From: <a href="http://www.aftenposten.no/spesial/wikileaksdokumenter/article3971894.ece">Aftenposten</a><br>
Date: 6.1.2008

<pre>
S E C R E T STATE 001264 
SIPDIS
SIPDIS 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/07/2018
TAGS: PREL, PARM, MNUC, MARR, CH
SUBJECT: SECOND DEMARCHE FOR CHINA REGARDING CHINAS 
JANUARY 2007 ANTI-SATELLITE TEST 
REF: (A)07 STATE 4837 (NOTAL), (B)07 BEIJING 331, (C)07 STATE 6192,
(D)07 BEIJING 473, (E)07 BEIJING 2106, (F)07 BEIJING 3462,
(G)07 TOKYO 2282, (H)SECDEFWASH 091500Z NOV 07,
(I)SECDEFWASH 091518Z NOV 07, (J)SECDEFWASH 061700Z DEC 07 
CLASSIFIED BY ACTING U/S FOR ARMS CONTROL AND INTERNATIONAL SECURITY (T)
JOHN C. ROOD, REASONS, 1.4 (B) AND (D).

1. (SBU)
THIS IS AN ACTION REQUEST. Ambassador or other senior Embassy
official is instructed to seek a high-level meeting with the
Ministry of Foreign Affairs to deliver a demarche drawing upon
the talking points in paragraph 3, which should be left as a
non-paper as Embassy determines appropriate. Embassy is
requested to deliver the demarche on Monday, January 7, and
provide confirmation of delivery and any reactions provided at
the time of delivery. Embassy may also draw upon the "if
raised" talking points in paragraph 4, as necessary, and may
volunteer this information as seems appropriate.

2. (S)
BACKGROUND: On January 11, 2007 (UTC), China conducted an
anti-satellite (ASAT) test by launching a ground-based weapon
against one of its own satellites. On January 15, 2007,
Ambassador Randt delivered a demarche to Chinese Assistant
Foreign Minister He Yefei. (REFTELs A and B) Then-Under
Secretary of State for Arms Control and International Security
Robert Joseph also demarched the Chinese Ambassador in
Washington, D.C. (REFTEL C) On January 21, 2007, AFM He
delivered the Chinese Governments formal response, telling
Assistant Secretary Hill that the test posed no threat to any
other nation, targeted no third country, and that "for the
time being, China has no plans for further tests." (REFTEL D)
In reply, A/S Hill emphasized that the explanation did not
square with Chinas stated position of not wishing to embark on
any kind of arms race in outer space. A/S Hill cautioned AFM
He that the U.S. remained concerned that China had not
explained adequately the purpose of the test. In nearly 12
months since the Chinese test, Beijing has provided no further
explanation in diplomatic channels regarding many of the
questions first raised on January 15, 2007. During
military-to-military exchanges with senior Peoples Liberation
Army officials last spring, China was only slightly more
forthcoming. (REFTELs E and F) In these military-to-military
exchanges, Chinese military officials termed the event a
"scientific experiment" and dismissed as overblown concerns
about the leftover debris field. (REFTEL G) During a May 11,
2007, meeting with Central Military Commission Vice Chairman
General Guo Boxiong, Commander of the United States Pacific
Command (PACOM) Admiral Timothy Keating strongly challenged
this explanation. Admiral Keating pointed out that the test
had raised concern in many countries and was a "confusing"
signal, inconsistent with Chinas stated interest in the
peaceful use of outer space. Senior Chinese officials have
continued to decline to provide any meaningful response to
expressed U.S. concerns about the ASAT during recent security
dialogues with Secretary of Defense Gates and other senior DoD
officials.

SIPDIS

(REFTELs H, I and J) Chinese officials have also dropped the
earlier talking point they were using regarding the position
that China has "no plans for further tests."

3. (S//REL CH)
BEGIN TALKING POINTS (SHOULD BE LEFT AS A NON-PAPER): 
-- As Ambassador Randt explained in a demarche to Assistant
Foreign Minister He on January 15, 2007, and in follow-up
discussions throughout 2007 between senior U.S. and Chinese
political and military officials in diplomatic and
military-to-military channels, the United States remains
concerned about the possibility of increased risk to human
spaceflight, including the International Space Station and the
U.S. Space Shuttle, resulting from Chinas flight-test of a
direct-ascent anti-satellite (ASAT) weapon.
-- Debris from Chinas ASAT test has increased hazards to other
peaceful uses of space in low earth orbit by the United States
and other space-faring nations.
-- This is a very serious matter for the entire international
community.
-- Unfettered access to space and the capabilities provided by
satellites in orbit are vital to United States national and
economic security. -- The United States considers space
systems to have the rights of unhindered passage through, and
operations in, space without interference.
-- Any purposeful interference with U.S. space systems will be
interpreted by the United States as an infringement of its
rights and considered an escalation in a crisis or conflict.
-- The United States reserves the right, consistent with the
UN Charter and international law, to defend and protect its
space systems with a wide range of options, from diplomatic to
military.
-- Purposeful interference with the space systems of other
nations which are used by the United States for peaceful
purposes in pursuit of U.S. national interests also will be
considered as contrary to the interest of maintaining
international peace and security.
-- It has been nearly a year since China intentionally
destroyed a satellite using a ground-based direct-ascent ASAT
weapon.
-- Since this flight-test occurred on January 11, 2007, the
United States has detected and tracked over 2,500 pieces of
orbital debris directly attributable to this ground-based
direct-ascent ASAT flight-test.
-- Our experts estimate that many of these pieces, and as many
as 100,000 smaller debris objects, some of which will remain
in orbit for the next 100 years.
-- Currently, of all identified satellite (spacecraft and
rocket bodies) breakup debris now in low Earth orbit, 45
percent has been generated by China.
-- China is now responsible for more breakup debris in low
earth orbit than any other state.
-- We have already been compelled to take precautionary
measures to maneuver U.S. satellites to reduce the probability
of collision with the debris. Our experts predict that to
avoid collisions with the debris from Chinas test, the
International Space Station may need to make maneuvers that
otherwise would not have been required.
-- Chinas intentional destruction of a satellite, and the
resultant creation of long-lived debris, is contrary to
international Space Debris Mitigation Guidelines. These
guidelines were endorsed over four years before the ASAT test
by Chinese government scientists.
-- Under the Convention on International Liability for Damage
Caused by Space Objects, China may be liable for damage caused
by debris from Chinas January 11, 2007, ASAT flight-test.
-- The contradiction between Chinas statements and actions in
this area raise questions about the credibility of Chinas
declaratory policies and commitments in other areas of
national security affairs.
-- The United States believes Chinas development and testing
of such capabilities is inconsistent with the constructive
relationship that our Presidents have outlined, including in
the area of civil space cooperation.
-- The inadequate nature of Chinas response to our January 15,
2007, demarche and your governments continued unwillingness to
provide a full explanation for its actions call into question
Chinas intentions in space and undermines trust.
-- As Secretary of Defense Gates noted in his meeting with
President Hu on November 6, 2007, the United States remains
interested in talking to China about Chinas anti- satellite
weapons development.
-- Such a dialogue could help reduce the risk of
misunderstanding or miscalculation.
-- As we look to the future, we expect China to bear in mind
the requirement under Article IX of the Outer Space Treaty, to
which China is party, for a State Party to "undertake
appropriate international consultations" before proceeding
with any activity that it "has reason to believe would cause
potentially harmful interference with activities of other
States Parties in the peaceful exploration and use of outer
space."
-- The U.S. is refraining from any expansion of space- related
cooperation with China. One of the primary reasons for this
position is the continued lack of transparency from China
regarding the full range of Chinas space activities. One sign
of increased transparency would be forthright responses to the
following questions:
-- What analysis did China perform to estimate the debris that
would be caused by the intentional destruction of your
satellite in the January 11, 2007, test?
-- What steps did China take to mitigate damage to the
satellites of other countries?
-- What are Chinas future intentions for its direct- ascent
ASAT development and testing program?
-- Will there be further tests of a direct-ascent anti-
satellite weapon or other anti-satellite weapons,
capabilities, or technologies? If so:
-- How will your government ensure that further testing does
not create new hazards for human spaceflight and other space
activities?
-- What notification will China provide for any future ASAT
tests?
-- Are you planning to deploy your ground-based direct- ascent
ASAT, or other, similar weapons, capabilities, or
technologies?
END TALKING POINTS AND NON-PAPER. 

4. (S//REL CH)
BEGIN "IF RAISED" TALKING POINTS: 
a. If the Chinese counter with a statement such as: "The
United States conducted an ASAT test in 1985 and also is
responsible for most of the debris now in orbit," the U.S.
response should be:
-- Currently, of all identified satellite (spacecraft and
rocket bodies) breakup debris now in low Earth orbit, 45
percent was generated by China, 25 percent by the United
States, and 24 percent by Russia. -- Hence, China is now
responsible for more breakup debris in low earth orbit than
anyone else.
-- All breakup debris attributed to the U.S. that is now in
low earth orbit was caused by accidents (e.g., fuel tank
explosions) and other unintentional events.
-- The vast majority of breakup debris created by China is the
result of an intentional act.
-- The United States has not conducted an anti-satellite test
since 1985. The Cold War is over and the world economy is now
significantly more dependent on Low Earth Orbit satellites
than it was in 1985. That is why so many countries have
expressed concern about the Chinese test.
-- The majority of the debris created by the 1985 U.S. test
reentered the atmosphere within less than three years, and
none remains in orbit today.
-- The majority of trackable debris objects (e.g., those with
areas larger than 10 square centimeters) created by Chinas
ASAT test will remain in orbit until the late 2030s.
-- Less than three years after conducting this test, the
United States adopted the first of a series of national
policies directing all U.S. space activities to minimize the
creation of debris.
-- In fact, the longevity of the debris resulting from the
1985 ASAT test led directly to U.S. Department of Defense and
then national-level policies to minimize debris from space
tests.
-- The U.S. has actively worked with other nations to protect
the space environment for future generations. -- These efforts
include development of voluntary guidelines in the
Inter-Agency Debris Coordination (IADC) committee and the UN
Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space (COPUOS).
-- The U.S. also supports consideration at COPUOS of new
voluntary "Best Practice Guidelines" to ensure safe space
operations by all spacefaring nations.
-- Chinas civil national space agency participated in
developing the IADC and COPUOS debris mitigation guidelines,
which specifically call for nations to refrain from any
intentional destruction of satellites that might create
long-lived debris.

b. If the Chinese counter with an assertion such as: "We
believe the United States is pursuing space weapons," the U.S.
response should be:
-- The United States does not have any "weapons" in space, nor
do we have any plans to field such weapons.

c. If the Chinese counter with arguments related to U.S.
missile defense, the U.S. response should be:
-- The U.S. missile defense system is strictly a defensive
system. Missile defense protects people from attack. A Chinese
attack on a satellite using a weapon launched by a ballistic
missile threatens to destroy space systems that the United
States and other nations use for commerce and national
security. Destroying satellites endangers people.

d. If China raises questions relating to cooperation on future
Shenzhou or other crewed space missions, the U.S. response
should be:
-- The United States will continue to offer basic warning
advisories which China might find helpful in protecting
Chinese spacecraft carrying astronauts from collision with
other space objects.
-- These advisories are offered in the spirit of cooperation
and mutual assistance to minimize dangers to Chinese
astronauts in their role as envoys of humanity in outer space.
END "IF RAISED" TALKING POINTS.

RICE 
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