From: Aftenposten
Date: 2.12.2008
Embassy Bern CONFIDENTIAL
R 021439Z DEC 08
FM AMEMBASSY BERN
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 5485
INFO EUROPEAN POLITICAL COLLECTIVE
C O N F I D E N T I A L BERN 000612
EUR/FO FOR A/S FRIED, DAS GARBER, EUR/CE, CA FO, EUR/PPD,
EUR/EX
E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/05/2028
TAGS: PREL, ECON, ETRD, PHUM, EFIN, SZ
SUBJECT: BILATERAL RELATIONSHIPS WITH SWITZERLAND AND THE
PRINCIPALITY OF LIECHTENSTEIN
Classified By: AMB. P. CONEWAY FOR REASON 1.4 (b) and (d)
(U) As I approach the end of my two and one-half year tenure
in Bern, I would like to share a few thoughts regarding our
relationship with Switzerland and Liechtenstein. I hope that
these observations will be helpful to my successor and others
concerned to better understand the opportunities and
challenges we face in dealing with these very successful, but
frequently frustrating alpine democracies.
(U) Special thanks to our dedicated staff of career
professionals at Embassy Bern and at the EUR/CE Switzerland
desk in Washington for their contributions to this document
and their important role in the bilateral relationship.
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Historical Context
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(U) The quintessential element of Switzerlands foreign
policy is its centuries-old tradition of neutrality. In
Liechtensteins case, neutrality was adopted after World War
I. This, alongside the countrys unique system of direct
democracy, is considered by the Swiss to be one of the two
main factors in the countrys remarkable historical success.
During the last century, when the rest of Europe suffered
horrific human and material losses in wars and revolutions,
Switzerland remained an island of democratic stability. In a
turbulent Europe, the Swiss were at peace. No Swiss
factories were bombed, the infrastructure was slowly
perfected, and the countrys banks (and even its real estate
agents) thrived on its proven track record as a safe haven.
Gradually over decades, such circumstances and traditional
Swiss industriousness transformed a resource-poor alpine
republic into one of the most prosperous societies on earth.
(U) Even now, in the 21st century, with its growing global
political, economic, and environmental challenges, neutrality
remains the cornerstone of Swiss foreign policy, a view
supported by all major Swiss political parties. Switzerland
is neither a member of NATO nor the European Union, and the
Swiss public does not aspire to join either, according to
public opinion polls. In a 2001 referendum, the Swiss voted
to reject full EU membership. Instead, the Swiss opted for a
series of so-called bilateral treaties with Brussels to
increase Switzerlands economic integration with the EU (by
liberalizing movements of capital, goods, and labor), but
preserve the countrys ultimate sovereignty.
(C) In a 2002 referendum, 55% of the Swiss voted to join the
United Nations. Proponents argued that UN membership would
allow Switzerland to make its discrete views better heard on
global issues. The decision was heavily opposed by the
conservative nationalist Swiss Peoples Party (SVP) run by
Christoph Blocher, which argued it would weaken the country.
UN membership has forced Switzerland to take positions on a
range of issues on which it could have previously remained
silent. However, when faced with a particularly
controversial issue, the Swiss often abstain, such as in the
recent vote on whether to refer the question of Kosovos
independence to the ICJ.
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U.S.- Swiss Relations
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(C) U.S.-Swiss relations are correct and cordial, but they
lack the natural intimacy and trust that stems from a shared
struggle against Fascism or Communism, a common language, or
linked history. U.S. and Swiss soldiers never fought
side-by-side in a war, no Swiss town felt an emotional bond
to the U.S. for a past liberation or economic assistance
program, and no flood of Swiss political dissidents or
economic migrants had to seek shelter on U.S. shores.
(C) Despite paying lip service to the useful democratizing
and stabilizing role the U.S. has played in modern Europes
history, the Swiss foreign policy establishment is at heart
convinced that Switzerlands well-being and success is of its
own making, and the country owes a debt to no one. As a
result, the fabric of emotional and historical ties between
Switzerland and the United States is thinner than with many
other countries, and there is no store of historical goodwill
or accumulated political capital upon which to draw.
(C) This does not mean that the U.S. and Switzerland cannot
cooperate effectively in many areas. However, the ways in
which the Swiss choose to work with us (such as on global
economic, environmental or humanitarian issues) are those
where they believe our rational self-interest coincides and
which do not require Switzerland to abandon its strict
neutrality on international armed conflicts.
(C) Internal debates over Swiss foreign policy tend to focus
more on the style and body language of its neutrality
rather than its substance. Swiss Federal Councilor for
Foreign Affairs Micheline Calmy-Rey is resented in some Swiss
circles for her high-profile attempts to offer Switzerland as
an intermediary in various disputes, which runs counter to
Switzerland,s tradition of discrete, low-profile diplomacy.
Thus, for example, Switzerlands recent offer to represent
Russias interests in Tbilisi came almost as soon as the hot
phase of the conflict ended. However, the Swiss Department
of Foreign Affairs (EDA) strategists believe the move was an
effective way to underline Switzerlands status as neutral
and pose a counterpoint to its representation of U.S.
interests in Tehran and Havana. (It also represents Irans
interests in Washington).
(C) One of the most recent points of tension between the
United States and Switzerland was the decision of the Swiss
gas company EGL to enter into a long-term contract to buy
natural gas from Tehran. Swiss Foreign Affairs Councilor
Calmy-Rey has cited it as one of the achievements of her
activist style of diplomacy, which has allowed Switzerland to
win Irans trust. While Switzerland has supported UN
sanctions against states of proliferation, including Iran, in
Irans case, the Foreign Ministry has pursued its own "Swiss
Plan," which has on several occasions sent the wrong message
to Iran given the Swiss protecting power mandate for the U.S.
(see Political Issues for important expanded history on the
Iran Dossier).
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Liechtenstein
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(U) The United States enjoys excellent relations with the
Principality of Liechtenstein and its hereditary ruling royal
family. Despite having only 33,000 inhabitants, the
Principality is an important banking center, providing
offshore financial services to thousands of foreign
clients. The numerous banks and holding companies located in
the Principality manage more than $150 billion of client
assets and generate roughly 30% of the countrys GDP. Like
Switzerland, Liechtenstein has adopted neutrality as its
foreign policy strategy and often follows Berns lead on
international issues. In many countries, Liechtenstein
relies on the Swiss Embassy to represent its interests. For
these reasons, the U.S. Embassy in Bern devotes only a
fraction of its time to managing bilateral relations with
Liechtenstein. Our most substantive interactions have
involved seeking ways to improve our cooperation in the fight
against money laundering and terrorist financing and on how
to prevent Liechtensteins bank secrecy laws from being used
by U.S. taxpayers to evade taxes.
Terrorist Financing
(U) Liechtenstein and the United States signed a mutual legal
assistance treaty in 2002 focused on jointly combating money
laundering and other illegal banking activities. Close
relations with our Liechtenstein counterparts, such as
Liechtensteins Financial Intelligence Unit (FIU), have
helped the embassy resolve issues before they become
problematic. For example, in April 2007, Liechtenstein
halted the transfer of Boeing MD-80 aircraft from Germany to
Iran via Liechtenstein. Since September 11, Liechtenstein
has also frozen approximately $150,000 in terrorist assets.
Liechtenstein is a party to the UN Convention on Terrorist
Financing and in March 2008, Liechtenstein hosted the working
meeting of the Egmont Group ) the worldwide association of
national Financial Intelligence Units.
Tax Evasion
(C) Like Switzerland, Liechtenstein draws a fine line between
banking privacy and secrecy and exempts individuals for tax
evasion, but not tax fraud, from criminal prosecution. These
technical differences have hindered efforts to obtain banking
information on U.S. citizens suspected of tax evasion.
Liechtensteins largest bank, LGT, which is operated by the
royal family, is under scrutiny (and pressure from the U.S.
Senate) for allegedly encouraging U.S. citizens to commit tax
evasion and tax fraud. As a result, the U.S. and
Liechtenstein are currently negotiating a Tax Information
Exchange Agreement, which should provide more open access to
information and additional avenues for legal cooperation
where tax fraud is concerned.
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Private Sector
--------------
(U) Leaders in the private sector (CEOs, CFOs, public affairs
officers, etc.) and NGO arenas can wield considerable
influence in political matters when they choose to get
engaged.
(U) Typically, they are less involved in Switzerland than our
experience in the U.S., but it is a good investment for the
COM, DCM, Pol/Econ, Public Affairs, and Commercial officers
to develop relationships in these sectors. From programs and
panels at the WEF, Swiss-American Chamber events, programs,
and issues, and underwriting of exchange programs like the
U.S.Fulbright-Swiss Scholarship Program, to general support
of our Embassy and mission, the private sector and NGOs can
positively influence our success.
(U) The private sector can also enhance the publics positive
perception of the U.S. and our policies.
----------------
Political Issues
----------------
(C) The decentralized nature of political power in
Switzerland is unique in Europe. Far from having a unitary
Executive, the Swiss government is led by a seven-member
cabinet -- the Federal Council. The Swiss presidency is
largely ceremonial and rotates annually between different
members of the Federal Council. Even for those accustomed to
dealing with the complex political geometries of European
coalition governments, the Swiss form of decision making can
be disorienting. With the exception of the rightist Swiss
Peoples Party that opted for an opposition role last year,
all the major political parties are represented on the
Federal Council, spanning a broad spectrum from left to
right. Each Federal Councilor (Minister) serves at his or
her own pleasure and enjoys an ill-defined but generally high
degree of autonomy. While key policy decisions are taken by
the entire Council -- sometimes via vote -) its
deliberations are strictly secret, and the Swiss have a
long-standing tradition whereby Federal Councilors avoid
publicly criticizing each other. The end result is a
seemingly amorphous policy-making process in which decisions
are implemented with considerable freedom of interpretation
by senior representatives of political parties having often
diverging interests.
(C) An additional "x factor" in Swiss decision making is the
ability of the Swiss people to initiate or to strike down
legislation via an expansive and oft-used referendum
mechanism. It only takes 50,000 certified Swiss signatures
to force a public vote. The threat of a referendum is a fact
of Swiss political life that no politician here can ignore,
and something that Swiss officials frequently flag for us )
particularly when we ask them to do something difficult.
(C) Dealing with these unique elements of the Swiss
political system demands patience and flexibility but can pay
important dividends. Given its international reputation for
mediation and diplomatic competence, Switzerland,s influence
on the international stage is significantly greater than one
would otherwise assume for a country of its size. Standing
outside of the EU and NATO, Switzerland sees its comparative
advantage as working the seams via diverse and variable
coalitions of convenience. With enough effort and
coordination, the Swiss advantage in this respect can
sometimes become our own, as was the case with the strong
supportive roles the Swiss have played on Kosovar
independence, on obtaining the release of American citizens
wrongfully detained in Iran, on addressing interoperability
concerns with the Oslo Accord on cluster-munitions, on the
establishment of the Forum for the Future, and with the
resolution of the Magen David Adom dispute. But getting
successful outcomes requires strategic patience on our part
and a willingness to take the time to cultivate relationships
with each of the Federal Councilors, as well as with industry
leaders. In doing so, I have come to appreciate that the
extensive horse-trading endemic to the Swiss tradition of
political compromise sometimes gives unlikely actors
influence on issues of interest to us.
(C) As noted above, the Swiss penchant for equidistance
sometimes works to our advantage. However, on one key issue
of the past two years ) the Iran nuclear problem )
Switzerland,s instinct "not to take sides" has harmed
international efforts. While many Swiss clearly understand
and take seriously the threat that Irans dangerous nuclear
program represents to our mutual interests, FM Calmy-Rey has
apparently seen in this dispute an opportunity to raise her
own profile. While we and the members of the P5 1 group, the
EU, and other like-minded states have made considerable
progress in increasing the pressure on Iran, Calmy-Reys
ministry has undercut these efforts at several turns by
offering an alternative "Swiss Plan" for resolving the
dispute. The Swiss Plan and Calmy-Reys infamous trip to
Tehran in March to secure a major new gas deal with Iran for
Swiss firm EGL, have surely given Iran some reason to believe
that it can continue to resist pressure to meet its
international obligations.
(C) Swiss behavior regarding Iran is of particular concern
because Switzerland has been our Protecting Power in Iran
since 1980, and since Switzerland was re-elected to the IAEA
Board of Governors last fall. It has required much effort on
our part to contain Swiss activism on Iran, culminating with
a public endorsement in July of the P5 1 proposal by
President Couchepin, along with assurances that Switzerland
would no longer promote its own initiatives for resolving the
Iran nuclear dispute. At the same time, the Swiss have taken
increasingly firm and constructive stances regarding Iran at
the IAEA, thanks in no small part, I believe, to our lobbying.
(C) However, President Couchepins recent declaration, which
received broad press coverage (see July NZZ Sonntag article),
"For several weeks the Swiss position in the Iran-Nuclear
dispute is completely clear. There is no special initiative
any more. We do not look for a special mediation/way.
Instead we support the position of the P5 plus 1 countries,
and we hope that Iran will give in," has effectively muzzled
the Foreign Ministrys determination to pursue its own "Swiss
Plan."
(C) If and when this or the new administration wishes to
explore a diplomatic dialogue on the Iranian nuclear
proliferation issue, perhaps we could engage the Swiss at the
outset to truly represent us, with the understanding at that
point, that they would only deliver our message, and not
something diluted by independent Swiss thinking. If and when
such a dialogue is in our best interests, I believe the Swiss
and their Foreign Ministry would jump at the chance to truly
represent us without prejudice and with strict guidelines.
This idea is worth exploring if an appropriate opportunity
presents itself.
(SBU) To reinforce our ability to identify and pursue goals
of mutual interest, in 2006 we signed a MoU with the EDA
initiating a so-called "Political Framework for Intensified
Cooperation." Though such instruments are always at risk of
becoming merely talk-shops, the EDA places high importance on
the Framework, making it a potentially useful tool for us to
define and achieve USG goals, including in such areas as
promoting civil society in the Broader Middle East and North
Africa, human rights, peace support operations in the Balkans
and Africa, and counterterrorism.
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Economic Issues
---------------
(U) Switzerlands highly advanced and diversified economy
has so far proven comparatively resilient in the global
financial crisis. The Swiss government estimates that GDP
growth will fall from roughly 1.9% in 2008 to a maximum 1.0%
in 2009. Switzerland,s GDP in 2007 totaled 512 billion CHF
($450 billion), resulting in a per capita GDP of about
$60,000, according to the IMF. Only three percent of Swiss
wage-earners take home less that 3,000 CHF per month, and one
out of five Swiss pensioners has a net worth of more than
1,000,000 CHF. Unemployment is 2.3%. Switzerland is home to
a disproportionate number of large European multinationals,
and global companies such as Nestl, Novartis, Roche, Credit
Suisse and UBS gave the Swiss Stock Exchange a market
capitalization equal to roughly 2/3 that of Germanys.
(U) U.S.-Swiss economic ties are robust and long-standing,
and they contribute most positively to our political
relationship with Switzerland. The economic sphere is an
area where both sides perceive a clear win/win situation.
Swiss firms have collectively invested over $140 billion in
the United States and employ nearly 500,000 U.S. workers,
ranking Switzerland seventh among all foreign investors in
the U.S. On the other side, more than 600 U.S. enterprises
have together invested more than $90 billion in Switzerland,
providing jobs for 70,000 people (or about 2% of the nations
entire labor force.) Switzerland is a preferred location for
the European headquarters of a number of top U.S.
multinationals (Caterpillar, GM, Dow Chemical, DuPont,
Colgate-Palmolive, etc.), while U.S. citizens head up some of
Switzerland,s bluest of blue chip companies. These include
Brady Dougan at Credit Suisse, Michael Mack at Syngenta, and
James Schiro at Zurich Financial Services. The Swiss bank
UBS actually has more employees in the United States (32,000)
than it does in Switzerland (27,000).
(U) Despite the lack of a free trade agreement, U.S. trade
with Switzerland is largely free outside of agriculture, and
Switzerland is a strong supporter of global services and
manufacturing trade liberalization. In 2007, U.S.
merchandise exports to Switzerland rose 18.5 percent to $17.0
billion (making the alpine country our 17th largest export
market). At the same time, merchandise imports from
Switzerland rose 3.7 percent to $14.8 billion. Key U.S.
exports to Switzerland included precious stones and metals,
pharmaceutical products, art and antiques, optical and
medical instruments, and aircraft, while top U.S. imports
from Switzerland included pharmaceutical products, clocks and
watches, machinery, optical and medical instruments, and
chemicals. Although most trade and business activity takes
place entirely in the private sector, the Mission must still
occasionally intervene with Swiss authorities to defend U.S.
commercial interests.
(U) In 2005, Switzerlands Federal Council decided to
propose exploration of a free trade agreement with the United
States. The attempt foundered on opposition from
Switzerland,s highly-protected farm sector. Instead, the
U.S. and Swiss governments agreed to establish a bilateral
Trade and Investment Cooperation Forum to address small yet
sensitive trade issues. Under its auspices, in October 2008
the two governments signed an E-Commerce Declaration, which
provides a framework for cooperation to improve trade
conditions for these services. In addition, a Safe Harbor
Agreement to allow free flow and effective protection of
personal data is in the final states of negotiations and is
likely to be concluded before the end of 2008.
(U) Also this year, the U.S. and Switzerland concluded an
expanded Open Skies Agreement, and are exchanging
discussion drafts on a Multilateral Convention on
International Investment in Airlines. The U.S.,
Switzerland, and several other countries are also engaged in
negotiating the Anti-Counterfeiting Trade Agreement,
(ACTA), which held its last negotiating round in Tokyo in
October 2008 and is intended to increase international
cooperation and strengthen the framework of practices that
contribute to effective IPR protection.
(U) Another tool utilized by the Mission to promote trade is
the U.S.-Swiss Joint Economic Commission (JEC). The JEC meets
once a year to discuss and resolve bilateral
misunderstandings. The JEC also holds a panel at the World
Economic Forum at Davos, the premier international event of
its kind, as documented in the World Economic Forum section
below.
(U) The JEC panel, which is organized by the Mission in
cooperation with the Swiss Department of Foreign Affairs, the
Swiss-American Chamber of Commerce, and EconomieSuisse,
allows the mission to publicize USG messages to an
influential global audience, such as supporting the Doha
Round at the 2008 panel and addressing the impact on trade of
the global financial crisis, the topic of the upcoming 2009
panel.
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World Economic Forum
--------------------
(U) The World Economic Forum (WEF) annual meeting in Davos,
Switzerland, is unlike any other event of its kind. Over a
five-day span at the end of January each year, 2,000 world
leaders, Fortune 500 chief executive officers, international
media moguls and nongovernmental organization (NGO) leaders
gather in the small alpine village of Davos to participate on
panels, in industry meetings and in "off the record"
sessions. The WEF meetings in Davos have been a ripe target
for public diplomacy efforts over the past 38 years, and the
WEFs founder, Dr. Klaus Schwab, has preserved the original
intent of the forum in maintaining its focus as a place for
informal dialogue and debate on major social and economic
problems.
(U) Davos 2008 was an important milestone for the United
States. During the final year of the Bush presidency, the
administration dispatched five cabinet secretaries, three
deputy secretaries, and numerous undersecretaries to Davos.
Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice, Secretary of Homeland
Security Michael Chertoff, Secretary of Energy Samuel Bodman,
Secretary of Education Margaret Spellings, U.S. Trade
Representative Susan Schwab, and Deputy Secretary of the
Treasury Robert Kimmitt, participated in five days of panels
and discussions that covered topics ranging from Middle East
peace, climate change, and educational reform to immigration,
financial market stability, and trade liberalization.
(U) Embassy Bern has worked closely with Klaus Schwab and his
WEF team to include U.S. delegations that not only speak with
strength and conviction on the global issues of our time, but
are also internationally recognized experts on the pressing
issues of the day.
During the last three years, our Mission has helped shape six
panels for Klaus and his team. The environment, challenges in
the global financial arenas, energy security, global
prosperity, and Muslim outreach are among the topics on which
we have collaborated with Dr. Schwab. No other nation works
so closely with the WEF on topics and participants, and no
other nation has our record of success in organizing panels
for key officials.
(U) Engaging a skeptical world is not an easy task. Public
diplomacy is vital if the United States is to correct skewed
impressions. Communication and public diplomacy are major
reasons for the success of the World Economic Forums annual
meeting in Davos. Klaus Schwab has made Davos media-friendly.
One of his primary goals each year is to expand the medias
reach. As a result, world leaders travel to the Swiss Alps to
deliver addresses aimed at their constituents around the
world. It has been an effective platform for the United
States Government and private sector leaders to support and
advance Americas missions and values.
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Foreign Commercial Service
--------------------------
(U) The U.S. Foreign Commercial Service (FCS) has the lead on
providing promotional support and advocacy for U.S. exporters
and on attracting Swiss business investment to the United
States. Thus, it intervened with Swiss authorities in the
telecom sector to obtain regulatory approvals and in the
pharmaceutical sector to expand insurance reimbursements. In
aerospace, FCS and Mission management facilitated export
licenses leading to millions of dollars in U.S. exports. Over
the past year, FCS developed programs with multiple U.S.
universities to attract Swiss students to the U.S.A. In
October 2008, it mounted a USDOC-certified U.S.A. Pavilion at
WorldDidac (an educational fair in Basel). These activities
took place at the same time as we were consolidating the
operations of our FCS Zurich office into the new Embassy in
Bern.
(U) Our strong relationship with the Swiss-American Chamber
of Commerce is a vital asset in our efforts to promote U.S.
business. The 41-person board of directors of the Chamber is
a Who,s Who of the Swiss business community led by Executive
Director Martin Naville who is one of our biggest friends and
assets in-country. Virtually every board member is a CEO or
senior officer of a major corporation in his/her own right.
There is probably no better high-level, pro-U.S. audience in
Switzerland with which to promote investment in the U.S. In
June 2008, I rolled out the Commerce Departments Invest in
America Initiative in a speech to nearly 400 Swiss AmCham
members and guests. In November 2008, the Chamber and FCS
will co-host an Invest in U.S.A. Seminar with speakers from
Commerce, Treasury, State, and Homeland Security. Finally, in
June 2008 FCS consummated its "Transformational Commercial
Diplomacy" initiative for Switzerland by integrating its
Zurich office with the Embassy in Bern.
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Management
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(U) In June 2008, the Mission completed the sale of the
government-owned chancery complex and moved to a
newly-renovated, short-term lease property. It represents a
substantial upgrade in embassy habitability, and the new
building occupies a geographically central location in Bern
that minimizes transportation movements in our daily
business. The USG-owned Chief of Mission Residence (CMR) is
located next to the new chancery.
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Post Security
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(C) The Missions overall security posture significantly
improved with the relocation of the Embassy. The physical
security of the building is excellent; it is outfitted with
modern hardline doors, windows and barriers, and we achieved
significantly more "setback" from the street. Moreover, we
now control all vehicles entering and exiting the compound,
which was not the case in the previous location. Technical
security also improved with better-constructed and
well-defined CAAs.
(C) The Regional Security Officer (RSO) faces a challenging
audience when dealing with Swiss authorities on Post
security. Many Swiss authorities do not consider the United
States Embassy in Bern as a high-value target for terrorists;
this fallacy and its resulting challenges require frequent
intervention and lobbying by the RSO. Recurring conversations
and education resulted in positive instances of excellent
security support. We succeeded in persuading Swiss
authorities not to cut the number of posts currently manned
by either Swiss law enforcement or military. In addition, we
have requested and received security support for dozens of
high-level U.S. officials either visiting or transiting
Switzerland. The response of Swiss authorities to security
incidents has been commendable. They sent a well-trained
professional team to the Embassy to deal with a "white
powder" incident, and on several occasions have controlled
and mitigated suspicious individuals or vehicles in the area
of the Embassy. They sent appropriate support for
demonstrations directed at the Embassy and for special events
such as the July 4th celebration. On occasion, the RSO has
requested and received close protection for me at large
public events.
(C) The most disappointing security issue was the rejection
by the Swiss government of our request to deploy a
surveillance detection team. The decision was made at the
highest levels (the Federal Council) and was conveyed to us
by the Foreign Ministry. The chances of reversing that
decision are poor considering the high level of political
attention it received. The RSO will continue to work with his
resources and coordinate with Swiss authorities to provide
appropriate levels of security support.
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Defense Attach Office
----------------------
State of the Partnerships
(U) Switzerlands continued presence in the Balkans, level
of engagement in NATOs Partnership for Peace, and its recent
decision to withdraw the two military officers assigned to
ISAF reflect a military willing and at least superficially
able to contribute to regional security but severely
constrained politically. As Switzerland tries to find its
niche on the geo-strategic security stage, it has begun to
focus limited efforts towards Africa. Given the current
turmoil within the Defense Ministry and the recent abrupt
resignation of the current Defense Minister Samuel Schmid,
Swiss engagement abroad will increasingly be under the
auspices of the Foreign Ministry.
Greatest Challenges
(U) The Swiss military is limited by law to participating
only in peace support operations (PSOs) -- as opposed to
peacekeeping or peace enforcement -- and only under the
auspices of either a UN or an OSCE mandate. Furthermore, the
standing posture of the militarys involvement in PSOs and
other military engagements is participation under a
multilateral umbrella, equally avoiding bilateral
involvements with either NATO or the EU.
Contribution to Regional Stability, Democracy, and Foreign
Assistance
(U) On September 20, 2007, the Swiss parliament voted to
double the number of peace support operations troops from 250
to 500. While the actual realization of this effort will
most likely occur beyond the 2010 timeline originally
attached to the bill, it nevertheless provides insight into
the Swiss desire to be seen as contributing to regional
security and stability. Currently, Switzerland is
coordinating though DAO Bern to donate medical equipment to
the Afghan National Army. And, as mentioned previously,
Switzerland is increasingly focused on disarmament,
democratization, and reintegration efforts on the African
continent.
(U) Our engagement initiatives with the Swiss military will
continue to emphasize U.S. desires for them to maintain their
250-strong peacekeeping contingents deployed in Kosovo and
Bosnia and broaden their NATO-partnership activities beyond
Europe, and we will continue to explore cooperative ventures
for improved regional security and stability in Africa.
Towards that end, we will work in concert with both U.S.
European Command (USEUCOM) and African Command (USAFRICOM).
We will continue to maintain a robust defense procurement
relationship with the Swiss military, even as Swiss budgetary
constraints manifest themselves in less outlay for
acquisition. We will also continue to encourage the Swiss
military to further utilize military assets -- particularly
excess defense articles -- in humanitarian relief/aid efforts.
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Law Enforcement
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Counterterrorism and Law Enforcement Efforts
(U) The Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), Department of
Homeland Security (DHS), and Drug Enforcement Administration
(DEA) are the law enforcement entities represented at post.
Other law enforcement offices are represented through
regional offices. Ongoing efforts continue with the
government of Switzerland to grant the Regional Security
Office (RSO) law enforcement status.
(U) Switzerland strictly forbids investigative activity
within its territory by U.S. law enforcement. Thus, a high
reliance exists on the Swiss authorities to conduct
investigations on behalf of the U.S. in Switzerland.
Obstacles that have continued to hinder full cooperative
efforts and the free exchange of information in this regard
include an unfavorable Mutual Legal Assistance Treaty (MLAT)
that requires Swiss notification to the subject and
disclosure, and Switzerland,s strict personal privacy
statutes.
(U) This has reinforced the importance of the development of
liaison and rapport with Swiss law enforcement authorities by
U.S. law enforcement agencies at a working level, as well as
efforts at the ministerial level to invigorate information
sharing, particularly as it relates to counterterrorism and
money laundering.
(U) As a result of these efforts, we have seen a measured
improvement in overall Swiss cooperation with U.S. law
enforcement authorities at the federal, cantonal, and local
level. In addition, we remain optimistic concerning a new
version of the Operative Working Arrangement (OWA) recently
ratified by the Swiss parliament, which allows the formation
of joint U.S.-Swiss investigative teams to address criminal
and counterterrorism investigations with a U.S.-Swiss nexus.
(U) Our current challenge exists in continuing to enhance law
enforcement cooperation, intelligence sharing, and efforts to
apply the OWA in joint cases.
(U) Liechtenstein continues to be a model of cooperation for
U.S. law enforcement, having offered legal assistance on
important money laundering investigations and the arrest of
significant U.S. fugitives. The principality continues to be
in full compliance with the Financial Action Task Force
requirements.
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Public Diplomacy
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(U) The Public Affairs Section (PAS) is lean, with one
officer and three staff members. The budget supports limited
programming, two IVLPs, and one to one-and-one-half I-Bucks
speakers. Public Diplomacy outreach focuses on enhancing
public support for the United States and its goals and on
improving counterterrorism cooperation. Mutual understanding
is advanced through intensive use of the Fulbright and IV
Programs and alumni; actively engaging media in
Switzerland,s three major languages; increasing educational
advising and university relationships; presenting
multi-culturalism in the United States through Iftar, Black-
and Womens History Month speakers; and programming American
terrorism experts in all language regions.
(U) The last published media survey addressing Swiss
anti-Americanism was Q1 2007. It ranked Switzerland as
having the most anti-American levels in Western Europe.
Moreover, a September 2008 interview with Swiss Ambassador to
the United States Urs Ziswiler said he was concerned by the
anti-American attitude of the Swiss. PAS believes
anti-Americanism remains high: Inaccurate and/or negative
stories about the United States or the Embassy continue in
tabloids, free commuter papers and in the Geneva dailies.
However, the investment in ramped-up outreach has yielded
results, including dramatic increases in the number and
diversity of Fulbright applicants; the number of universities
hosting Embassy programming; the number of media inquiries
and accurate stories; and alumni group participation and
activity.
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Consular
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(U) In 2008, the Consular Section led an interagency effort
to convince the Swiss government to begin negotiations on the
Terrorist and Criminal Information-Sharing Agreement. To
date, the Swiss have shown little interest in this proposal,
arguing that such an agreement would be incompatible with
Swiss privacy laws. The Consular Section is now attempting
to get Swiss authorities to suggest their own version of such
an agreement that would be consistent with Swiss privacy laws
and still fulfill the intent of the U.S. proposal. We hope
to lay the groundwork for a Swiss negotiating team to visit
Washington in early 2009.
(U) The January 12, 2009, deadline for mandatory use of the
Electronic System for Travel Authorization (ESTA, a DHS
program for advance registration of travel to the U.S. so far
aimed at Visa Waiver Program (VWP) travelers) is fast
approaching. The Bern Consular Section has been active in
getting the word out to airlines, tourist agencies, leading
business groups, and the Swiss traveling public at large that
ESTA is out there and that its use will be required for all
Visa Waiver travel as of January 12. These outreach efforts
have been assisted by FCS and PAS.
(U) The early arrival (August 2008) of the new Consular
Section chief, permitting a 3-month overlap with the
departing Section Chief, temporarily brought the Sections
officer complement to the full staffing of four officers.
This enabled Post to greatly reduce its large backlog of NIV
appointments, which had occurred due to staffing gaps.
Currently, the waiting period for an appointment is one week.
As of early November, the Consular Section has found itself
again short one officer, and only the seasonal drop in NIV
applications has prevented the backlog from again approaching
high levels. The next entry level officer is due to arrive
in March 2009. Post is seeking TDY/WAE support in the
meantime to keep the situation from assuming the unacceptable
Spring-Summer 2008 proportions.
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Conclusion
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I would like to thank the following dedicated and talented
career officers at Embassy Bern who have worked with me in
advancing our mission in Switzerland and Liechtenstein. They
contributed significantly to this memorandum and remain
committed to working under the leadership of Deputy Chief of
Mission and Charg, Leigh Carter, until the next ambassador
arrives.
XXXXX
Thank you for this opportunity to serve my country.
Ambassador Peter R. Coneway
CONEWAY