From: <a href="http://www.aftenposten.no/spesial/wikileaksdokumenter/article3954371.ece">Aftenposten</a><br>
Date: 17.11.2003

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11/17/2003 11:13
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 COLOMBO 001982
SIPDIS
DEPARTMENT FOR D, SA, SA/INS, EUR/NB, INR/NESA
NSC FOR E. MILLARD E.O. 12958:
DECL: 11-17-13 
TAGS: PGOV, PREL, PINS, PTER, PINR, CE, NO, Political Parties 
SUBJECT: Possible ways forward in political standoff 
between Sri Lankan President and Prime Minister
Refs: (A) Colombo 1974 
- (B) Colombo 1971, and previous
(U) Classified by Ambassador Jeffrey J. Lunstead. Reasons 1.5 (b, d).

1. (C)
SUMMARY: President Kumaratunga and Prime Minister
Wickremesinghe continue to consult to find a workable solution
to the current political struggle. The PM has remained focused
on the peace process throughout the crisis. Reaction from
international as well as domestic parties has been focused on
possible repercussions for the peace process. Several options
remain available to resolve the imbroglio, and attention is
now focused on which will play out. END SUMMARY.

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President remains steadfast on Defense Ministry 
----------------------------------------------- 

2. (C)
As previously reported, following her November 4 takeover of
three key ministries and prorogation of Parliament, President
Kumaratunga has publicly called for a national government of
reconciliation, invited the PM for talks, and met with
Norwegian peace facilitators. Throughout these past two weeks,
the President has repeatedly stated that she supports the
peace process and ceasefire accord. However, the President has
remained steadfast that she retain the Defense Ministry, a key
component in the peace process. While the initial round of
talks with the PM did not break the impasse between the two,
there are some signs that a workable compromise might be
possible. The President and Prime Minister will meet again on
November 18.

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PM focused on peace process 
---------------------------

3. (C)
Prime Minister Wickremesinghe, for his part, has remained
focused on the peace process throughout his efforts to bring
resolution to the current political crisis. Avoiding direct
criticism of the President, the PM has worked to provide
leadership to his United National Front (UNF) party, to temper
UNF hardliners advocating retaliation against the President,
and to appeal to the international community for support. He
has let key party politicians, such as peace process
negotiator G.L. Peiris and chief whip Mahinda Samarasinghe,
garner domestic support and argue the GSLīs position in the
public arena. He maintains that, without control of the
defense portfolio, he can not be in charge of the peace
process, and thus has offered the President this
responsibility. While the Prime Minister publicly says he is
willing to work with the President, privately he is skeptical
of such cohabitational success.

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Concern over Presidentīs actions 
--------------------------------

4. (C)
Reaction to the Presidentīs November 4-5 actions has centered
mainly on the possible effect on the peace process. (Septel
addresses the economic ramifications.) Support for the PM has
been especially strong, with 130 MPs signing a letter
expressing their full confidence, and thousands of supporters
rallying in support upon his return. While several political
parties have expressed admiration and support for the
President, she has also come under criticism -- by segments of
the Buddhist clergy, for example -- for causing complications
in the peace process at an extremely crucial time. Members of
the international community, including the U.S., UK, EU, India
and Japan have issued statements and/or publicly expressed
concern over the situation, stressing the need for the peace
process to continue. Tamil political parties and the
Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) have also voiced their
concern over the effects that the President-PM wrangling might
have on the peace process, but all in all, the Tigers seem to
be appraising the situation in the south judiciously.

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Effects on Peace Process 
------------------------

5. (C)
Even with the Defense Ministry now under the President, there
has been no short-term impact to the peace process vis-a-vis
the military and the ceasefire. The Sri Lanka Monitoring
Mission (SLMM) continues to report a high degree of
cooperation with the military, and statements made by defense
officials (see Ref B) indicate that the military will continue
to act with prudence while civilians sort out the political
situation. Both the President and the Tigers have stressed the
importance of the ceasefire continuing. At a November 14 press
conference, however, Norwegian Deputy Foreign Minister Vidar
Helgesen emphasized the need for clarity in the south in order
for real progress in the peace track, and stated that until
such clarity existed, there was no space to assist the GSL and
the Tigers in peace negotiations. Helgesen has made clear he
believes the ceasefire could come undone if the situation
drags on unresolved too long.

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Ways to Go Forward 
------------------

6. (C)
As the Prime Minister and President propose ways to create a
workable solution to the events of the past two weeks, there
is much speculation regarding the ultimate way forward.
Depending on the current mood of the President or PM, several
options appear likely. They include:
-- Returning the Ministries: In this scenario, the President
would return control to the government of the defense,
interior and mass communications ministries. The government
would presumably provide some face-saving method for the
President to do so. While this would restore the GSLīs control
of the peace process, the situation would not resolve the
Presidentīs cohabitation disagreements that precipitated her
November 4 actions. There is talk she might give back Interior
and Mass Communication but keep Defense and/or that a Defense
Secretary palatable to both the PM and the President

SIPDIS 

might be appointed.
-- Cohabitational Committee: According to the PMīs idea, a
committee comprising representation by the GSL and the
Opposition would advise the government on the peace process.
This would formalize an arrangement for the President to
provide her input on the GSLīs peace process decisions and
possibly address her contention (which has some merit) that
the PM does not "consult" with her regarding negotiations with
the Tigers. This is also sometimes referred to as a "council
of concilitation."
-- Elections: From the Presidentīs perspective, her hope in
calling elections would be for her Peopleīs Alliance (PA)
party to increase its number of seats, and, in coalition with
other parties, regain the majority in Parliament. This would
put the President in control of the peace process. The PM
believes that parliamentary elections would result in more
seats for his UNF coalition, serving to strengthen his mandate
to lead the peace process. Even if the UNF were to increase
its majority, a resolution to the current crisis could still
be elusive: the government would still have to cohabitate with
the President, who remains in her position regardless of the
electoral outcome. Moreover, there is a palpable sense of
dread at the prospect of elections which historically are
violent and corrupt.
-- Standoff: If neither the PM or President agree on the
ministerial or committee option and elections are not called,
it is possible that the current standoff could continue. The
government would continue its business, with Parliament
meeting to work on the budget. Negotiations with the LTTE,
however, would likely remain on hold with neither the PM or
President in clear control of the peace process. As noted
above, this poses a danger to the peace process.

7. (C)
COMMENT: Missionīs position so far has been to emphasize to
all parties the need for the peace process to be supported,
while not becoming embroiled in the internecine political
struggle between the President and PM. The first test of the
changed political landscape and a marker of the PMīs and
Presidentīs willingness to resolve this comes on Wednesday,
November 19 when Parliament is set to reconvene and the GSL
presents the budget after the two week prorogation. While
fresh elections are possible, they would likely be expensive
and violent, and result in a situation not that much different
from the current stalemate. Mature cooperation between the PM
and President to take the peace process forward would be the
best possible outcome, but the two have a long history of
rivalry, which they would have to put behind them. END
COMMENT.

8. (U) Minimize considered.

LUNSTEAD 
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