From: <a href="http://www.aftenposten.no/spesial/wikileaksdokumenter/article3955946.ece">Aftenposten</a><br>
Date: 25.5.2006

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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 COLOMBO 000872
SIPDIS
SIPDIS
E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/25/2016 
TAGS: PGOV, PTER, PHUM, CE, NO 
SUBJECT: TOKYO CO-CHAIRS PRE-MEETINGS
Classified By: Ambassador Jeffrey J. Lunstead for reason 1.4 (d).

1. (C)
Summary: GSL representatives admit that at least some elements
of armed forces may be cooperating with irregular armed
groups.  Government is trying to crack down on this, and is
also trying to develop a proposal for a political
settlement. EU will likely designate LTTE as terrorist group
on May 29 or 30, but there are still internal divisions on how
to handle this issue, and this may affect discussions in
Tokyo.  Norwegian Special Envoy Hanssen-Bauer is pushing the
GSL hard to examine its assumptions and is looking for new
ways to get the parties to talk to each other. END SUMMARY

2. (U)
Ambassador met May 24-25 with Peace Secretariat Head Palitha
Kohona, Defense Secretary SIPDIS Gotabaya Rajapaksa and
Foreign Secretary Palihakkara to discuss the upcoming Tokyo
Co- Chairs meeting. In addition, Co-Chairs Chiefs of Mission
met May 24 with visiting Norwegian Special Envoy Jon
Hanssen-Bauer, and Ambassador had follow-on meeting next day
with Netherlands Ambassador Van Dijk.

3. (C)
In all meetings, Ambassador began by noting the importance of
the Tokyo meeting. The Co-Chairs had been formed in a
different environment with a specific task--to monitor the
parties' compliance with the Tokyo Declaration which linked
development assistance with progress on the peace
process. That task no longer existed, and the Co-Chairs should
consider what their role should now be. They would discuss in
Tokyo what their expectations were from both parties if they
were to continue successfully. He noted that the US was
developing further its proposal for two international groups
to crack down on Tiger fundraising and weapons procurement.

Kohona: "Some Bad Things Happening" 
-----------------------------------

4. (C)
Peace Secretariat Head Palitha Kohona said that the GSL
strongly supported the proposed initiatives on fundraising and
weapons procurement, and he believed that Japan did also.
Japanese Special Envoy Yasushi Akashi had told him that Japan
wanted to modify the role of Norway as facilitator. Norway
(and by extension the Co- Chairs) should be "neutral but not
impartial."  Ambassador said that in addition to stating that
the Tigers needed to give up violence and enter the political
process, the Co-Chairs would likely repeat the recent
statements by PDAS Camp that the Government needed to find
ways to address long- term Tamil grievances and to protect the
rights of Tamils in the short-term. Kohona agreed that "some
bad things are happening" which the Government needed to
control. Some elements of the security forces, he said, might
be colluding with Karuna and others.

5. (C)
On the political front, Kohona said, he had just spent two
days in a retreat with Hanssen-Bauer in Barcelona to go over
the basics of the peace process. Hanssen-Bauer had pushed him
hard, Kohona said, which was good. Regarding the Sri Lanka
Monitoring Mission (SLMM), which has been very forthright
recently in its statements, Kohona said that it was fair for
the SLMM to criticize the GSL when it did something wrong, but
it should not equate the Government and the Tigers.

Gotabaya Rajapaksa: Indians Pushing Hard
----------------------------------------

6. (C)
Defense Secretary Gotabaya Rajapajksa admitted to Ambassador
that some elements of the armed forces might be colluding with
Karuna, and that this had to stop. He said that the President
was adamant on this point and had made it strongly to the
service chiefs at a National Security Council meeting that
same morning.  Gotabaya said that Indian officials had pushed
him hard during his recent visit to New Delhi. National
Security Adviser Narayanan was very familiar with the issue,
since he had spent "over 500 hours" with LTTE head Prabhakaran
when Narayanan was working in RAW. Naryanan and others had
recommended strongly that Sri Lanka adopt something like the
Indian model of governance, which had defused India's own
ethnic crises. The Indians also told him that the GSL had to
curb abuses against Tamils, and had to offer the Tamils
something positive to work towards.

Palihakkara: GSL Serious about Human Rights 
-------------------------------------------
 
7. (C)
In a May 25 conversation with the Ambassador and DCM, Foreign
Secretary H.G.M.S.  Palihakkara said that President Rajapaksa
is "very keen" in mounting serious investigations into
possible security force human rights violations.  To that end,
Foreign Minister Mangala Samaraweera and Minister of Disaster
Management and Human Rights Mahinda Samarasinghe would later
on May 25 hold the first meeting of a revived inter-
ministerial committee on human rights which would provide
oversight of security force conduct. "We want to prevent
security force misconduct while investigating any that has
already taken place," Palihakkara said. There would be a
standing working group under the committee, chaired by
Samarasinghe, which would include the service commanders,
Defense Secretary Gotabaya Rajapaksa, the Attorney General and
others. At the same time, the President's Secretary, Lalith
Wiratunga, would be meeting with the governor of the Northeast
Province and UNHCR to deal with those who have been displaced
by disturbances in the Trincomalee area. That situation,
Palihakkara stated, is "still manageable" but needs to be
handled carefully, he said.

8. (C)
Looking longer term, Palihakkara agreed with the Ambassador
that the GSL needs to take steps to spell out a political
future for the country which would give a sense of belonging
and security to Tamils and Muslims. To that end, the President
has initiated a working group to put flesh on the bones of his
presidential campaign commitment to "maximum devolution."
Palihakkara commented that it would be important to not get
caught up in labels like devolution or federalism.  "We should
label it after we've put it together."

9. (C)
Palihakkara agreed with the Ambassador that the May 30
co-chairs meeting in Tokyo would be an important opportunity
for the co-chairs to determine what useful role they could
play given that their initial raison d'etre really did not
exist anymore. "New thinking is needed."  Palihakkara
commented that the "ancillary ideas" of forming working groups
to crack down on money and weapons flows were welcomed by the
government which looked forward to feeding information to the
groups once they were formed. He said he hoped the co-chairs
would come out strongly against the current violence and
discuss ways to lessen it, commenting that the cease-fire
agreement is intended to mean "no violence not regulated
violence."

10. (C) 
Palihakkara reiterated that the GSL remains committed, despite
the current difficulties, to getting the Tigers "back to the
table" not just to discuss the cease-fire agreement but also
to talk about long-term solutions (which made a public
presentation on "maximum devolution" all the more
important). He thanked the Ambassador for Secretary Rice's
response to Foreign Minister Samaraweera's letter on the
all-party congress and commented that while it was easy to be
dismissive of such exercises, the congress had been very
important in getting the radical JVP to commit publicly to a
number of steps.

Hanssen-Bauer: Looking for Ways Forward 
---------------------------------------
11. (C) 
Co-Chair Chiefs of Mission (US, Japan, Norway, Netherlands
representing EU Presidency, and EC) met with visiting
Norwegian Special Envoy Jon Hanssen-Bauer evening of May
24. Hanssen-Bauer said that his Barcelona meeting with Kohona
was intended to help the GSL think through its strategy, and
to push the GSL on what it could offer for a political
deal. Hanssen-Bauer would see President Rajapaksa on Friday
(after visiting the Tigers in Kilinocchi on Thursday) and
would try to take these ideas further then.

12. (C)
Hanssen-Bauer said that as an interim confidence building
measure, he was considering inviting the parties to come to
Oslo to discuss the role of the SLMM, something they both
seemed interested in. This was especially important in view of
recent Tiger statements that the SLMM sea wing should no
longer ride on Sri Lankan Navy vessels, and that land travel
was now also dangerous.

13. (C)
Hanssen-Bauer asked COM's what they thought should come out of
the Tokyo meeting.  There was general consensus that the
Co-Chairs should state that they wanted to help the peace
process but could only do so successfully if the parties were
serious and took certain actions.  The LTTE would need to give
up violence and terrorism and enter the political process. The
Government would need to show that it recognized Tamil
grievances and was willing to take the dramatic political
steps needed to address them.  It would also need to ensure
that Tamils were protected.  Unexpectedly, Netherlands
Ambassador Van Dijk said that a Co-Chairs statement should not
mention "terrorism," especially since EU designation of LTTE
as a terrorist group was liable to be announced simultaneously
with Tokyo meeting on May 29 or 30. Van Dijk's position seemed
to surprise everyone, and Ambassador strongly refuted it.

EU Inside Baseball 
------------------

14. (C)
Van Dijk called Ambassador May 25 and asked to get together to
talk the issue through.  Van Dijk (please protect) told
Ambassador that there were still deep divisions within EU on
this subject. France and Italy had objected to the listing on
procedural grounds, because they thought they were being
pushed into it by the US.  When that objection was dealt with,
the Nordics still objected on substantive grounds. They
insisted that a listing be accompanied by a statement which
mentioned the failings of both the Government and the LTTE. He
also said that EC Commissioner Ferrero-Waldner and her
colleague Herve Jouanjean (who will represent the EC at Tokyo)
had pushed for a lesser action than listing--some type of
targeted sanctions--but had lost. As a result, Van Dijk
predicted, Jouanjean could be difficult at Tokyo. Ambassador
said he believed there was no way we could accept a Tokyo
statement which did not mention the need for the Tigers to
give up terrorism, and van Dijk eventually agreed there should
be some way to do that.

COMMENT 
-------
15. Several things strike us from these meetings.  For one,
the GSL seems to have gotten the message that it must do
something to prevent abuse of Tamils, and also to think
seriously about what a long-term solution would look like. We
were particularly struck by the turnaround in Gotabaya
Rajapaksa. Previously he would strenuously deny any connection
between the GSL and the Karuna group--now he admits it is
probably occurring. We are favorably impressed by
Hanssen-Bauer, who is bringing both imagination and structure
to the peace process and the work of the Co-Chairs. It seems
certain that the EU will designate the LTTE, but it is still
in disarray internally. Van Dijk is excitable and not always
accurate in his predictions, but we may have to work hard on
the EU in Tokyo to make any statement meaningful. In the end,
Kohona is right: we can and should criticize both sides, but
we should not equate them.

LUNSTEAD 
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