183213
12/16/2008 13:24
08OSLO670
Embassy Oslo
CONFIDENTIAL
08OSLO522|08OSLO585|08OSLO629
VZCZCXYZ0000RR RUEHWEBDE RUEHNY #0670/01 3511324ZNY CCCCC ZZHR
161324Z DEC 08FM AMEMBASSY OSLOTO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC
7219INFO RUEHAK/AMEMBASSY ANKARA 0226RUEHBY/AMEMBASSY
CANBERRA 1073RUEHCP/AMEMBASSY COPENHAGEN
2490RUEHLO/AMEMBASSY LONDON 1523RUEHOT/AMEMBASSY OTTAWA
3070RUEHRO/AMEMBASSY ROME 0548RUEHSM/AMEMBASSY STOCKHOLM
3351RUEHTC/AMEMBASSY THE HAGUE 4407RHMFISS/JOINT STAFF
WASHINGTON DCRUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHINGTON DCRUEHLO/USDAO
LONDON UKRHMFISS/CDR USEUCOM VAIHINGEN GERUEHTC/USDAO THE
HAGUE NLRHEFDIA/DIA WASHINGTON DCRUEHNO/USMISSION USNATO
1537RUEHNY/ODC OSLO NO

C O N F I D E N T I A L OSLO 000670 SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/13/2018
TAGS: MARR, MASS, MCAP, PREL, PGOV, NO
SUBJECT: LESSON LEARNED FROM NORWEGIAN DECISION TO BUY JSF
REF: A. A: OSLO 629 B. B: OSLO 585 C. C: OSLO 522
Classified By: Deputy Chief of Mission Kevin M. Johnson
for reasons 1.4 b and d 1.

(C) Summary. After an extensive, coordinated USG effort, the
Norwegian Government decided to buy F-35s in the Joint Strike
Fighter (JSF) program, instead of the Saab Gripen. This first
foreign JSF sale is an important step for the program as it
will likely have a domino effect on other potential
purchasers. The sale was not an easy one, however, and we
outline a number of lessons learned that may prove helpful as
other countries make their choice. End Summary.

The Tale
--------

2. (C)
The country team has been living and breathing JSF for
over a year, following a road to success that was full of
heart-stopping ups and downs. A quick recap of key events
includes:
--In 2007, the GON announced criteria for Future Combat
Aircraft competition to include aircraft capability, life
cycle costs and industrial participation.
--In April 2008, the two remaining competitors (US F-35 Joint
Strike Fighter and Swedish Saab JAS-39NG Gripen) delivered
responses to MOD,s Request for Binding Information (RBI). Saab
immediately claimed that the Gripen would be half the price of
the JSF.
--Over the spring and summer, Saab,s promotion of its
industrial package was intensive and covered every province of
Norway. Norwegian Labor Party leaders admitted to Embassy that
they received frequent calls from local mayors in favor of the
Gripen.
--A sudden onslaught of negative press during this same time
prompted us to meet with Lockheed Martin to better understand
their media strategy and to discuss the best way to counter
myths and disinformation about the JSF.
-- Embassy and Lockheed Martin efforts to counter
disinformation reaped some apparent success (ref B).
--In the fall of 08, we invited a number of USG officials to
visit Oslo to make the public case on why the F-35 is an
excellent choice, and the private case on why the choice of
aircraft will have an impact on the bilateral relationship
(see refs A,B).
-- The delivery of Norway,s first C-130J transport aircraft in
November 2008, which followed intense USAF efforts to rush
this vital capability to Norway (and came directly from the
USAF production line), allowed us to make the (unstated) point
that we are good allies and reliable partners.
--On November 20, the GON announced the decision to buy the
F-35s, using unusually strong language (for domestic political
reasons) to say the Gripen was uncompetitive.

3. (C)
Following the announcement, the Ambassador met with
Deputy Defense Minister Espen Barth-Eide. In a very relaxed
meeting, Barth-Eide thanked us for sticking to defending our
plane, rather than attacking the Gripen. He praised the GON,s
bottom-up process that focused on the criteria. Noting that
while some politicians would have like to have chosen the
Gripen, the overwhelming technical success of the F-35 in the
ministry,s four scenarios made such a choice impossible. He
complained about Saab,s, but not the GOS, reaction to the
decision. For example, the GON had never promised them 24
hours notice of the decision (which would have been illegal
under Norwegian insider trading laws). Commenting on the press
coverage of the JSF, Barth-Eide said that Aftenposten (the
paper of record) had `gone off the deep end' with its open
anti-JSF campaign of disinformation.

4. (C)
Looking ahead, Barth-Eide said we were now on the same
side and it would be very helpful if the USG were to:
--publicly stress the strength of the F-35 and the viability
of the JSF program.
--confirm there was no USG political pressure to buy the plane.
--note the low price of the F-35 is due to the scale of the
JSF program (more than 3200 aircraft) and the timing of the
Norwegian buy in 2016, when full-scale production of the
aircraft will be in full swing.
--arrange visits by U.S. officials to emphasize the above.
--encourage US companies to enhance the Industrial
Participation package (the one area that Gripen clearly
dominated).

5. (C)
Barth-Eide stressed that Norway,s role as the second to
buy into the program (following the US) was an important
bellwether and would have a positive impact on other
governments, decisions. He noted that having a socialist
government like Norway,s chose the JSF is an even more
powerful symbol than if a right-wing government of another
country had gone first. While the GON will not actively lobby
on behalf of JSF with other governments, it is in the GON
interest that other partners buy into the program. He expects
the Danes will ask for the GON data analysis and the GON will
try to accommodate that within the limits of confidentiality.

The Lessons Learned
-------------------

6. (C)
While many of the issues in this effort were unique to Norway, some
lessons learned may be applicable elsewhere. The main ones include:
--Get the whole country team involved. The active involvement
of the Ambassador and DCM, ODC, DAO, Pol/Econ, FCS, and Public
Affairs offices ensured that the fighter plane decision was an
Embassy priority. This was necessary to convince Lockheed
Martin and Washington officials that it was important to
devote time and resources on Norway,s decision.
--Working with Lockheed Martinto determine which aspects of
the purchase to highlight. In Norway the capabilities of the
JSF vs. the Gripen were the strongest suit, and Embassy and
Lockheed Martin efforts focused on discussions of why the
JSF,s capabilities were the best match for Norway,s needs,
especially in the High North. This focus played to the JSF,s
strengths and eventually proved to be the decisive factor,
despite perceived weaknesses in other areas such as the
industrial package.
--Jointly develop a press strategy with Lockheed Martin and
collectively determine the role the Embassy will play in this
strategy.
--Use the Ambassador to give numerous on-the-record interviews
but also to have off- the-record in-depth discussions with
editorial boards on the purchase.
--Be constantly available to the media to discuss the
technical merits of the aircraft, and be assertive in refuting
disinformation. In Norway, there were many self-proclaimed
experts talking about the F-35 and making wildly inaccurate
statements on everything from its lack of ability to its
exorbitant price. It was important to counter these assertions
and our ODC chief gave more than 20 separate interviews.
--Create opportunities to talk about the aircraft. The
Ambassador hosted a luncheon for retired senior military and
think-tankers during which an extensive presentation on the
capability of the F-35 was given. This enabled our host nation
advocates to actively contribute to the public dialogue from
their respective positions of authority. Embassy also
coordinated with Lockheed Martin for attendance at all
relevant airshows and roundtable discussions. The fighter
competition was consistently a part of our informal
discussions with MFA, MOD and influential think tanks.
--Talk about the impact on the relationship carefully.
Deciding our line on this was critical, given Norwegian
sensitivities. We needed to avoid any appearance of undue
pressuring (which was construed as `threatening' Norway in its
sovereign decision-making process), but we couldn,t let stand
the view that the choice didn,t matter for the relationship.
We opted for `choosing the JSF will maximize the relationship'
as our main public line. In private, we were much more
forceful.
--Reach out to other USG agencies and experts to encourage
their participation in the process and leverage their tools to
support the effort. In this process also ensure the same
messages are delivered in DC to the partner Embassy as are
delivered overseas to the Host Nation government.
WHITNEY