From: Aftenposten
Date: 14.11.2007
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 05 BEIJING 007107
SIPDIS
E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/14/2032
TAGS: PGOV, CH
SUBJECT: CONTACTS ON NEW POLITBURO STANDING COMMITTEE
MEMBER XI JINPING'S RISE, NEW LEADERSHIP LINEUP
REF: A. BEIJING 7004
B. BEIJING 6940 (NOTAL)
C. BEIJING 6777 AND PREVIOUS
Classified By: Political Minister Counselor Aubrey Carlson. Reasons 1.4
(b) and (d).
Summary
-------
1. (C) Many Embassy contacts have told Poloffs that
the elevation of "fifth generation" leaders Xi Jinping
and Li Keqiang to the Politburo Standing Committee
(PBSC) at the recently completed 17th Communist Party
Congress (Ref A) may be the Congress's most
significant outcome. Anointing Xi and Li as China's
next leaders largely determines the outlines of
Chinese elite politics for the next fifteen years. In
the end, Xi Jinping was reportedly ranked ahead of Hu
Jintao protege Li Keqiang because of Xi's broad
acceptability within the Party. The support Xi
garnered from Party elders and "princelings" as the
son of well-respected early revolutionary Xi Zhongxun
and a desire to check the influence of Hu Jintao and
the Communist Youth League (CYL) were also important
factors in his rise. One source claimed that Hu
Jintao himself put forward Xi Jinping's name as the
leading fifth generation PBSC member after his first
choice Li Keqiang ran into opposition from Party
elders. Contacts also speculated about impending
government personnel changes at the March 2008
National People's Congress (NPC) and offered personal
insights on new PBSC member He Guoqiang and new
Politburo member Li Yuanchao. End Summary.
China's New Leadership: Eyes on 2012, Party Stability
-----------------------------------------------------
2. (C) In the wake of China's 17th Communist Party
Congress and the unveiling of the Party's new
leadership lineup on October 22 (Ref C), a range of
contacts have told us that China's new leaders were
chosen primarily to maintain a balance within the
Party among various interests, thereby ensuring a
stable leadership succession in 2012, when current
General Secretary Hu Jintao is expected to step down.
Although Beijing observers have commented extensively
about what the Congress meant in terms of Hu Jintao's
power (Ref A), many have also said that the Congress'
most significant outcome may in fact have been the
elevation of Xi Jinping and Li Keqiang to the PBSC,
thereby anointing those two as China's next generation
of leaders and largely setting the general outlines of
Party leadership politics for the next fifteen years.
3. (C) Immediately following the unveiling of the new
leaders on October 22, XXXXX, an official
in XXXXX with close ties to Central Party School
officials, told Poloff that the overriding message of
the lineup was that it is "super stable" and
represents a "highly appropriate balance" of competing
Party interests. XXXXX separately agreed,
commenting on November 1 that the new lineup,
particularly the selection of the "princeling" Xi
Jinping balanced by Hu protege and former CYL head Li
Keqiang, provides "something for everyone," thereby
guaranteeing relative harmony among competing Party
factions for at least the next five years. XXXXX,
senior journalist at the XXXXX, said that
while "perhaps not ideal," the leadership lineup
nevertheless is designed to guarantee that politics at
the CCP's top remains balanced, thereby ensuring no
"radical changes" in either the Party's leadership or
its general policy direction in 2012 and beyond.
Xi Jinping's Popularity
-----------------------
4. (C) The decision to elevate former Shanghai Party
Secretary Xi Jinping to the PBSC, and to rank him
ahead of purported Hu Jintao favorite Li Keqiang, was
due in large part to the broadly favorable opinion
toward Xi within the Party, according to a number of
contacts. XXXXX told Poloff
on October 26 that Xi's support within the Party was
demonstrated in part by a "straw poll" carried out at
the Central Party School on June 25, immediately after
Hu Jintao delivered his speech there previewing his
Congress Political Report. The 400 Party officials
present at the June 25 speech were asked to provide
feedback on a list of 200 candidates for the PBSC. Xi
did very well in this "survey," XXXXX said on October
26, surmising that he also did "very well" in the
Congress voting for the Central Committee, likely
finishing "far ahead" of Li Keqiang.
5. (C) Zhang Zhijun of the CCP International Liaison
Department provided the official propaganda line on
the June 25 "vote" when on October 24 he told a group
of foreign diplomats, including Poloffs, that the
Party had employed a "democratic nomination process"
on June 25 involving 400 senior officials who,
following Hu's speech earlier that day, "created" a
list of nominees to newly enter the Politburo from
among a roll of 200 qualified "candidates." Zhang
called this a true demonstration of "inner-Party
democracy." Separately, XXXXX and close associate of Ministry
of Civil Affairs officials in Beijing, told Poloff on
October 25 that the real purpose of the June 25 "vote"
was to generate a list of the most "viable" new
candidates for the Politburo, which could then be
thoroughly "scrubbed" to ensure that popular
candidates had "no major flaws" in terms of their
prior performance, health or integrity. The CPS's
XXXXX said that Xi is acceptable to Hu for a variety of
reasons, but Hu "simply could not ignore" the "obvious
support" for Xi within the Party, particularly since
Hu had stressed that the opinions of other Party
members and even the public should be taken into
account in selecting the Party's new leaders.
6. (C) The sources of Xi's purported popularity are
said to be many. First, several contacts pointed to
Xi's status as son of Xi Zhongxun, an early
revolutionary who later became Party Secretary of
Guangdong and both Politburo member and Vice Premier
under Deng Xiaoping. According to
XXXXX, Xi's father's status "virtually
ensured" Xi broad support within the Party, given the
elder Xi's credentials as both a revolutionary and a
Deng Xiaoping ally in promoting reform. Moreover,
XXXXX said, Xi Zhongxun's role as a military leader in
the revolution has helped Xi Jinping garner support
from the PLA. Second, contacts say, almost everyone
"likes" Xi Jinping because, unlike many other
princelings, he is "not arrogant" and instead is low-
key, humble and self-effacing. XXXXX, who has direct access to
Zhongnanhai, told Poloff October 23 that Xi is well
liked by "nearly everyone" and has a great network of
contacts across China, which in the PRC is still more
important than one's talent. XXXXX
contrasted Xi's low-key manner with that of other
princelings such as former PBSC Member Chen Yun's son,
Chen Yuan, who apparently greatly angered Deng
Xiaoping many years ago by issuing a "declaration"
calling for the princelings to "rule" China. Third,
there is a general perception within the Party,
according to both XXXXX and XXXXX,
that Xi has a great deal of experience in governing at
a variety of levels, having served in Hebei, Fujian,
Zhejiang and Shanghai, in positions ranging from a
county-level official to Provincial Party Secretary.
(Note: XXXXX said he has known Xi since XXXXX, it was obvious that Xi had a
bright future, given his ability and great attitude,
though XXXXX "never dreamed" Xi would be in line to
become the Communist Party's next General Secretary.)
Xi as "Compromise Candidate"
----------------------------
7. (C) While Xi's popularity and broad support
certainly played a role in his elevation, several
contacts stressed these factors came into play only
after intense jockeying over the Party's most senior
posts, with Xi in the end becoming the "compromise
candidate" acceptable to all, even to Hu Jintao.
According to XXXXX, a collection of "Party elders," including
but not limited to Jiang Zemin, challenged Hu's
initial proposal to elevate Li Keqiang as his
successor by arguing Li "lacked sufficient
experience." Initially, XXXXX claimed in a November 8
discussion with Poloffs, these "elders" offered no
alternative but made clear they would not accept Li
Keqiang in the "heir apparent" slot. Hu Jintao
allegedly then came back with two choices of "fifth
generation" leaders as candidates to be placed ahead
of Li Keqiang on the PBSC: Minister of Commerce Bo
Xilai and Xi Jinping. The choice, XXXXX said, was
"obvious," given the younger Bo's unpopularity in many
quarters within the Party. Also as part of the deal
for having Li Keqiang "take a step back," Zeng
Qinghong agreed to step down, XXXXX claimed.
8. (C) XXXXX separately told
Poloff that he also understood that Zeng Qinghong's
stepping down was part of a "package deal" to elevate
Xi ahead of Li Keqiang. He also said that in his
view, Xi Jinping's promotion to Shanghai Party
Secretary in March 2007 "previewed" his later
promotion to the PBSC. At that time, XXXXX claimed,
Hu was pushing for United Front Work Department Head
Liu Yandong to go to Shanghai, but Jiang Zemin and
Zeng Qinghong were backing Xi Jinping. In the end, Hu
relented and agreed on Xi, agreeing to accept Xi even
though he was not his first choice. XXXXX argued that
the elevation of Xi to the PBSC last month followed a
"nearly identical dynamic."
Checking Hu, Protecting Princeling Interests
--------------------------------------------
9. (C) Other contacts emphasized the desire to check
the influence of Hu Jintao and the CYL and the
perceived need to protect "princeling" interests as
being behind Xi's rise. XXXXX, for example, said
Xi Jinping's promotion should be viewed as a "direct
reaction" among Party elders, the remnants of the
Shanghai faction and others to the growing power of Hu
Jintao and the CYL. XXXXX
similarly told Poloff on October 24 that Xi is on the
PBSC primarily because "Party elders" want him there,
as they feel they "know" Xi and are "comfortable" with
having him groomed to succeed Hu. Freelance
journalist XXXXX agreed, though he thought that
Party elders were primarily concerned with having
someone "conservative" like Xi in place who will not
threaten their "vested interests." XXXXX also played up the support of Party
elder families and their "princeling" offspring,
arguing that ever since the 1989 Tiananmen protests
and the 1991 collapse of the Soviet Union, a number of
Party elders have been pushing for placing their
progeny atop the Party, believing that only their own
offspring can be trusted to run the country. Xi
Jinping is proof of the elders' and princelings'
influence, XXXXX said, calling Xi's elevation the
beginning of the "return of the Princelings."
Comparing Xi to Li Keqiang
--------------------------
10. (C) While such "factional" balancing appears to
have played a key role in the decision to elevate Xi
ahead of Li, contacts have said Li Keqiang was more
vulnerable than Xi for other reasons as the leaders
jockeyed for PBSC slots. XXXXX
commented that, for many Party leaders outside the
CYL, it was not so much that they do not trust Li
Keqiang as much as they simply "do not know him."
XXXXX described Li Keqiang as an "intellectual"
closely identified with Hu Jintao who rose through the
ranks of the CYL. In that sense, Li simply does not
compare well to someone like Xi, the son of a
prominent revolutionary who was much more widely known
and revered. Moreover, many people argued that Li
does not have such great accomplishments to show for
his time in Henan and Liaoning provinces. While Li
may not have run into such great problems, he has no
great achievement to point to, XXXXX said.
Separately, the XXXXX
agreed, arguing that Li simply does not have the kind
of experience or accomplishments that would qualify
him to be the country's next Party General Secretary.
11. (C) Contacts who underscored Li's strengths
similarly noted that CYL stereotypes and his career
background worked against him. XXXXX said he was XXXXX at
the same time as Li, calling him "smart," a good
student and a "good person." The overwhelming
impression Li gave was that of a "good Party
bureaucrat." XXXXX, who has had ties to Li Keqiang
going back a decade or more, said that Li Keqiang is
"highly capable" and is also low-key, polite and
respectful of Party elders, even though he simply was
not their first choice for the top slot. XXXXX also
thought that Li comes across as a good CYL cadre,
exhorting the Party "troops" to do great work and
citing the correct Party slogans. By contrast, XXXXX
said, Xi comes across as a more confident, forceful
leader, despite being low-key. XXXXX
argued that Li Keqiang is "more open, more Western"
than Xi Jinping, givn his undergraduate legal
education at PekingUniversity. Xi Jinping, by
contrast, receive a more "Leftist, Marxist"
education, even though he supposedly has a doctorate
in "law." XXXXX conceded, however, that Li had to deal
with the "unpopularity" of the CYL in certain quarters
within the Party, with some believing that CYL cadres
are too "bureaucratic" and are simply "careerists"
worried mostly about their next promotion, thereby
putting "form" ahead of "substance."
12. (C) In the end, XXXXX opined, neither Xi
nor Li are "ideal" leaders in a "scientific" sense,
given that both are relatively junior and lacking in
experience. XXXXX also agreed that neither Xi nor
Li has as much experience as a Chinese leader should
have. Nevertheless, they are the two leaders the
system clearly has chosen to lead the country. Under
this system, one's loyalty and connections (Xi's to
the Party elders and Li's to Hu Jintao) counted more
in the end than their ability. XXXXX
posited that Li and Xi share many similarities,
despite their different backgrounds and bases of
support. Both will likely seek stability of the CCP
ruling system above all, XXXXX speculated, but Li is
more likely to seek stability by dealing with
inequality and various social problems by
redistributing wealth. Xi, on the other hand, may be
more likely to use coercive means to keep the CCP, and
princelings, in power.
Speculation on Impending Government Appointments
------------------------------------------------
13. (C) Two contacts speculated on the impending high-
level government personnel changes slated for the
March 2008 National People's Congress (NPC). XXXXX said his "best contacts" tell him that Li Keqiang will
become Executive Vice Premier, replacing the deceased
Huang Ju. Zhang Dejiang will be Vice Premier in place
of Wu Yi, while Wang Qishan will be Vice Premier
replacing Zeng Peiyan. Meanwhile, Hua Liangyu will
stay on as Vice Premier. CPS Professor XXXXX
agreed that Li Keqiang is headed for the Executive
Vice Premier slot but said he had heard that it is
Wang Qishan that will replace Madame Wu Yi, not Zhang
Dejiang. XXXXX said he had also heard that Zhang
Dejiang may end up staying put as a Party Secretary
"out in the provinces." As for the Vice President's
slot that will be vacated in March by Zeng Qinghong,
who has already stepped down from the PBSC, XXXXX said
he expected Xi Jinping, as heir apparent, to take over
this position. It is, however, still possible that
the post could be left vacant for a short while.
Regardless, XXXXX thought the chances of giving the
Vice Presidency to a non-Party person, as had been
done previously, were "quite low."
---------------------------------------------
14. (C) Well-connected XXXXX told Poloff that XXXXX.
(Note: XXXXX said. XXXXX. The CDIC portfolio is
"incredibly difficult" and must be filled by someone
"everyone in the Party" can trust, XXXXX said. Given
that He is well-known for being low-key and "not
aggressive," it is likely that he was acceptable to
all in the CDIC slot, given that many people fear the
use of anti-corruption investigations as political
weapons.
15. (C) XXXXX said that his impression is that He
Guoqiang has a "relatively favorable" attitude toward
the United States, believing that the United States
should be recognized for its political and economic
accomplishments but that not all of its lessons can be
"transplanted" to China. XXXXX.
Li Yuanchao's "Huge Step Up"
----------------------------
16. (C) XXXXX provided Poloffs with
comments on Li Yuanchao, the former Jiangsu Party
Secretary and Hu Jintao protege who was recently
promoted to the Politburo, where he has been made head
of the Party's Central Organization Department. XXXXX
said he knows Li Yuanchao well, as XXXXX. In recent years,
Li's wife lived in Beijing teaching music, traveling back to
Jiangsu for weekends with her husband. Li's wife
reportedly recently told XXXXX that, with her husband's
promotion to the Politburo, her "long march" is "over"
and she has recently moved into quarters in
Zhongnanhai. Li Yuanchao has made his "fair share of
enemies" over the years, XXXXX claimed, though he
speculated that everyone would "kiss his ring" now,
given his important new position. XXXXX said that Li
Yuanchao's promotion to Organization Department Head
is a "huge step up," given that Li will now control
the fate of many people in China. While Li may have a
hard time influencing those above him, all of the
leaders' factional networks will fall under his
authority. XXXXX expressed a similar view
on Li's power, but provided a somewhat different
perspective on the political dynamics associated with
Li's position. In response to Poloff's observation
that some people think PBSC Member He, as former
Organization Department head and Zeng Qinghong
protege, would have a large influence over Li's
decisions, XXXXX said that Li's close relationship to Hu
Jintao would pose a significant check on He's power.
Although He retained top authority over the Party's
personnel system, he would be reluctant to overrule
Li's decisions.
PICCUTA