From: <a href="http://www.aftenposten.no/spesial/wikileaksdokumenter/article3988311.ece">Aftenposten</a><br>
Date: 31.12.2009
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S E C R E T ASTANA 002273 
SIPDIS 
STATE FOR ISN, SCA/CEN 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/31/2029
TAGS: PGOV, PREL, PARM, MNUC, KNNP, IR, JA, KZ
SUBJECT: KAZAKHSTAN STRONGLY DENIES REPORT OF POTENTIAL
URANIUM TRANSER TO IRAN 
REF: A. ASTANA 2257 B. SECSTATE 131723 C. ASTANA 2158 
Classified By: Ambassador Richard E. Hoagland: 1.4 (B), (D) 

1. (S) SUMMARY: The government of Kazakhstan publicly and
privately denied allegations of negotiations between Iran and
KazAtomProm for the purchase of yellowcake uranium (refs A-B).
During a December 31 meeting, Deputy Foreign Minister of
Kazakhstan Kairat Umarov told the Ambassador that an extensive
interagency investigation found no evidence of discussions
with, or even a proposal from, Iran. He stressed Kazakhstans
strong commitment to non-proliferation and stringent
export-control regime. Umarov requested further details to
assist the investigation and a public statement of support
from the United States (see suggestion in para 13). Umarov
passed the Ambassador the Foreign Ministrys December 30 press
release and a non-paper (see paragraphs 11-12). END SUMMARY.

"NO STONE UNTURNED" 

2. (S) In response to the Ambassadors December 30 demarche
regarding possible negotiations between a Kazakhstani
subsidiary of KazAtomProm (KAP) and Iran for the sale of a
large quantity of yellowcake uranium, the Deputy Foreign
Minister of Kazakhstan Kairat Umarov requested an urgent
December 31 meeting with the Ambassador. Umarov first
emphasized the Kazakhstani governments serious and immediate
response to the allegations, stating, "All agencies have
worked together to leave no stone unturned." He then passed
the Ambassador the Foreign Ministrys December 30 press release
and a non-paper on the governments investigation (see
paragraphs 11-12). Summarizing the non-paper, he thanked the
U.S. government for providing information about the
allegations and underlined the Kazakhstani governments strong
commitment to non-proliferation. Umarov further reaffirmed
support for the prevention of uranium exports to Iran, in
accordance with UNSCR 1737. Highlighting U.S. assistance, he
stressed Kazakhstans strong export-control regime, which
precludes the possibility of a uranium shipment to Iran.
Umarov asserted, "There are no negotiations on an uranium
shipment. We have quickly checked all questions and are taking
additional measures, but there are no leads to confirm the
intention to transfer uranium." Umarov concluded by requesting
"documents and materials, with names and data, on those
conducting the negotiations."

NO CONTRACTS, NO CONTACT, AND NO NEGOTIATIONS 

3. (S) Umarov then turned to his private report on the
interagency investigation, which concluded that KAP has
neither contracts nor contact with Iran on any possible
uranium shipment. Furthermore, he asserted, "No one has
received a proposal from Iran, and a check of all potential
mediators has not shown any evidence of a request from Iran."
Turning to Baiken-U, owned jointly by KAP and Energy Asia
Limited, a consortium of Japanese power companies, Umarov
underlined its 95% Japanese ownership. "Even with that,
KazAtomProm has no information that negotiations are in
process," he stated.

ONE-THIRD OF KAZAKHSTANS URANIUM PRODUCTION 

4. (S) To emphasize the improbability of the sale, Umarov then
recited detailed information on Baiken-Us limited mining
operations and small stock of unprocessed uranium ore -- 70
tons. The volume of yellowcake under alleged negotiations, he
continued, equals one-third of all Kazakhstans production. "To
ship that amount unaccounted is crazy," he argued.
Highlighting the regular inventory of stockpiles by the
competent Kazakhstani agencies, he revealed, "They have
checked half, nothing is missing, and no documents have been
distorted."

MANDATORY END-USE CERTIFICATES 

5. (S) About transportation, Umarov told the Ambassador that
all uranium exports occur exclusively by railway, and that no
shipments have ever passed through Kazakhstani sea ports [on
the Caspian Sea]. Kazakhstans multi-layered, strict export
controls would ensure immediate identification of any shipment
of any amount of uranium, he argued. Furthermore, he said, "No
Kazakhstani company has requested a license to export uranium
to Iran, and we never ship uranium to a non-nuclear power
without an end-use certificate."

REPUTATION AT STAKE 

6. (S) "This investigation led to our statement, and now we
have big questions for you and Washington. Information is very
important because Kazakhstans reputation has been put at
stake," he asserted. "If you consider us a strategic partner,
as you say, you must share information. We are working for one
and the same goals, and we have always been helpful on Iran.
The appearance of this article and the mention of intelligence
leads to questions about trust." Umarov then underlined the
governments "disappointment" that the State Departments
statement (drawn from press guidance) did not more firmly
support Kazakhstan and underline Kazakhstans staunch support
for non-proliferation. "Now, we are in a damage-control
situation," he concluded with real chagrin.

INCIDENT ORCHESTRATED? 

7. (S) Umarov relayed the Kazakhstani governments request to
the IAEA for the report. "The IAEA says that they do not have
the report, which leads us to the conclusion that it was
orchestrated." He then repeated his request for additional
information in order to continue the investigation in greater
detail. "As partners, we must work together constructively to
stop activity confidentially. Our previous experiences have
shown the effectiveness of this approach. You trusted us
before with such sensitive projects as Operation Sapphire."

STRONGER, BROADER INTELLIGENCE COOPERATION WELCOMED 

8. (S) After thanking the Ministry and government for its
serious, speedy response, the Ambassador emphasized that the
U.S. government is not accusing the Kazakhstani government of
involvement in the alleged negotiations. He asserted that he
met with the Foreign Minister in advance of the article,
because the U.S. government sees Kazakhstan as a strong
partner. The Ambassador mentioned the U.S. governments
recognition and praise for Kazakhstans long history of
positive cooperation, especially on non-proliferation.
Recalling his meeting with the new head of the National
Security Committee (KNB) (ref C), the Ambassador welcomed
stronger, broader intelligence cooperation.

PUBLIC STATEMENT OF SUPPORT? 

9. (S) Looking for a way to restore Kazakhstans image, Umarov
concluded with a request that the U.S. government make a
public statement of support, "We have strenuously worked on
our non-proliferation reputation, and now it is being
questioned, now the word has gone out. We would appreciate
strong support from our partners." The Ambassador agreed to
relay the request.

10. (S) In a private pull-aside, Umarov told the Ambassador
that Kazakhstan has some degree of suspicion that a third
nation (unnamed) might have fabricated the initial report and,
for its own purposes, leaked it to the Associated Press.

11. (U) BEGIN DECEMBER 30 PRESS STATEMENT: 
STATEMENT OF THE MINISTRY OF INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS 
The Ministry of Foreign Affairs categorically repudiates
certain news media reports alleging Kazakhstans connection to
a possible deal to supply uranium to Iran and considers them
groundless insinuations damaging the reputation of our
country.
As is known, Kazakhstan has voluntarily renounced the worlds
fourth largest nuclear and missile arsenal, shut down the
worlds second largest Semipalatinsk nuclear test site, and is
one of the recognized leaders of the global process of
disarmament and nonproliferation.
Kazakhstan is firmly committed to the principles of
nonproliferation of weapons of mass destruction and tough
control over the turnover of dual use materials. As a
non-nuclear weapon state, Kazakhstan has been unwaveringly
committed and remains committed to the principles of the
Treaty on non-proliferation of nuclear weapons, relevant
resolutions of the United Nations Security Council, the UN
Convention on physical protection of nuclear materials, as
well as the principles and rules of the Nuclear Suppliers
Group.
All the operations with nuclear materials in Kazakhstan,
including our cooperation regarding peaceful use of atomic
energy with foreign countries, are subject to IAEA
comprehensive safeguards.
In this connection, Kazakhstan expects the IAEA to give an
appropriate assessment of the information being disseminated
by the news media.
END STATEMENT. 

12. (S) BEGIN INFORMAL EMBASSY TRANSLATION
OF MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS NON-PAPER: 
Thank you for providing the information on the attempts of
Iranian company Nur Afzar Gostar (NAG) to purchase uranium ore
from Kazakhstan. Kazakhstan unwaveringly fulfills its tight
export-control obligations with respect to nuclear materials
and is committed to strengthen the international nuclear
non-proliferation regime. We fully support your efforts to
prevent the export of nuclear materials to the Islamic
Republic of Iran, in accordance with UN Security Council
resolution 1737. Kazakhstans export-control system excludes
any possibility of illegal deliveries of uranium products to
that country. Kazakhstans government agencies and private
companies are not conducting, nor have they ever conducted,
official negotiations for the delivery of uranium ore to the
Islamic Republic of Iran. Based on your inquiry, the
government conducted a thorough investigation of the companies
you identified and took additional steps to prevent the
illegal transfer of purified uranium ore, including
yellowcake. To date, no evidence of an illegal export of
significant amounts of uranium ore have been found. From our
side, we request that you provide copies of materials
containing further information on the companies and
individuals engaged in the negotiations to transfer uranium
ore from Kazakhstan.
END NON-PAPER. 

13. (S) COMMENT: We know from other sources that Kazakhstans
initial investigation was indeed swift and relatively
thorough. Nonproliferation is one area where the United States
and Kazakhstan have consistently and successfully cooperated
for nearly two decades, and sensitive nonproliferation
programs still continue. Given the very strong disappointment,
almost chagrin, that Umarov expressed, we suggest it would not
be remiss for the Department to issue a press statement (or
for Embassy Astana to be authorized to issue one) that notes
the government of Kazakhstans full cooperation in the
investigation of this current allegation, as well as our long
and successful partnership to prevent the proliferation of
weapons of mass destruction. Please advise. END COMM
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