From: <a href="http://www.aftenposten.no/spesial/wikileaksdokumenter/article3954385.ece">Aftenposten</a><br>
Date: 9.6.2004

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6/9/2004 9:35
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 COLOMBO 000953
SIPDIS
DEPARTMENT FOR SA, SA/INS; NSC FOR E. MILLARD
PLEASE PASS TOPEC E.O. 12958:
DECL: 06-09-14 
TAGS: PREL, PGOV, PTER, CE, NO, Political Parties, LTTE - Peace Process 
SUBJECT: Recent meetings show the way forward for Sri 
Lanka peace process is troubled
Refs: (A) Colombo 915, and previous
(U) Classified by Ambassador Jeffrey J. Lunstead. Reasons 1.5 (b,d).

1. (C)
SUMMARY: Opposition Leader Wickremesinghe thought the
Co-Chairs statement was good, but that the President and her
government do not understand the psychology of the LTTE, and
are determined to begin talks on the final ("hard") issues. He
also thinks the military is using LTTE rebel Karuna to attack
the LTTE. When pressed to support the peace process, he said
that the Government needs to make a statement laying out its
policy.

2. (C)
SUMMARY CONTINUED: Norwegian Ambassador Brattskar says that
the two sides are moving further apart, rather than closer.
The LTTE will meet with its diaspora experts in Switzerland in
mid-July. President Kumaratunga called the Norwegian Foreign
Minister to complain that she had already made many
concessions. No one expects any movement until after the July
10 Provincial Council elections. END SUMMARY.

Ranil: She just does not understand. 
------------------------------------

3. (C)
Ambassador met with Opposition Leader (and former Prime
Minister) Ranil Wickremesinghe the evening of June 7 to
discuss the recent Co-Chairs meeting in Brussels. Ranil said
that he had read the Co-chairsī statement and thought it was
"good." At the moment, he did not plan any action on the peace
process: "She has the mandate, not me." President Kumaratunga
and Foreign Minister Kadirgamar, he said, did not understand
the psychology of the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE).
"They only want to discuss an interim administration. They
will never agree to discuss final issues now." He had
discussed this with Kadirgamar, but Kadirgamar had insisted
that he wanted to take up hard issues now. Ranil said that he
had ignored some transgressions by the LTTE because it was the
only way to keep negotiations going. The President did not
understand this.

4. (C)
Ranil said that the Government was playing a dangerous game
because the Sri Lanka Army (Department of Military
Intelligence, "DMI") was using the breakaway LTTE rebel Karuna
to get back at the LTTE. Ranil said he "knew" this was the
case -- he had sources in the military who told him so. This
was another example of the Governmentīs dangerous game.

5. (C)
Ambassador said that the Co-Chairs statement was directed at
all parties in Sri Lanka. If the international community were
to keep its interest alive, we expected everyone to support
peace. Pressing the point, Ambassador said that he thought
comments such as recent remarks by UNP spokesman G.L. Peiris
that the Presidentīs efforts were a "sham" peace process were
not helpful. One could criticize what the President wanted to
do, Ambassador said, but should not imply that she was not
interested in peace. Ranil said that the President and her
ruling coalition needed to make a clear policy statement on
the peace process. (Comment: The President is avoiding this
because she could never get her JVP coalition partners to go
along with anything reasonable.)

Norwegians: Getting worse, not better
-------------------------------------

6. (C)
Ambassador met with Indian High Commissioner Sen and Norwegian
Ambassador Brattskar mid-day on June 8, along with EU and
Canadian Chiefs of Mission. (Brattskar had arrived back from
Oslo, where he had stopped after Brussels, only that same
morning.) Brattskar said that the Norwegians were trying to
put together a statement which would allow talks to resume.
The Norwegians were in constant touch with both sides,
receiving messages from both, but unfortunately the sides were
moving farther apart. Each side was sending "unhelpful
clarifications." The Government insistence on holding
"parallel" talks on final settlement issues was, Brattskar
said, just a non-starter.

7. (C)
Each side was afraid that giving in would prejudice the final
outcome. The LTTE had rejected the plan to resurrect a
NERF-like mechanism to disburse aid because they felt if they
did so, the Government would never seriously discuss the
LTTEīs Interim Self- Governing Administration (ISGA). The
Government did not want to discuss the ISGA alone because it
feared that if an ISGA were set up, the LTTE would have no
incentive to discuss final issues. Brattskar said that
President Kumaratunga had called the Norwegian Foreign
Minister the day before to complain that she had made many
compromises, but the Tigers had not made any.

LTTE issues 
-----------

8. (C)
Sen said that he had heard that the GSL had been using Karuna
and his faction to get back at the LTTE, but that the military
had now been given orders to stop providing assistance to
Karuna. Brattskar said that the LTTE was now preparing for a
week-long meeting they would hold in Switzerland beginning
July 20. The meeting would include the legal and
constitutional experts from the Tamil diaspora who had helped
the LTTE prepare their ISGA proposal.

Messy Political Situation 
-------------------------

9. (C)
All agreed that the current political situation makes it
particularly difficult to make progress: -- The Government
still does not have enough votes to show a majority in
Parliament. (See Septel for report on June 8 altercation in
parliament.) -- The JVP faction within the government
continues to snipe at the peace process (see Reftels). --
Pending Provincial Council elections on July 10, no one wants
to make a dramatic move.

10. (C)
COMMENT: We believe that Ranil Wickremesinghe heard the
Ambassadorīs message about not trying to take political
advantage by attacking the peace process. Wickremesinghe made
it clear, however, that he is not about to lend support to the
President. Ranilīs analysis of the psychology of the Tigers,
and the need to induce them to participate in the talks may be
accurate. The Presidentīs problem is that she directed the
electoral campaign against Ranil on the basis that he gave in
too easily to the Tigers -- now she has to show that she is
harder to budge. Combined with Kadirgamarīs insistence on
discussing final issues, the result is a poisonous atmosphere.

11. (U) Minimize considered.

LUNSTEAD 
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