From: <a href="http://www.aftenposten.no/spesial/wikileaksdokumenter/article3954394.ece">Aftenposten</a><br>

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9/20/2004 10:31
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 COLOMBO 001558
SIPDIS
DEPARTMENT FOR SA, SA/INS NSC FOR DORMANDY 
PLEASE ALSO PASS TOPEC E.O. 12958:
DECL: 09/20/2014 
TAGS: PREL, PGOV, CE, NO, LTTE - Peace Process 
SUBJECT: NORWEGIAN ENVOY SOLHEIM FINDS GSL AND LTTE 
COMMITTED TO PEACE PROCESS
REF: COLOMBO 1555 AND PREVIOUS
Classified By: Ambassador Jeffrey J. Lunstead. 1.4(b,d)

1. (C)
SUMMARY: Solheim is frustrated with the stalemate in the peace
process, but the cease-fire has saved thousands of lives. He
thinks bold steps are needed to resume the talks.  He thinks
talks will resume if the wording of the agenda regarding an
interim authority is resolved.  The Tigers are feeling
international pressure and resent what they perceive as
"bias." Norway sees this as a long-haul process in which
concerted donor action will be important. Solheim may visit
Washington in early October. END SUMMARY.

2. (U) 
Norwegian Special Envoy Erik Solheim briefed the donor group
September 17 at the end of his four-day visit to Sri Lanka.
Solheim had met Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eela (LTTE)
official Thamilchelvan in Kilinochchi on September 16, and had
seen President Kumaratunga the morning of the 17th.  He also
met with Opposition Leader Ranil Wickremesinghe.

FRUSTRATION WITH STALEMATE, BUT BETTER THAN WAR 
-----------------------------------------------

3. (C)
Solheim began by noting that press pieces that morning had
carried his public statement expressing "frustration" with the
stalemate in the peace process. It was important, however, to
put this in context. Over the last two years of the ceasefire,
some two to three hundred people had been killed. If the war
had been ongoing, that number would have been two to three
thousand.  Solheim also noted that he saw no signal that
either side wanted to go back to war. Obviously hostilities
could resume through some inadvertent incident, but, he
believed, there was no deliberate plan by either side to
resume fighting. The bottom line was that the "no war/no
permanent peace" situation was certainly preferable to a
resumed war.

BOLD STEPS NEEDED TO RESUME TALKS 
---------------------------------

4. (C)
The question then was how to move to the next phase.  Solheim
had told both sides that a bold step was needed. At present
they were bogged down in small issues, namely the wording of
the agenda with regard to the Interim Self Governing Authority
(ISGA). Thamilchelvan told Solheim that the LTTE had already
showed flexibility when it gave up its demand for a separate
state, which had been the mandate of Tamil parties since the
1970s. By contrast, the government had done nothing to prepare
the Southern public to accept federalism, Thamilchelvan said.
This will take time, so an interim setup was needed. Therefore,
Thamilchelvan said, the LTTE cannot be flexible on the
formulation for talks.  However, once talks started they could
be flexible on the ISGA proposal, and were ready to discuss
alternate proposals.  Thamilchelvan thought the government was
now in a better position to enter talks based on the ISGA
because of the entrance into the ruling coalition of the
Ceylon Workers Congress, and because of statements by the
opposition United National Party (UNP) that it would support
the government if it entered negotiations based on the
ISGA. The LTTE, Thamilchelvan said, would not put forward any
further conditions. The Tigers were now preparing for a
seminar they would hold in Geneva in two weeks, which would be
followed by visits to some European countries. The Tigers,
Solheim said, were in no particular hurry, and saw no need to
help any particular Southern political party.

KUMARATUNGA SUPPORTS NORWEGIAN ROLE 
-----------------------------------

5. (C)
President Kumaratunga, Solheim said, was eager to get to
talks, but he had not achieved any breakthrough in his
discussion with her. Ambassador asked if she had any reaction
to Solheimīs request for "bold steps." Solheim said that she
was considering what she might do. (n.b., President left the
following day for the UNGA session and will be out of country
for 7-10 days, so nothing should be expected in that time
frame. Ambassador will see Kumaratunga upon her return.)
Ambassador noted that Kumaratunga had made a very positive
statement about the Norwegians after her meeting with Solheim,
and presumed that was not coincidental.  Solheim said that was
correct. He had told Kumaratunga that Norway had been put into
an awkward position the last few months. It faced constant
public criticism in the South since it was working with the
Tigers, but this was part of its role as facilitator.
Kumaratunga had then issued her statement, which was part of
her running battle with her coalition partners, the Janatha
Vimukthi Peramuna (JVP).  Kumaratunga for her part had told
Solheim that it would help if the Tigers would reiterate their
commitment to a federal solution.

CEASE-FIRE BROADLY FOLLOWED 
---------------------------

6. (C)
On the status of the cease-fire, Solheim said that both
parties were broadly adhering to it, but neither party was
strictly following it. The government had tried to use Karuna
to weaken the LTTE, while the LTTE continued its campaign of
assassinations of its opponents.  Hence both sides were
playing with fire.

TIGERS FEELING INTERNATIONAL PRESSURE? 
--------------------------------------

7. (C)
Solheim said that Thamilchelvan complained about "bias" from
the international community. International pressure was
one-sided, Thamilchelvan said, and directed against the
Tigers.  August statements by the US and the EU were examples,
as were comments by the US Counter-terrorism Coordinator
Ambassador Cofer Black during his recent visit.  He also
complained specifically about high-ranking military visits
from the US and India. In a private aside, Solheim told
Ambassador that LTTE theoretician Balasingham had told him
that the mid-August statement by Deputy Secretary Armitage had
been useful as it put pressure on the LTTE to stop murdering
its opponents. Solheim asked that comment be kept strictly
private. (COMMENT: Good, the Tigers are getting the message.)

INFLUENCE OF EAST? 
------------------

8. (C)
Ambassador told Solheim that his (Solheimīs) emphasis seemed
to be on resolving the agenda issue as the roadblock to
resumed talks. However, many in the South were saying that the
Tigers would not come back to the table until they were able
to reassert their control in the East. Did he think that was
the case?  Solheim said he did not agree. If the President met
the LTTE demands on the agenda and ISGA, he said, the Tigers
will come to the table. Solheim also said that Balasingham
would resume his role as chief negotiator for the Tigers.

LONG-HAUL APPROACH
------------------

9. (C)
Solheim concluded by saying that the Norwegians were in this
for the long haul. The donors needed to think, he said, how to
use their money to underpin the peace process.  They needed to
assist not only the government and the LTTE, but also civil
society.

COMMENT 
-------

10. (C)
Solheimīs entire visit was conducted in a low-key manner.  His
comments to the press were minimal, and press coverage was
largely confined to the inside pages -- a sharp contrast to
previous visits. As noted above, the Tigers seem to be feeling
some international pressure, but it is not clear if it has
actually changed their behavior in any way.  His assessment
that neither side wants or is planning for a return to war is
hopeful -- if it is accurate. His further assessment that only
the ISGA formulation remains as a roadblock to new talks can
only be tested if the Government comes around on that
point. It is also quite possible that the Tigers will just
come up with new conditions.

11. (C)
COMMENT CONTINUED: The LTTE meeting in Geneva, which will be
attended by Tamil expatriates from around the world, could be
useful if the expats argue for a return to talks without
further conditions. Department contacts with potential
US-based participants could be helpful, and we would encourage
them. END COMMENT.

SOLHEIM TO WASHINGTON? 
----------------------

12. (U)
After the meeting, Solheim told Ambassador that he was
thinking of visiting the US soon -- perhaps the week of
October 4 -- to renew contacts and share ideas. Ambassador
said he thought this would be useful. Norwegian Embassy may be
in touch to discuss a possible trip.

LUNSTEAD 
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