From: <a href="http://www.aftenposten.no/spesial/wikileaksdokumenter/article3963358.ece">Aftenposten</a><br>
Date: 08.05.2009

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S E C R E T STATE 046946
NOFORN 
SIPDIS
E.O. 12958:
DECL: 05/01/2019 
TAGS: ETTC, KN, KNNP, MARR, MCAP, MOPS, PARM, PINR, PREL 
SUBJECT: SRI LANKA NEGOTIATING TO PROCURE LETHAL MILITARY EQUIPMENT
FROM NORTH KOREA AND IRAN
REF: 2006 STATE 141140
Classified By: Michael Owen, Director SCA/INS per E.O. 12958
for reasons 1.4 (B), (D)

1. (U)
This message contains an action request, please see paragraph 6.

------- 
Summary 
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2. (S/NF)
The Government of Sri Lanka (GOSL) is negotiating the
procurement of Lethal Military Equipment (LME) from North
Korea and Iran. Recent intelligence reports indicate that a
Sri Lankan company responsible for the acquisition of
equipment and services for the Sri Lankan military is
negotiating the purchase of RPG-7 Rocket Propelled Grenade
Launchers (RPGs) and Multiple Rocket Launchers (MRLs) from
North Koreaīs primary weapons trading firm. Some of these
proposed arms imports appear to violate UNSCR 1718. We have
also received information that Iranīs Ministry of Defense
Logistics Export Center (MODLEX) has recently provided a
multimillion-dollar quote to the Sri Lankan Navy for the
installation of naval equipment. Moreover, an Iranian Islamic
Revolutionary Guard Corps Force element located in Sri Lanka
provided details to an Iranian shipping company for the sale
of weapons to the Sri Lanka Army. Post is requested to deliver
the talking points in paragraph 6 and report any GOSL
reactions. End Summary.

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Background 
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3. (S/NF)
This is not the first time Sri Lanka has attempted to purchase
LME from countries under UN Security Council sanctions. In
August 2006, the USG demarched the GOSL regarding its interest
in acquiring pyrotechnic and armament spare parts for training
aircraft, as well as hundreds of weapons from Iran (Ref A).

4. (S/NF)
As part of our ongoing dialogue on nonproliferation, we would
like once again to express our concern over Sri Lankaīs
potential procurement of lethal military equipment from Iran
and North Korea. We also want to remind the GOSL of possible
sanctions under the Iran, North Korea, and Syria
Nonproliferation Act (INKSNA). The INKSNA requires regular
reports to Congress identifying individuals and entities who
have transferred to or acquired from Iran, North Korea, or
Syria certain items related to weapons of mass destruction,
ballistic or cruise missiles or advanced conventional weapons.

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Objectives/Action Request 
-------------------------

5. (S//REL SRI LANKA)
Post is requested to draw upon the talking points in paragraph
6 with appropriate host government officials. Post should
pursue the following objectives:
-- Remind the GOSL that any arms purchase contracts entered
into by Sri Lankan entities with North Korea or Iran, if
implemented, could trigger sanctions against the entities
involved under the Iran, North Korea, and Syria
Nonproliferation Act (INKSNA).
-- Recall that paragraph 8(b) of United Nations Security
Council Resolution 1718 requires member states to prohibit the
procurement of certain military-related items, including LME
such as combat aircraft, battle tanks, large caliber artillery
systems, or missile systems, or related materiel including
spare parts, and that any import of such items by Sri Lanka
would constitute a violation of UNSCR 1718. In addition,
paragraph 8(c) of UNSCR 1718 requires UN Member States to
prevent transfer from North Korea of any technical training,
advice, services or assistance related to these items. The
full list of items prohibited by UNSCR 1718 can be found on
the UNīs web site (<a target="_blank"
href="http://www.aftenposten.no/spesial/wikileaksdokumenter/www.un.org/sc/committees/1718/xport%20list.shtml">www.un.org/sc/committees/1718/xport
list.shtml</a>). Items on these lists (identified in Security
Council documents S/2006/814, S/2006/815, and S/2006/853) are
also prohibited for transfer regardless of their intended use.
-- Emphasize our concern that Lanka Logistics and Technologies
Ltd may attempt to circumvent export controls on transfers
with North Korea.
-- Request the GOSL to investigate Lanka Logistics and
Technologies Ltd and provide the United States with the
results of its investigation as soon as possible.
-- Request the GOSL to provide information on whether its Navy
is negotiating with MODLEX $11.4 million for rockets and
rocket launchers that can be installed on naval equipment.
-- Request the GOSL to provide clarification on negotiations
with Iran on procurement of weapons and defense equipment for
the Sri Lankan Army in the amount of $40 million.
-- Note that under 1747, Iran is prohibited from exporting
arms and states are to prohibit the procurement of such items
from Iran by their nationals.
-- Urge GOSL authorities to stop any military negotiations
with North Korea or Iran involving LME or sensitive
technology.

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Talking Points 
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6. (SECRET//REL SIR LANKA)
Note that the first four bullets in the Talking Points are
derived from intelligence and must be used verbatim. These
points are bracketed and flagged as "VERBATIM POINTS."

Begin Talking Points.
(BEGIN VERBATIM POINTS: 
-- We have information that Lanka Logistics and Technologies
Ltd has been negotiating the purchase of RPG-7 Rocket
Propelled Grenade Launchers (RPGs) and Multiple Rocket
Launchers (MRLs) from the Korea Mining Development Company
(KOMID), North Koreaīs primary weapons trading firm.
-- Our information indicates that this sale has not been
completed.
-- We also have information that Iranīs Ministry of Defense
Logistics Export Center (MODLEX), in December 2007, provided
the Sri Lankan Navy a quote of $11.4 million for rockets and
rocket launchers that could be installed on Sri Lankan naval
equipment. The offer did not include the cost of installation
and training, which could be provided at an additional cost.
-- We also understand that an Iranian Islamic Revolutionary
Guard Corps Qods Force element located in Sri Lanka, in
February 2008, provided details to an Iranian shipping company
for the procurement of weapons to the Sri Lanka Army. The
total cost of the weapons and defense equipment totaled
approximately $40 million. END VERBATIM POINTS.)
-- Lanka Logistics and Technologies Ltd., according to your
own press, handles the acquisition of equipment and services
for the Sri Lankan military.
-- Any arms purchase contracts with North Korea or Iran, if
implemented, could trigger sanctions against the entities
involved under the Iran, North Korea, and Syria
Nonproliferation Act (INKSNA).
-- Under INKSNA, the United States is required to report to
Congress persons and companies who have transferred to or
acquired from North Korea, Iran, or Syria goods, services or
technology controlled by multilateral nonproliferation export
control regimes, specifically the Missile Technology Control
Regime, the Australia Group, the Chemical Weapons Convention,
the Nuclear Suppliers Group, and the Wassenaar Arrangement.
-- MRLS, RPGs, and other weapons and munitions are controlled
under the Wassenaar Arrangement and are therefore reportable
under the INKSNA.
-- Given North Korea,s continued destabilizing activities, and
the international reaction to those activities, now is not the
time for business as usual with North Korea.
-- We ask that you halt the purchase of all military equipment
from Iran. Paragraph 5 of UNSCR 1747 provides that Iran "shall
not supply, sell or transfer...any arms or related materiel,
and that all States shall prohibit the procurement of such
items from Iran by their nationals..."
-- Moreover, DIO is an entity subject to the asset freeze
provisions in paragraph 12 of UNSCR 1737, so any goods
received from the DIO or any payments made to the DIO must be
frozen under the provisions of the resolution.
-- We urge you to investigate the above activities and share
with us at your earliest convenience the results of your
investigation.
-- Beyond these cases, we urge Sri Lanka to cease all
cooperation with North Korea, Iran, and Syria on goods and
technologies controlled under the nonproliferation export
control regimes and United Nations Security Council
Resolutions we have cited.
-- We look forward to our continued cooperation on this and
other related matters. (If Asked)
-- Sanctions that could be imposed under INKSNA include:
a. No department or agency of the United States Government or
U.S. company may procure, or enter into any contract for the
procurement of any goods, technology, or services from them;
b. No department or agency of the United States Government or
U.S. company may provide any assistance to them, and they
shall not be eligible to participate in any assistance program
of the United States Government;
c. No sales to them of any item on the United States Munitions
List are permitted and all sales to them of any defense
articles, defense services, or design and construction
services under the Arms Export Control Act are terminated;
and,
d. No new individual licenses shall be granted for the
transfer to them of items controlled under the Export
Administration Act of 1979 or the Export Administration
Regulations, and existing such licenses are suspended.
End Talking Points.

7. (U)
Washington appreciates Postīs assistance on this matter.
Department Point of Contact is xxxx. Please slug all replies
to ISN/CATR, EAP/K and SCA/INS.

CLINTON
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