From: Aftenposten
Date: 1.8.2002
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 COLOMBO 001422
SIPDIS NOFORN
DEPARTMENT FOR SA, SA/INS;
LONDON FOR POL/RIEDEL;
NSC FOR E. MILLARD E.O. 12958:
DECL: 08-01-12
TAGS: PGOV, PTER, PINR, PREL, PARM, CE, NO, LTTE - Peace Process
SUBJECT: GSL minister cautiously optimistic on direction of peace process
based on meeting with Tiger spokesman
Refs: (A) Oslo 1742; (B) Colombo 1391 (U)
Classified by Ambassador E. Ashley Wills.
Reasons: 1.5 (b,d).
1. (C/NF)
Summary: In a July 31 meeting, Milinda Moragoda, a senior
GSL minister, provided the Ambassador a detailed readout of his recent
talks with Anton Balasingham, the spokesman of the Liberation Tigers of
Tamil Eelam (LTTE). The atmospherics were excellent, he related. On
substantive issues, productive discussions were held on many topics,
including the scope and timing of proposed negotiations, and ceasefire
pact implementation. The LTTE side also sounded out Moragoda about the
PM´s recent visit to the U.S. Overall, the London meeting seems to have
provided a solid foundation for next steps in the peace process. End
Summary.
-----------------
Meeting in London
-----------------
2. (C/NF)
In a July 31 meeting with the Ambassador, Milinda Moragoda, a
senior GSL minister, provided a detailed readout of his July 27 talks
with Anton Balasingham, the LTTE spokesman. The meeting took place at
the Norwegian Embassy in London. Moragoda was the only GSL
representative present. Balasingham and his (Australian) wife, Adele,
represented the LTTE. Norwegian Deputy Foreign Minister Vidar Helgesen,
Special Envoy Erik Solheim, Norwegian Ambassador to Sri Lanka Jon
Westborg, and Norwegian MFA official Lisa Golden were also present at
the meeting as observers. (Note: Ref A contains Golden´s readout of the
meeting. Her remarks track with Moragoda´s.)
---------------------
Positive Atmospherics
---------------------
3. (C/NF)
Moragoda said the
atmospherics of the meeting were excellent. The Tigers had requested the
meeting and they seemed to want to make it work. Balasingham gave the
impression that he wanted to settle differences. Throughout the meeting,
he seemed "sincere, amiable, flexible." He was much easier to deal
with and less dogmatic than Moragoda had thought he would be. He was
even "disarming." At one point in the discussion, for example,
Balasingham jokingly (and accurately) used the term "extortion" in
referring to his organization´s so-called "taxation" policies. It was
possible, Moragoda allowed, that Balasingham was being "duplicitous"
and "putting on an act" in order to gain some sort of advantage in the
talks. If that was the case, Balasingham did his best to hide any such
ulterior motives.
----------------------------
Discussion re Proposed Talks
----------------------------
4. (C/NF)
On matters of
substance, the talks were quite productive, according to Moragoda. He
noted that there was a brief discussion of when proposed face-to-face
high-level negotiations between the GSL and the LTTE might be held.
Moragoda´s general impression was that the talks might kick off at some
point in September or October, but it was still not clear and there had
been no agreement on the issue. (Note: The two sides have already agreed
that the venue of the proposed talks will be Thailand.)
5. (C/NF)
The two sides also discussed the scope of possible negotiations.
Balasingham seemed intent that the proposed talks focus primarily on the
setting up of an interim council for the north and east, as opposed to
focusing on a final settlement of the dispute. He specifically said the
LTTE did not want "countless lawyers" being involved in the talks.
That would only complicate matters. Moragoda replied that the GSL wanted
all issues to be on the table. He also told Balasingham, however, that
it would be possible for certain issues -- including the interim council
-- to be dealt with more quickly than other, so-called "core issues."
Balasingham seemed relieved to hear this. (Note: Moragoda told the
Ambassador that Ambassador Westborg had mentioned to him the best way
forward regarding an interim administration may be to revive the
"north-east council" structure. The council -- a product of the 1987
Indo-Sri Lankan accord -- is no longer active, but is already codified
in the 13th amendment to the Sri Lankan Constitution. End Note.)
6. (C/NF)
In an interesting aside on the LTTE´s long- term objectives,
Balasingham told Moragoda that the Tigers were mulling over ideas such
as "internal autonomy, federalism and confederalism." Moragoda thought
that this was positive in that Balasingham had not mentioned the word
"separatism." He admitted that he was not sure what the LTTE might
mean by these terms, however, as they were all subject to various
interpretations.
--------------------
Other Issues Covered
--------------------
7. (C/NF) Moragoda said there was also a
constructive give-and-take on a wide variety of additional subjects
related to the peace process, including: -- Ceasefire Accord
Implementation: Balasingham stressed that it was important that the Sri
Lankan government adhere to the terms of the February ceasefire accord.
He indicated that the matter was not a "deal breaker," however -- the
LTTE just wanted to see more progress. In particular, the Sri Lankan
military had to do a better job of vacating temples and schools. In
addition, the LTTE was concerned about the "high security zones," the
large swaths of the north and east currently controlled by the Sri
Lankan military. These areas should be made smaller, so that Tamil
civilians had increased access to public lands. Moragoda replied that
the government would look into the issue, although the zones were
technically permitted under the ceasefire accord. -- Sea-related Issues:
Balasingham told Moragoda that the LTTE was concerned that Sri Lanka
Naval (SLN) vessels were transiting too close to LTTE shore-based
positions off the Mullaitivu region on Sri Lanka´s northeast coast. LTTE
guns had a range of up to 10 miles in that area. It was important that
the SLN not spark an incident. The LTTE had also recently purchased
trawlers in India and was using them to fish. The GSL should allow this
activity. Moragoda replied that the Sri Lanka Monitoring Mission (SLMM)
should look into these issues; that was what the group was there for.
The issue of transit by LTTE boats was also discussed. The LTTE had
backed off its formerly hard-line stand. It now seemed willing to accede
to a compromise formulation developed by the SLMM that would allow less
than fully armed LTTE cadre to travel via LTTE boats. LTTE boats could
also carry a specified amount of ammunition for their fixed guns, per
the SLMM proposal. -- LTTE Cadre Held Prisoner: Balasingham also
requested that LTTE personnel held prisoner by the government be
released as soon as possible. Moragoda said he would look into the
matter. (Note: Balasingham estimated that the GSL held hundreds of its
cadre prisoner. Moragoda said he had been told by GSL contacts that the
number was less than a hundred.) -- LTTE request re Banking: On behalf
of LTTE financial chief "Thamil Enthy," Balasingham requested that the
government open up banks that would provide loans to farmers and others
living in Tiger-controlled areas. This would help increase economic
activity in the area. Moragoda told Balasingham he would review this. He
noted to the Ambassador that he was checking on whether a defunct
GSL-backed micro-credit bank could be revived in order to focus on this
matter. -- Muslim Issues: Balasingham complained that Sri Lanka Muslim
Congress (SLMC) leader Rauf Hakeem had been asked by the LTTE to keep in
touch with LTTE eastern commander Karuna. Hakeem, however, continued to
demand that his only LTTE interlocutor be the group´s leader, V.
Prabhakaran. This was a problem and was leading to a breakdown in
LTTE-SLMC relations. In fact, the LTTE was increasingly avoiding the
SLMC altogether and dealing directly with other Muslim groups.
-------------------
Query re U.S. Visit
-------------------
8. (C/NF)
The LTTE side also wanted to know about Prime Minister
Wickremesinghe´s July 21-25 visit to the U.S., with Adele Balasingham
specifically asking about the PM´s meeting with President Bush. Moragoda
replied that President Bush had given the PM his full vote of
confidence and had expressed support for a negotiated solution of the
conflict. (Anton) Balasingham commented that this was fine with the
LTTE, as the group understood that the U.S. and India had key roles to
play in the peace process. Moragoda briefly mentioned U.S. assistance on
military matters, commenting that a more secure Sri Lankan military
would only benefit the peace process. ----------------------
Balasingham´s Schedule ----------------------
9. (C/NF)
The London
meeting wrapped up with a brief discussion of Balasingham´s schedule.
Balasingham said he would be in London until mid-August (apparently his
mother-in-law was in town). He planned to travel to Oslo around August
15 to give a speech. He wanted to travel to Canada at some point, too,
but it was not clear whether the Canadian government would permit him to
visit. Around August 20, he planned to travel to Sri Lanka to visit the
LTTE leadership in the north. Balasingham noted that in doing this he
would like to transit India, but it was not clear whether India would
allow him in the country. (Note: The Indian government has previously
given Balasingham a firm "no" in reply to his pleas to enter the
country.) Adele Balasingham noted that her husband´s health was poor and
that India should be helpful and offer him medical treatment if he
needed it while in northern Sri Lanka. (Note: India has said no to this
before, too.)
10. (C/NF)
Moragoda told the Ambassador that he had
invited Balasingham to transit Colombo on his way to the north, but
Balasingham had turned down the offer, saying "not at this time."
Moragoda added that he had heard from the Norwegian side that Helgesen
might make a trip to Sri Lanka in late August, around the same time as
Balasingham´s planned trip.
-------
Comment
-------
11. (C/NF)
Overall, the London meeting seems to have provided a solid foundation
for next steps in the peace process. Moragoda, for one, appeared
confident that the talks had gone well. That said, he made clear that he
did not want to make too much of the meeting and that he remained
cautious, given the difficulty of reading the LTTE´s true intentions.
Certainly, the meeting -- the highest-level GSL-LTTE contact in years --
was an important benchmark. The notion of high-level representatives of
the GSL and the LTTE discussing issues face-to-face in a productive
give-and-take is a new and positive development. In addition, the fact
that the talks took place at all was important for the GSL in
underscoring to Sri Lankans that its peace initiative still maintains
traction and is not sliding backwards. End Comment.
12. (U)
Minimize considered.
WILLS