From: <a href="http://www.aftenposten.no/spesial/wikileaksdokumenter/article3954339.ece">Aftenposten</a><br>
Date: 21.5.2003

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5/21/2003 11:46
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 COLOMBO 000851
SIPDIS
DEPARTMENT FOR SA, SA/INS, INR/NESA; NSC FOR E. MILLARD
LONDON FOR POL/RIEDEL E.O. 12958:
DECL: 05/21/13
TAGS: PGOV, PTER, PINR, EAID, CE, NO, JA, LTTE - Peace Process
SUBJECT: Tigers issue hard-edged letter demanding
interim structure in north/east
Refs: (A) Colombo-SA/INS 05/21/03 unclass e-mail
- (B) Colombo 838, and previous
(U) Classified by Lewis Amselem, Deputy Chief of Mission. Reasons: 1.5 (b,d).

1. (C)
SUMMARY: The Tamil Tigers have sent the Norwegian facilitators
a tough letter demanding the setting up of an "interim
administrative structure" in the north/east, which the group
would control. The Tigers say they might restart peace talks
and come to the Tokyo conference if the government reacts
positively to their proposal. With contacts telling us the
group is in an increasingly hard-line mode, the sudden
recrudescense of the interim structure idea raises real
questions regarding the Tigers“ commitment to the process. END
SUMMARY.

2. (SBU) 
TOUGH TIGER LETTER: Late May 21, the Liberation Tigers of
Tamil Eelam (LTTE) sent the Norwegian government facilitators
a tough letter demanding the setting up of an interim
structure in the north and east. (Note: The text of the letter
was posted on the pro-LTTE website "TamilNet" and has been
sent to SA/INS in Ref A.)  In the long, complicated, and
somewhat convoluted letter, which was addressed to Deputy
Foreign Minister Vidar Helgesen, LTTE spokesman Anton
Balasingham makes clear that the Tigers believe that previous
agreements on structures/modalities of funneling
humanitarian/development assistance to the north and east are
not working. On this point, Balasingham states flatly:
"Unfortunately, SIHRN (see note below) failed to function
effectively and no progress has been made toward alleviating
the hardships and suffering of the displaced population...This
lack of performance and the failure to produce tangible
results on urgent humanitarian issues has eroded all
confidence of the Tamil people in SIHRN."  (Note: "SIHRN"
stands for Sub-Committee on Immediate Humanitarian and
Rehabilitation Needs for the North and East, which was formed
earlier this year as a joint GSL- LTTE committee working on
assistance issues. Since the committee was set up, the Tigers
have basically argued that they wanted watertight
acknowledgement of their right to control funds allotted for
the north/east. End Note.)

3. (U)
In light of this characterization of SIHRN“s performance and
rejecting recent GSL proposals to reform assistance
implementation, Balasingham goes on to state that the LTTE has
no choice but to return to its long- standing demand that an
"interim administrative structure" be set up for the north and
east.  (Note: The letter is not clear, but the LTTE seems to
be envisaging that the interim structure would mainly focus on
economic matters, but would also have a dominant political
role.) In making this demand, Balasingham notes that during
the December 2001 national election campaign the governing
United National Party (UNP) advocated the setting up of an
interim structure to govern the north and east. Although the
idea of forming such a body was left off the peace process“
agenda up to now, Balasingham says the LTTE believes it is now
time to revive it because the proposal is the only way forward
given the failure of SIHRN and given that "a permanent
political settlement is not feasible in the immediate future."
While couching his public comments carefully, Balasingham also
leaves little doubt that the LTTE should control this interim
structure. He notes, for example, that the 1987 Indo-Sri
Lankan accord provided the "LTTE a dominant participatory
role" in a proposed interim council to govern the north/east.
(Note: Aside from this one mention of the Indo-Sri Lankan
accord, the letter is otherwise vague on potential
constitutional implications.)

4. (U) 
Balasingham also addresses the issue of the peace talks, which
the Tigers recently pulled out of, and the upcoming donors
conference in Tokyo, which the Tigers have said they will not
attend. He indicates that a positive response to the LTTE“s
demands might lead the LTTE to change its mind on these
matters, stating: "A positive and constructive response from
the prime minister setting out his ideas and proposals in
clear and concrete terms will certainly help our leadership to
take a crucial decision on the resumption of peace talks and
participation at the donor conference in Japan."

5. (C)
TAMIL CONTACTS ON LTTE MINDSET: The LTTE letter came out too
late on May 21 for contacts to provide us a considered
response. In discussions with poloffs held early May 21,
however, Tamil political contacts who had met with the LTTE on
May 20, indicated that the group was increasingly in a
hard-line, uncompromising mode.  Echoing the comments of other
Tamil National Alliance (TNA) figures, Suresh Premachandran,
told us that political chief S.P. Thamilchelvam, who led the
Tiger side at the meeting, made clear that the LTTE was fed up
with the GSL.  The LTTE felt that the government -- while
basically well intentioned -- was not strong and could not
carry through on its plans because it was too afraid of
Sinhalese chauvinists. In making these comments, Premachandran
said Thamilchelvam asserted in very strong terms that the
Sinhalese south could not be trusted because it had broken
agreements with Tamils so many times in the past. (Note: In a
May 19 meeting, Deputy Foreign Minister Helgesen told us that
LTTE leaders had made this same point in vivid terms during
recent interactions with the Norwegians.) At this point,
Premachandran added, the LTTE wanted written, ironclad
assurances from the GSL on the way forward, or they would
continue to stall the process.

6. (C)
Despite their hardline positioning, Premachandran still
thought that the Tigers "were committed to the peace process
and would listen to reason." He allowed that he was not sure
the government could meet in short order all of the LTTE“s
demands and thus ensure the group“s participation in the Tokyo
conference. He thought, however, that the LTTE had not totally
discounted the possibility of participating in Tokyo.

7.  (U)
(((Note: Before Balasingham“s letter was issued, we had heard
that the LTTE“s S.P. Thamilchelvam was planning to hold a
press conference on May 22 in the LTTE-controlled town of
Kilinochchi in northern Sri Lanka. This press conference had
been originally slated to take place on May 21, but had been
postponed. In light of Balasingham“s letter, which quite
clearly enunciates LTTE thinking at this point, it is not
clear whether the May 22 press conference is still on and what
it might add if it is. End Note.)))

8. (C)
COMMENT: While respectful in tone, the LTTE letter is
hard-edged and clearly to be taken very seriously.
Balasingham, for example, at several points in the letter
underscores that he is transmitting the views of
V. Prabhakaran, the LTTE“s supreme leader.  The sudden
recrudescence of the interim structure idea, which had
basically dropped from sight for months, raises real questions
re the Tigers“ commitment to the process.  The group almost
certainly knows that the issue is a very tricky one for the
government and would -- under normal circumstances -- take
months to negotiate. That said, the Tigers are pressing the
government for a response right now. This degree of impatience
does not appear to bode well for LTTE agreement to resume the
peace talks and reconsider its decision not to participate in
Tokyo. END COMMENT.

9. (U) Minimize considered.

WILLS 
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