From: <a href="http://www.aftenposten.no/spesial/wikileaksdokumenter/article3958233.ece">Aftenposten</a><br>
Date: 26.10.2009

<pre>
S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 05 BEIJING 002964
SIPDIS
PACOM FOR FPA PICCUTA
E.O. 12958:
DECL: 09/29/2029 
TAGS: OVIP (STEINBERG, JAMES B.), PREL, MNUC, SN, CH, KN 
SUBJECT: DEPUTY SECRETARY STEINBERG´S SEPTEMBER 29, 2009 
MEETING WITH PRC VICE FOREIGN MINISTER WU DAWEI
Classified By: Political Minister Counselor Aubrey Carlson. Reasons 1.4 (b/d).

1. (SBU)
September 29, 2009; 11:40 a.m.; Ministry of Foreign Affairs; Beijing

2. (SBU)
Participants:

U.S. 
---- 
The Deputy Secretary Amb. Jon M. Huntsman, Jr., Embassy Beijing 
Joseph Donovan, EAP Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of State 
Rear Admiral Charles Leidig, Joint Chiefs of Staff 
Amb. Joseph DeTrani, Mission Manager for North Korea, DNI 
Amb. Sung Kim, Special Envoy for the Six-Party Talks 
Derek Mitchell, Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense 
RDML Bradley Gerhrke, U.S. Defense Attache in Beijing 
Pamela Park, Special Assistant to the Deputy Secretary 
Ryan Hass, Embassy Political Officer (notetaker)
James Brown, Interpreter

CHINA 
------ 
Vice Foreign Minister Wu Dawei 
Yang Houlan, Ambassador for Korean Peninsula Issues 
Cong Peiwu, Counselor, MFA Department of North American and Oceanian Affairs

3. (S)
SUMMARY: In a September 29 meeting with Vice Foreign Minister
Wu Dawei, Deputy Secretary Steinberg stressed that the U.S.
remains committed to the Six-Party process and to the
verifiable denuclearization of North Korea. The Deputy
Secretary emphasized the importance of continued, close
contact with the PRC on North Korea and stressed that the U.S.
would not compromise its relations with China or other
Six-Party Talks partners in pursuit of bilateral contact with
the DPRK. The Deputy Secretary noted that the U.S. was not
willing make concessions to entice North Korea to abide by its
previous commitments. Ambassador DeTrani assessed that the
DPRK was ready to return to multilateral talks on its nuclear
program, but that it had not made a strategic decision to
abandon nuclear weapons. VFM Wu encouraged the U.S. to engage
in direct contact with the DPRK, which he felt could spur the
DPRK to return to the Six-Party Talks. VFM Wu speculated that
DPRK leader Kim Jong-Il´s deteriorating health and his desire
to cement a legacy provided an opportunity for the resolution
of the nuclear issue. In order to protect the gains that had
been made and also to advance the Six-Party Talks, VFM Wu
asserted, all parties had to remain committed to the September
2005 joint statement on denuclearization. VFM Wu reiterated
China´s commitment to implementation of UNSC Resolution 1874
and offered a read-out following Premier Wen Jiabao´s October
4-6 visit to Pyongyang. End Summary.

Positive U.S.-China Relations 
-----------------------------

4. (S)
Deputy Secretary Steinberg met with Chinese Vice Foreign
Minister Wu Dawei in Beijing on September 29 for a
fifty-minute discussion on North Korea. VFM Wu noted that the
Deputy Secretary would have an opportunity to meet with a
number of Chinese leaders during his visit, which spoke of the
importance that China attached to its relationship with the
U.S., as well as the respect that Chinese leaders held for the
Deputy Secretary. VFM Wu commented that the Deputy Secretary´s
visit occurred on the heels of President Obama and President
Hu´s September 22 meeting in New York. The two Presidents had
reached consensus on key issues in the bilateral relationship,
and now it was each side´s responsibility to work together to
implement that consensus. VFM Wu described himself as an
outsider to U.S.-China relations, and even as an outsider he
had met the Deputy Secretary three times over the past year, a
fact that VFM Wu said spoke volumes about the positive
development of U.S.-China relations.

U.S. IS THE MISSING ELEMENT 
---------------------------

5. (S)
VFM Wu raised "The Red Cliff," a John Woo-directed

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movie about the Battle of Red Cliffs 1,801 years ago along the
banks of the Yangtze River, as a metaphor for the current
diplomatic situation with North Korea. At that time in China,
three states were in conflict. Two overmatched southern states
had joined forces to fight the numerically-superior northern
state. The two southern states planned to use fire as a weapon
to defeat the northern state, but in order to do so, the
southern states required an easterly wind. The battle ensued
in November, when the prevailing winds normally came from the
west. During the battle, an easterly wind arrived, which
enabled the southern forces to use fire as a weapon to defeat
the superior northern forces. This story was an aphorism, VFM
Wu suggested. In the story, the southern forces had all of the
elements in place except for the crucial one -- the east wind
("dong feng"). The same was true with the Six-Party Talks.
There have been positive interactions among the parties to the
Talks, and the U.S. and China saw eye-to-eye on issues. There
was only one missing element: only the U.S. could bring the
east wind, VFM Wu declared.

PRC RATIONALE BEHIND HIGH-LEVEL VISITS TO DPRK 
----------------------------------------------

6. (S)
VFM Wu explained that he had traveled to Pyongyang in July,
State Councilor Dai had visited in August as President Hu´s
Special Envoy, and Premier Wen Jiabao would pay a visit
October 4-6. The purpose of these visits was to persuade North
Korea to return to the Six-Party Talks. North Korea´s "supreme
leader" called all of the shots. China sometimes had sharp
debates with North Korea at the working-level, but when big
matters were raised to the "supreme leader" for a decision,
they were often easier to resolve. That was why China had sent
him and State Councilor Dai and would send Premier Wen to
Pyongyang in rapid succession, according to VFM Wu.

7. (S)
VFM Wu explained that his visits to Pyongyang had left him
with a clear impression that bilateral contact with the U.S.
was the issue most on the minds of North Korean leaders. It
was possible to revive the Six-Party Talks, but only if the
U.S. would engage North Korea. Wu observed that the U.S. was
at times capable of taking diplomatic initiative, and at other
times was cautious in its diplomatic approach. In this
instance, the U.S. had been overly cautious. China hoped the
U.S. would initiate contact with North Korea, which VFM Wu
stressed was crucial to re-convening the Six-Party Talks and
to the larger goal of denuclearization of the Korean
Peninsula.

CHINESE ASSESSMENT OF KIM JONG-IL 
---------------------------------
8. (S)
VFM Wu allowed that DPRK leader Kim Jong-Il might have some
realistic ideas, and stated that Kim Jong-Il wanted to engage
the U.S. soon. Kim had been impressed by President Clinton´s
visit, and had come away from his meeting with President
Clinton with an understanding that there were areas for
discussion with the United States. VFM Wu stressed his
personal feeling that if the U.S. made substantive contact
with North Korea, then positive progress on the nuclear issue
was within reach. The U.S. and China should not put off
resolution of North Korea´s nuclear issue indefinitely, VFM Wu
stressed.

9. (S)
VFM Wu stated that he had read a statement after President
Clinton´s visit that suggested that Kim Jong-Il was in good
health, and speculated that the medical experts that
accompanied President Clinton to Pyongyang might have arrived
at a different conclusion. VFM Wu suggested that Kim Jong-Il
would like to resolve outstanding issues in the near future
because his health might not permit him to put off decisions
for too long. This dynamic created a favorable moment for
resolving the nuclear issue; it was important for the U.S. and
China to seize this moment and bring North Korea back to the
path of consultations and negotiations, VFM Wu stressed.

U.S.-PRC SHARED ASSESSMENT ON NORTH KOREA 
-----------------------------------------

10. (S)
The Deputy Secretary expressed appreciation for VFM Wu´s
insights on North Korea and for China´s decision to send
senior representatives to North Korea to press for the early
resumption of the Six-Party Talks. The U.S. and China shared

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common goals and a common assessment of the path forward on
North Korea. Both countries had the confidence to send
parallel messages to North Korea, and when we were able to
engage North Korea at high levels, it reinforced shared
U.S.-Chinese objectives. Regarding U.S.-DPRK contacts, the
Deputy Secretary suggested, China already understood from
Ambassador Bosworth´s September 3 visit and our ongoing
bilateral contacts that the U.S. was prepared to have direct
contact with North Korea as a way to bring North Korea back to
the Six-Party Talks.

LEARNING THE RIGHT HISTORICAL LESSONS 
-------------------------------------

11. (S)
The Deputy Secretary noted that some people carried history
forward through their own experiences. It was important that
the U.S. and China drew from their shared history of dealing
with North Korea to determine the best way forward. The Deputy
Secretary noted that the chief obstacle to progress at the end
of the Bush Administration had not been a lack of U.S.-DPRK
contact. In fact, the frequency of direct contact became a
source of criticism, with some observers suggesting that the
U.S. had too much direct contact with North Korea and not
enough coordination with Six-Party partners.

12. (S)
The Deputy Secretary observed that North Korea had established
a pattern of provocation followed by conciliation to
ameliorate pressure from the international community resulting
from its actions. It was imperative to break this pattern,
which was counter-productive to shared U.S.-Chinese goals on
North Korea.

KEY ELEMENTS TO CURRENT APPROACH 
--------------------------------

13. (S)
The Deputy Secretary asked VFM Wu what missing element, or
"easterly wind," would lead to a change in North Korea´s
behavior and produce a different outcome than during the 1980s
and 1990s. The Deputy Secretary offered three elements that
could affect North Korea´s decision-making.

14. (S)
The first element was the unified position on North Korea
among the Six-Party Talks partners. The U.S. wanted to ensure
that if it proceeded to bilateral contact with North Korea,
such contact would not undermine in any way the strong unity
of approach among Six-Party Talks partners.

15. (S)
The second key element was the strong unity of action among
Six-Party Talks partners, particularly in implementation of UN
Security Council Resolution 1874. It would be important for
Six-Party Talks participants to continue full implementation
of this resolution, the Deputy Secretary stressed.

16. (S)
The third key element would be to articulate clearly to North
Korea precisely what steps the Six-Party Talks partners
expected the DPRK to take to irreversibly denuclearize, while
also making clear exactly what benefits the DPRK would derive
from such actions. The Deputy Secretary acknowledged that
significant work had already been undertaken in this regard,
but much more work was needed to establish a specific, common
understanding among Six-Party Talks participants.

17. (S)
The Deputy Secretary acknowledged that although he was not
certain whether these three elements would be enough to
convince North Korea at a strategic level to decide it was
better off without nuclear weapons, the U.S. was willing to
test the proposition. The U.S. was prepared to have bilateral
contact with North Korea to determine whether a different
outcome was possible now that the Six-Party Talks participants
held a clear, unified position.

U.S. CAUTION ON BILATERAL U.S.-DPRK CONTACTS 
--------------------------------------------

18. (S)
The U.S. "caution" in re-engaging with North Korea stemmed
from its interest in ensuring that any contact would be done
on the clear basis that bilateral contact was not about
managing North Korea´s nuclear program, but rather about
taking concrete measures to dismantle it, the Deputy Secretary
stated. North Korea had recently sent several positive
signals, including through VFM Wu and State

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Councilor Dai´s meetings, North Korean public comments that
walked back its previous rejection of the Six-Party Talks,
hints that there could be a new formation for international
talks on denuclearization, and statements that North Korea
understood the goal was denuclearization. Premier Wen Jiabao´s
October visit would present another opportunity to convey to
North Korea that the Six-Party Talks partners shared a common
position.

19. (S)
On the current status of U.S.-DPRK bilateral talks, the Deputy
Secretary explained that there had been exchanges in recent
days through the New York channel on modalities for bilateral
contacts. The U.S. wanted to ensure that if direct engagement
occurred, the DPRK would participate at a high level. This
would be the only way to determine whether North Korea was
serious about engagement. While the U.S. was prepared to have
bilateral contact with North Korea, it was not willing to
engage in extended bilateral negotiations in which an
agreement would be reached outside of the Six-Party Talks
framework. The only way to ensure an effective solution was to
guarantee that all of the Six-Party Talks partners´ interests
were brought into play, the Deputy Secretary said, while also
noting that Six-Party Talks partners´ interests were similar,
but not identical.

KEY QUESTION: KIM JONG-IL´S CALCULUS 
------------------------------------

20. (S)
The Deputy Secretary suggested that the key questions
concerned Kim Jong-Il´s motivations, specifically how he
viewed his interests, and how much emphasis he placed on
reaching a solution to the nuclear issue and normalization of
relations with the U.S. as part of his legacy. The Deputy
Secretary emphasized the need for continued, close dialogue
with China.

DPRK NOT CLEARLY COMMITTED TO DENUCLEARIZATION 
--------------------------------------

21. (S)
Ambassador DeTrani said that the U.S. assessed, largely as a
result of VFM Wu and State Councilor Dai´s seemingly
successful efforts, that the DPRK was ready to return to
multilateral talks on its nuclear program. The U.S. further
assessed that North Korea at a strategic level had not
committed to the goal of complete, verifiable, irreversible
denuclearization. North Korea wanted to be accepted as a
nuclear state with ICBM capabilities. The DPRK´s September 3
letter to the UN was indicative of this point. In the letter,
the DPRK acknowledged that it had reprocessed spent fuel rods
and extracted plutonium that was being weaponized, and after
six years of denial, admitted to possessing a uranium
enrichment program. A key question would be whether North
Korea would negotiate while UNSC Resolution 1874 sanctions
were still in place, Ambassador DeTrani noted.

22. (S)
Ambassador DeTrani observed that North Korea had established a
pattern of walking away from negotiations as a sign of
displeasure, such as its 13-month hiatus from the Six-Party
Talks after the U.S. had suggested it possessed an HEU program
and its similarly long absence in protest of reports of money
laundering through a Macau bank (BDA). In both of these
instances, the Six-Party Talks partners had conceded
something, after which the DPRK returned to the Talks. The
U.S. intelligence community assessed that if the Six-Party
Talks partners did not concede something, the DPRK would be
reluctant to move the Six-Party process forward. Ambassador
DeTrani emphasized the shared U.S.-China objective in
achieving progress in the Six-Party Talks building upon the
September 2005 joint statement that VFM Wu was so instrumental
in crafting.

CHINA COMMITTED TO 6-PARTY TALKS, DENUCLEARIZATION 
--------------------------------------------------

23. (S)
The Six-Party Talks, on the whole, "have been positive," VFM
Wu declared. VFM Wu recounted that he had told North Korean
counterparts on numerous occasions that the Six-Party Talks
enabled the U.S. and North Korea to feel comfortable with
bilateral engagement. China supported U.S.-DPRK bilateral
engagement, and such contact would not affect U.S.-China
relations, VFM assured, allowing that other Six-Party Talks
partners might not share the same view.

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24. (S)
VFM Wu affirmed that China was committed to getting North
Korea back to the negotiating table. In order to protect the
gains that had been made and to advance the Six-Party Talks,
all parties had to remain committed to the September 2005
joint statement on North Korea´s denuclearization. VFM Wu
allowed that in light of the current situation, it might be
necessary to refine the statement, but nonetheless, the
September 2005 statement had to serve as the starting point.

25. (S)
On North Korean denuclearization, VFM Wu agreed with the U.S.
assessment that it would be difficult to obtain North Korea´s
commitment. The U.S. should inform North Korea that improved
U.S.-DPRK relations depended upon verifiable steps toward
denuclearization. VFM Wu agreed with the U.S. assessment that
North Korea had not made a strategic decision to forego its
nuclear weapons program. North Korea was looking in particular
at its relations with the U.S. and was not moved by Chinese
representations of what steps the U.S. would be willing to
take. North Korea often insisted that it was an independent
country and did not like having China as a go-between with the
U.S., according to VFM Wu.

CHINA URGES BILATERAL, MULTILATERAL COMBINATION 
------------------------------------------------

26. (S)
VFM Wu proposed that Six-Party Talks partners consider using
bilateral mechanisms within the Six-Party Talks framework to
improve relations with North Korea. Through a combination of
bilateral and multilateral channels, it might be possible to
persuade North Korea to abandon its nuclear program. Because
the opportunity to persuade North Korea still existed, China
would continue making vigorous efforts in this pursuit. VFM Wu
stressed that the Chinese government was serious about UNSC
Resolution 1874 implementation, adding that there had not been
any change in China´s policy.

27. (S)
The Deputy Secretary agreed with VFM Wu´s basic conclusions,
expressed appreciation for VFM Wu´s leadership on the North
Korea issue, and reiterated the U.S. interest in continued
close contact with China. VFM Wu offered to provide a briefing
for the U.S. immediately following Premier Wen Jiabao´s
October 4-6 visit to Pyongyang.

28. (U)
The Deputy Secretary cleared this message.

HUNTSMAN 
HUNTSMAN 
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