region, we will review our missile
defense posture, and augment it as needed.
- A benefit of the European architecture as outlined in our
new phased approach is its ability to adapt as the Iranian
ballistic missile threat evolves. In the near term, we will be
able to counter the expected short- and medium-range threat to
our deployed forces, friends and allies in the region.
- We are monitoring the Iranian threat closely and will be
prepared to adjust our missile defense capabilities and
posture in a timely manner. The phased approach ensures that
we are best able to defend against all ranges of Iranian
ballistic missiles both today and in the future.

7. Is the new approach cost-effective?
- Yes. This approach begins with proven capabilities, like the
Aegis ballistic missile defense system, with SM-3
interceptors, and relocatable radars that are being deployed
and in use today.
- As newer, more capable versions of these systems become
available, we will deploy them to defend against evolving
threats.
- This approach employs missile defense capabilities that are
flexible and scaleable; that is, they are mobile or
relocatable and can be surged in times of crisis. This is a
cost-effective way to leverage our BMD investments.
- We estimate that the overall, long-term cost of the Phased
Adaptive Approach will be roughly the same as the previous
program. In addition, we expect the per-interceptor costs for
SM-3 to be significantly less than for a GBI.

8. Who pays? Potential cost to Allies?
- We will work closely with NATO Allies to examine broader
resourcing requirements and determine the most efficient and
appropriate way to finance the integration of the Phased
Adaptive Approach with NATO.

9. What about NATO missile defense efforts?
- NATO missile defense efforts in recent years have focused on
missile defense systems to protect deployed forces from
shorter-range ballistic missile threats. Several NATO
countries already possess or are acquiring missile defense
systems.
- U.S. missile defense efforts will, of course, be
complementary to those of NATO, and we will ensure our systems
are interoperable. We expect that the current NATO systems
will be able to "plug-and-play" with the overall phased
approach.
- NATO is already developing a command and control
architecture designed to link missile defense systems for
defense of NATO forces in the field, known as the Active

STATE 00096526 005 OF 007

Layered Theatre Ballistic Missile Defense Program (ALTBMD).
- Thus, Allied contributions will have the possibility of
being linked together to ensure they form a cost-effective and
comprehensive architecture.
- Use of ALTBMD as a shared command and control backbone will
enable a more cost-effective missile defense architecture.

10. Did you consult as youd promised with allies? 
- Consultations with allies and friends on the BMD Review
began early in May, in bilateral and multilateral settings
with allies and partners around the world.
- Over the past several months, we have had multiple
senior-level discussions with NATO, as well as with many
individual countries including the Czech Republic and Poland.
- During these consultations, we listened. And we assured our
partners that our decisions would be informed by our
assessments of the nature of the threat from Iran, by the
costs and effectiveness of various missile defense
capabilities - and by these discussions with our allies.
- As soon as the decisions on missile defense in Europe were
made, we informed our allies first and foremost.

11. If a primary purpose of this is to defend Allies, why
arent they paying for it? Do NATO members even want this?
Whats the purpose of the NATO MD?
- The ballistic missile threat concerns not just the U.S. but
our Allies, as well. In fact, NATO has been working on missile
defense for the past few years, agreeing to develop a system
called Active Layered Theatre Ballistic Missile Defense
(ALTBMD) to protect deployed forces. At the NATO Summit in
April, 2009, Allies agreed to examine whether the Alliance
should expand its ALTBMD program to cover Alliance territory
and populations as well.
-Prior to that, at the Summit in Bucharest last year, Allies
provided strong support for the U.S. missile defense program
and tasked the Alliance to look at how those two programs
could work together.
- To implement Alliance missile defense, Allies are purchasing
national systems such as Patriot, Aegis or Patriot-like
systems, and the NATO Alliance itself will finance the C2
backbone for ALTBMD into which Allied national systems can be
integrated.
- We will work closely with NATO Allies to examine broader
resourcing requirements and determine the most efficient and
appropriate way to finance the integration of our Phased
Adaptive Approach with the NATO program.

12. Are we giving Poland or the Czech Republic something
instead - are we "pulling the rug out from under them"?
- The threat has evolved and technology has changed; the
Czechs and Poles appreciate this fact and the need to change
our approach to the missile defense threat to enhance
protection for all of our European Allies.
- Under the phased adaptive approach, there are greater
opportunities for our Allies and friends to participate. One
of the characteristics of our new architecture is its
flexibility. There are many options for working with Allies on
the way-ahead and we intend to engage soon at NATO and with
Allies on how they might be involved. We look forward to
working with Poland/Czech Republic and all of our NATO Allies
on moving the Phased Adaptive Approach forward together.

13. How does this affect U.S. missile defense cooperation with
Allies in East Asia? How about our friends in the Middle East?
- The broad outline of this Phased Adaptive Approach for

STATE 00096526 006 OF 007 

Europe is consistent with our current missile defense efforts
throughout the world. We will continue to work with our
friends and allies in other regions to field our most capable,
mobile, interoperable systems to protect deployed U.S. forces,
civilian personnel, and their families, as well as allied
forces, populations, and territories.

14. Was your announcement rushed to be able to tell President
Medvedev the results next week?
- No. We made the announcement when we did in order to discuss
these developments with our allies and friends as soon as
possible. We did not want to delay the process for improving
defenses for ourselves and our allies, many of whom face an
increasing threat of missile attack over the next several
years. This has been a topic of great interest among our
international partners - not only in Europe, but across the
globe.
- We consulted with our allies first and foremost. Subsequent
talks with Russia are designed to provide them with
transparency into our decisions and to discuss possible areas
for cooperation.

15. Did you consult with the Russians prior to the public
announcement?
- Yes. The Russian Ambassador in Washington was informed of
the Presidents decision before the public announcement, but
after key Allies.

16. How about cooperating with Russia on missile defense? What
about using the Qabala and/or Armavir radars?
- The United States will continue to explore the potential for
cooperating with Russia on missile defenses that enhance the
security of both countries and that of our Allies and
partners.
- In this regard, the U.S. and Russia agreed at the July 6
summit to continue the dialogue on missile defense issues,
including identifying areas for cooperation.
- These efforts could include data sharing, such as from the
Qabala or Armavir radars, which could offer a way for Russia
to make a meaningful contribution in a joint architecture.

17. Did you cave in to Russian demands just to get a START
Treaty or Russian cooperation on other issues?
- We are moving to a Phased Adaptive Approach because it will
be more effective against current and emerging missile threats
to Europe and the United States, including large missile raid
sizes from Iran.
- In their joint statement in London on April 1, Presidents
Obama and Medvedev agreed that the subject of the START
follow-on treaty would be the reduction and limitation of
strategic offensive arms. From the beginning of the START
follow-on negotiations, we have made it clear to the Russians
that the treaty should not include any limitations on missile
defenses and that discussions on missile defense should be
conducted through other bilateral contacts.
- The previous missile defense architecture did not pose any
threat to Russia, and we have repeatedly emphasized to Russia
that our missile defenses are not directed at them. The new
phased approach poses no threat to them either.
-- On the contrary, we believed before, and we still believe,
that the Russians would benefit from cooperating with the
United States and NATO on missile defenses.
- President Obama and President Medvedev agreed to pursue
missile defense cooperation when they met in Moscow in July
2009 and we look forward to this dialogue.

18. On potential linkage between offensive and defensive
weapons in START follow-on:

STATE 00096526 007 OF 007 

- The United States will not negotiate limitations on missile
defense capabilities in the START follow-on treaty with
Russia, and we have made that clear to the Russians.
- Our missile defenses are deployed to counter the threats
from Iran and North Korea, not Russia. It will be important
for Russia to help to constrain both of these growing threats.
- Both the United States and Russia have an interest in
maintaining a stable deterrence relationship, so it makes
perfect sense for us to discuss the relationship between
offensive and defensive weapons.
-- The fact that there is a relationship between offensive and
defensive forces has long been recognized by the United States
and Russia.
-- President Obama and President Medvedev agreed to have such
discussions in their April 1, 2009, Joint Statement.
-- While we welcome these discussions, we do not believe that
either the previous architecture or the new architecture for
missile defense in Europe poses any threat to Russia.
-- The previous architecture was not open for negotiation, and
neither is the new one.

19. Isnt Iran more likely to use means other than missiles for
coercing or attacking the United States and its allies?
- Iran is putting a lot of resources into its missile
programs, and is increasing its arsenal in terms of both range
and numbers. Ballistic missiles are attractive to rogue states
as tools of coercion and power projection because they are
capable of potentially delivering WMD payloads over great
distances in short periods of time.
- Although perhaps one should not take everything that Iranian
President Ahmadinejad says at face value, it is worth noting
that following an Iranian missile test on April 20 of this
year, he gave a speech saying "Today Iran has the power to
turn any base that fires a bullet at Iran into hell."

20. Does this reflect the Administrations acceptance of a
nuclear Iran - that were just going to defend against their
nuclear missiles rather than try to stop them from becoming a
nuclear power?
- The Administrations policy on Iran has not changed: a
nuclear-armed Iran is unacceptable.
-- We are continuing to work with our international partners
to prevent Iran from developing technologies capable of
deploying nuclear weapons.
-- We also remain open to direct discussions with Iran on this
and other issues.
- Countering ballistic missiles is just one part of our
overall response to the threat posed by Iran, and the new
phased approach is designed to be tailored depending on how
the Iranian missile threat evolves.

END TEXT OF QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS.

CLINTON
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