From: <a href="http://www.aftenposten.no/spesial/wikileaksdokumenter/article3957565.ece">Aftenposten</a><br>
Date: 23.01.2006: 

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AMBASSADORS CALL ON DEVELOPMENT MINISTER SOLHEIM

1. (C)
Summary. The Ambassador made his introductory call on
International Development Minister Erik Solheim January 19 and
discussed Solheims upcoming trip to Sri Lanka, the state of
play in Sudan, and the Ministers development priorities.
Solheim stressed that he is eager to cooperate with the United
States, noting that there is only so much Norway can do to
promote peace around the world. Ultimately, U.S. pressure is
usually needed to consolidate any process, Solheim commented.
Essentially, Solheim envisions Norway having a "complementary
role" to U.S. efforts. Solheim spoke highly of Deputy
Secretary Zoellicks in-depth knowledge of Sudan and praised
the United States for achieving the Comprehensive Peace
Agreement. Solheim welcomed the Ambassadors suggestion that we
not only continue the close cooperation on Sri Lanka and Sudan
but also identify new areas where we can work together to
advance peace and development, although he did not see an
increased Norwegian role in the Caucasus. Solheim bluntly
explained that Norway needs to be cautious in its approach to
the Caucasus given that it is Russias backyard. End summary.

Sri Lanka: Expectations for Solheim Trip "Too High"
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2. (C)
Solheim, who is traveling to Colombo January 23-26 (with a
planned stop in New Delhi on his way back to Oslo), commented
that expectations in the Sri Lankan press have gotten way out
of hand -- as if his visit would "save" the country. Solheim
remarked that ironically, the same people who only two months
ago were bad mouthing Norway and wanted to end the Norwegian
mediation role were now counting on Solheim to get the peace
process back on track. The Minister outlined two basic
objectives for his visit: 1) "stabilize the ceasefire" and 2)
meet the President in his new capacity with a view to getting
him to fully understand how he can advance talks with the
Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE). Solheim explained
that he wants to get a recommitment to the cease-fire, reduce
violations, and move the country away from the brink of war.
He added, that while he knows the President well and thinks
highly of him, Rajapaksa in his view is unfamiliar with the
complexities of the ethnic issues and needs to learn how to
best move the peace process forward. Solheim intends to
provide Rajapaksa the "LTTE perspective." On the question of
getting the Sri Lankan Government and LTTE to the table,
Solheim said that he hoped the parties would agree soon to a
venue in Europe. While not ruling out Oslo, Solheim said that
places like Sweden, Finland or Switzerland would be better.
Solheim noted that he looked forward to comparing notes and
discussing how best to advance the peace process with U/S
Burns when they meet in Colombo.

Sudan: Norway Appreciates U.S. Role
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3. (C)
Solheim was effusive in his praise for Deputy Secretary
Zoellick. Not only was Solheim impressed with the

SIPDIS

Deputys knowledge of Sudan but also that it was evident that
he follows the issue day-to-day -- clearly reflecting the high
priority the U.S. puts on Sudan. Solheim commented that
without the United States, there would not have been a CPA and
that now the U.S. and Norway need to continue to coax both
parties, Khartoum and the SPLM, to continue to make progress.
He remarked on the desperate state of the South, no roads, no
infrastructure; noting that it was important that peace yield
dividends. With the loss of Dr. Garang, the SPLM needs to
consolidate its power and that is where Norway will focus its
efforts. Solheim remains concerned about what he referred to
as the "spoilers," i.e., paramilitary groups such as the Lords
Resistance Army, and the situation in Darfur. Solheim added
that the situation in Sudan remains "dangerous," stressing
that it will require continued intense attention. Solheim
thanked us for supporting Tom Vraalsen for leader of the
Assessment and Evaluation Commission, remarking that without
the U.S. it would not have happened. Vraalsen is a good man,
he added, and an expert on Sudan.

4. (C)
On Darfur, Solheim believes the humanitarian situation has
improved but that security remains a difficult problem.
Solheim praised Deputy Secretary Zoellick for his efforts to
force the various guerrilla groups to adopt serious positions
in peace negotiations, noting that the situation will not
improve until people feel safe to return to their homes.

No Global Strategy
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5. (C)
Responding to the Ambassadors question as to where Solheim saw
Norway concentrating its development efforts under the new
Stoltenberg government, Solheim readily acknowledged that he
did not have a global strategy. In fact, Solheim said Norway
was prepared to help anywhere where parties in conflict would
want Norwegian participation. The Ambassador suggested that
perhaps Norway could do more to advance democracy and
stability in the Caucasus. Solheim bluntly replied that Norway
had to be careful about getting involved in the Caucasus for
fear of upsetting the Russians. Solheim noted that as a
neighbor to Russia, Norway needs to proceed carefully in the
Russian sphere of influence and all but ruled out any
significant engagement in the Caucasus. That said, the rest of
the world is game and we should consider where we can do more
together.

Comment
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6. (C)
It is a ironic that despite being a minister from the far-left
Socialist Left Party, Solheim (after FM Stoere), is the
cabinet member most interested in working with us. One big
reason for this is that his experience working with us on Sri
Lanka has been extremely positive; another is that he realizes
that he can do more as a peace broker if he has the U.S. as a
closer. We believe Solheim can continue to be a good partner
and that we should seize opportunities to engage him in areas
where we think he can contribute, particularly given Norways
deep aid pockets. It is clear that Solheim sees himself more
as someone who will push peace initiatives than run
development assistance programs.

7. (C)
We have been pushing Norway to do more in the Caucasus for
some time but to no avail. Solheims direct reply on concerns
over alienating Russia is the first time we have been told the
real reason. Norwegian officials are always quick to point to
their excellent ties to Russia but rarely come out and say
that they want to be careful not to irritate the bear.
Privately, however, Norwegians acknowledge that they remain
concerned over Russia and worry about some day returning to
having an unfriendly neighbor -- hence the importance they
place on NATO and their interest in making sure the United
States becomes engaged on High North issues. Norways objective
is to ensure that the U.S. is available and ready to help
reign in any Russian aggressiveness/misbehavior in the Barents
region.

WHITNEY
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