From: <a href="http://www.aftenposten.no/spesial/wikileaksdokumenter/article3954379.ece">Aftenposten</a><br>
Date: 15.4.2004

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4/15/2004 10:24
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 COLOMBO 000644
SIPDIS
DEPARTMENT FOR SA, SA/INS, INR/NESA; NSC FOR E. MILLARD
PLEASE PASS TOPEC E.O. 12958:
DECL: 04-15-14 
TAGS: PREL, PGOV, PINR, CE, NO, LTTE - Peace Process 
SUBJECT: In meeting, Norwegian Ambassador reviews recent
discussion with President on peace process
Refs: Colombo 637, and previous
(U) Classified by Ambassador Jeffrey J. Lunstead. Reasons 1.5 (b,d).

1. (C)
SUMMARY: Norway expects a formal request from the GSL to
continue its role as peace facilitator. Norwegians think the
new Sri Lankan Government needs to realize it cannot make
unilateral decisions on the course of the peace process. No
"Peace Team" in place yet. END SUMMARY.

2. (C)
Norwegian Ambassador Brattskar briefed Ambassador April 14 on
the conversation he and Sri Lanka Monitoring Mission (SLMM)
Chief Furuhovde had with President Chandrika Kumaratunga late
evening of April 10, following the delayed swearing-in of the
new cabinet. The meeting also took place as fighting between
forces of Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) chief
Prabhakaran and breakaway leader Karuna was ongoing, before
the collapse of Karuna´s rebellion (see Reftels). Brattskar
said that the President complained that LTTE actions were a
violation of the Ceasefire Agreement (CFA) and seemed to want
the SLMM to do something immediately. Brattskar explained that
the CFA set out a procedure, and that the GSL would have to
make a formal complaint to the SLMM, which would then
investigate and make a judgment.

3. (C)
The President said that she desired to restart the peace talks
as soon as possible. Brattskar said that he told the President
that when the previous government took power, it had formally
requested the Norwegians to continue their facilitation role.
Norway expected to receive such a request from the new
government, with a description of what it expected Norway to
do. The President was surprised at this. Brattskar then said
that he explained to the President that neither the GSL nor
the LTTE could make unilateral decisions about the talks. The
two sides would have to agree to any decisions. Brattskar told
Ambassador (but not the President) that the Norwegians, and
Deputy Foreign Minister Helgesen in particular, were disturbed
by an interview which new Foreign Minister Kadirgamar had
given to a local newspaper a few days ago in which he had made
several categorical statements, such as that any new rounds of
talks would be held only in Sri Lanka, not in foreign
locations, and also laying out what he thought Norway´s role
would be. Brattskar said that any such decisions would have to
be agreed by both sides and should be discussed privately, not
in the press. He also expressed unease about statements by
both Kadirgamar and new Prime Minister Rajapakse that India
would have a new, and prominent, role to play in the peace
process. Again, this was something both sides would need to
agree on.

4. (C)
Alluding to the then-ongoing LTTE infighting, the President
told Brattskar that she thought peace talks only succeeded
when one side negotiated from a clear position of strength.
(This position is probably made moot by Karuna´s collapse.)
Brattskar discussed with her a number of different peace
processes, but said he did not think the LTTE could be
pressurized in that way. He told Ambassador that it reminded
him of the strategy the President had followed in the mid-90s
of "War for Peace," which had ended disastrously.

5. (C)
Brattskar said it was also clear that the President had not
yet put together a "Peace Team" to conduct the negotiations.
She told him she would keep the current Peace Secretariat, but
change some of its personnel. She did say that current Foreign
Secretary and also Peace Secretariat Head Bernard Goonetilleke
would be removed from both jobs.

6. (C)
COMMENT: The charitable view of this is that the new
Government was unaware of the ways in which the Peace Process
has changed and become formalized over the past two years, and
will adjust to new realities. If it does not, and tries to
make unilateral changes and decisions, there could be a rough
road ahead. The Norwegians, no doubt feeling a bit buffeted by
criticism of their role during the election campaign, are
perhaps being over-sensitive. Nonetheless, they have made a
useful point to the President that their role cannot just be
taken for granted.

7. (C)
COMMENT (Continued): No one doubts the President´s commitment
to peace. What remains questionable are: (1) whether she has
the vision to understand what changes a peace settlement will
entail for Sri Lanka and (2) whether she can deal with the
Process in a systematic, disciplined manner. The weak nature
of her government, beset on peace from within by its JVP
partners and from without by the Buddhist monks, will make it
all the harder. END COMMENT.

8. (U) Minimize considered.

LUNSTEAD 
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