From: Aftenposten
Date: 07.05.2009
Dette dokumentet er omtalt i følgende artikkel:
C O N F I D E N T I A L KABUL 001178 SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/07/2019 TAGS: PGOV, PINS, PREL, AF SUBJECT: SPANTA AND CHARGE DISCUSS ELECTION POLITICS AND UPCOMING TRILATERAL MEETINGS Classified By: Acting DCM Alan Yu for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d) 1. (C) Summary. During a 4/30 meeting with Foreign Minister Spanta, the Charge reiterated U.S. impartiality in the current election cycle. Spanta was not happy with Karzai,s choice of Marshall Mohammed Fahim but could not offer a better candidate of his own. The Charge expressed U.S. disappointment with the Fahim choice. Spanta had encouraged Karzai to look to a new generation and break from the past. The Charge and Spanta agreed the two Vice Presidents must be qualified individuals who had the trust and confidence of the President. End summary. 2. (C) Charge and FM Spanta discussed election politics at a meeting at the Foreign Ministry on April 30. After noting the importance of the personal relationship between the President and his running mates, Spanta questioned the tentative selection of Mohammed Fahim. Spanta asserted that Fahim, then Defense Minister under the interim government headed by Karzai, was corrupt and untrustworthy. Spanta did not support Fahim and had told Karzai so. Karzai,s response was that Fahim `is clean now.' Either way, Spanta said, `We cannot have a united country with Fahim as Vice President.' 3. (C) The Charge repeatedly assured Spanta the U.S. was not picking favorites or taking sides - the most important factor was finding the most qualified VP candidates who had earned Karzai,s trust. Karzai had asked for Spanta,s thoughts on former Foreign Minister Dr. Abdullah and current NDS Chief Amrullah Saleh, but Spanta simply told Karzai to choose someone in whom he had confidence. 4. (C) The Foreign Minister declared that once Karzai makes up his mind, he doesn,t change it. Discussions on potential VP candidates started within the Cabinet 5 to 6 months ago. Spanta encouraged Karzai to consult outside the Cabinet as well, while warning that certain constituencies such as civil society organizations and urban voters would be against the Fahim choice. Spanta pointed out that Abdullah has his downsides as well: Pashtuns think he is Tajik and Tajiks think he is Pashtun, in addition to the fact that he is ¬ clean.8 Other names that came up as potential VP candidates were former Finance Minister Ashraf Ghani and former Interior Minister Ali Ahmad Jalali. But Spanta said that Karzai needed to `break the circle of forces of the past,' calling it a `vicious circle.' Afghanistan continues to look to the past for its leaders of the future, and many of those individuals are corrupt and human rights violators. It,s time to look for the `young and dynamic.' The Charge heartily agreed, saying he had told Karzai exactly the same thing. Ultimately, though, Spanta said he could offer no solution to the VP problem. 5. (C) The Charge then passed on a message to the Foreign Minister from POTUS and the Secretary, noting that choosing Fahim would have a serious effect on and potential negative consequences for the bilateral relationship. He asked that Spanta pass that message to President Karzai. 6. (C) On the topic of other Presidential contenders, Spanta said he had received a call from Zalmay Khalilzad earlier in the day. Khalilzad not only told him he would not run against Karzai in the current election, he said he would never run against Karzai. Spanta noted that Karzai believed USG representatives who met with opposition leaders and other potential Presidential contenders were showing favoritism through a lack of support for his own reelection. The Charge stressed that the U.S. did not support any individual candidate, including Karzai. 7. (C) The last topic concerned protocol on proposed meetings at the White House between POTUS and Presidents Zardari and Karzai. Spanta made the point that if the two Presidents were to meet with POTUS individually, he argued Karzai not have to wait. Spanta suggested either a joint meeting or separate meetings at prearranged times. He was concerned about the perception that Karzai would wait outside while POTUS met with his Pakistani counterpart. RICCIARDONE