From: Aftenposten
Date: 8. 2. 2006 SHEIKH CONFIRMS SARG INVOLVEMENT IN ESCALATING SITUATION IN DAYS PRIOR TO RIOTING
2006-02-06 16

1. (C)
Summary: An 
influential Sunni sheikh provided details February 6 that seem to 
confirm SARG involvement in escalating the situation that led to the 
violent rioting in Damascus two days earlier, including communications 
between the PMs office and the Grand Mufti. He also noted that SARG 
authorities now seem intent on identifying a few scapegoats to be blamed
for the incidents. The Danish Ambassador confirmed to us separately 
that the Minster of the Awqaaf had inflamed the situation the day before
the rioting, with his remarks at Friday prayers in a mosque. End 
Summary. 

2. (C)
xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx one of the most influential
Sunni religious figures in Damascus, provided PolChief February 6 with 
his assessment of SARG involvement in the run-up to the violent February
4 demonstrations (and its reaction in their aftermath). He noted that 
PM Naji al-Otri several days before the demonstrations instructed the 
Grand Mufti Sheikh Hassoun to issue a strongly worded directive to the 
imams delivering Friday sermons in the mosques of Damascus, without 
setting any ceilings on the type of language to be used. Hasson complied
with the order. (Note: Several Muslim contacts have confirmed that 
sermons based on these instructions were delivered, criticizing the 
publishing of the caricatures of the Prophet Mohammed, and condemning 
the actions of the Danish, Norwegian, and French governments. An 
Egyptian diplomat reported that the sermon he heard was critical but not
inciteful.)

3. (C)
PM Otri also instructed Hassoun and Minister
of the Awqaf Ayoubi that if diplomatic representatives from the Danish 
and Norwegian Embassies attempted to deliver apologies to them and to 
seek their assistance in defusing the situation, they were to take a 
hard line and insist that the only way forward was for the PMs of the 
two countries to issue official apologies. 

4. (C)
The banners 
put up in Rawda Square were obviously put up with SARG permission. When 
xxxxxx had attempted to put up banners in that area on a previous 
occasion, to announce some Muslim-Christian dialogue effort, they were 
removed immediately and he was told it was a "security area" and he 
needed permission from the governorate of Damascus to put up such 
banners because of all the diplomatic missions and protective security 
forces in the area. 

5. (C)
xxxxxxx noted that one of the key 
organizers of the march was Ammar Sahloul, a wealthy businessman (money 
trader)
with close ties both to the regime and to the Grand Mufti. 
xxxxxxxx suspects him of being an agent for the SARG. He said that 
Sahloul had been one of the people involved in sending out text messages
a few days before the demonstrations, inviting people to come. 

6. (C)
After the Danish Embassy was attacked (along with the Swedish and 
Chilean missions housed in the same building)
and the Norwegian Embassy 
was torched, Syrian security officers acted much more resolutely to 
prevent damage at the French Embassy. Sheikh xxxxx friend Ayoubi, the 
Minister of the Awqaaf, was on the scene trying to calm the 
demonstrators and get them to disperse. Ayoubi told xxxxxxx that the 
senior Syrian security officer then informed him "Thats it. Tell them to
disperse or we will use live ammunition" to stop the rioting and to 
prevent them from storming the Embassy. 

7. (C)
xxxxxxx assessed 
that the SARG allowed the rioting to continue for an extended period and
then, when it felt that "the message had been delivered," it reacted 
with serious threats of force to stop it. He described the message to 
the U.S. and the broader international community as follows: "This is 
what you will have if we allow true democracy and allow Islamists to 
rule." To the Islamic street all over the region, the message was that 
the SARG is protecting the dignity of Islam, and that the SARG is 
allowing Muslims freedom on the streets of Damascus they are not allowed
on the streets of Cairo, Amman, or Tunis. 

8. (C)
After the 
rioting, xxxxxxxxx said he was visited by representatives of several 
SARG security agencies, including Political Security and Syrian Military
Intelligence. He was summoned by director of the General Intelligence 
Directorate Ali Mamluk. The tone of all the questioning indicates the 
SARG is now energetically looking for scapegoats to blame for the 
rioting, said xxxxxxxx. He said he surprised Mamluk by acknowledging 
that a number of students from his institute had participated in the 
early stages of the demonstrations but had withdrawn before the violence
started at the Danish Embassy. 

9. (C)
The Danish Ambassador 
told Emboffs February 6 that he had met with the Minister of the Awqaaf 
on February 2 (and separately with the Grand Mufti)
to explain the 
Danish position and ask for help in cooling tempers. He noted that the 
while the Mufti issued a helpful statement, the ministers reported 
comments on Friday in a mosque in the upscale Malki neighborhood only 
served to inflame the situation. His repeated efforts to with the MFA 
the days before the rioting to get beefed up security for the Embassy 
proved fruitless, he noted.

SECHE