S E C R E T USNATO 000278
NOFORN SIPDIS
E.O. 12958:
DECL: 08/08/2018 
TAGS: PREL, MARR, NATO, MOPS, PINR, GG, RS
SUBJECT: NATO/GEORGIA: SITUATION AT NATO HQ AS OF COB ON AUGUST 8
REF: A. USNATO 274 B. USNATO 275 C. USNATO 276
Classified By: Charge d'Affaires Bruce Weinrod for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d)

1. (S)
SUMMARY: On the afternoon and early evening of August 8:
-- The Russian Charge reported that Russian Ambassador Rogozin
was returning to Brussels and would likely seek a meeting with
Deputy Secretary General Bisogniero over the weekend. The
Russian Charge also said that the NATO-Russia relationship
would be called into questions by closer NATO-Georgia
relations, including the upcoming visit of the North Atlantic
Council to Tbilisi;
-- The issue of whether NATO AWACS assets should be forward
deployed to Turkey was raised, but the likely recommendation
will be that they be put on a shorter alert status instead;
-- The IS said that they were prepared to call a meeting of
the North Atlantic Council over the weekend if they had to,
but that it is not their intention to do so at the current
time;
-- The Georgian Mission was discussing the possibility of 26
plus 1 meeting with members of the NATO International Staff,
which was urging caution;
-- The Georgian Mission said that Tbilisi was hoping to
involve the international community in the development of a
new conflict resolution dynamic by changing the facts on the
ground; and
-- The French Charge said Paris was cautious about the role
NATO could or should play in the crisis. END SUMMARY

Bisogniero Meets Russian Charge...
----------------------------------

2. (S/NF)
According to a senior American (strictly protect) on the NATO
International Staff (IS), Deputy Secretary General Bisogniero
met with Russian Charge Ivan Soltanovskiy, who reportedly
adopted a sorrowful rather than an angry tone. Soltanovskiy
said that the Secretary General's press statement was
balanced, but asked what NATO meant by "following the
situation." Soltanoskiy claimed that Georgia was perpetrating
ethnic cleansing and that Russia was only protecting Russian
citizens. Soltanovskiy had asserted that Russia was not a
party to the conflict and was only a mediator. Bisogniero had
contradicted him on that point saying: "you are a party, that
is what we meant (in the statement). You are using troops and
bombers, too."

3. (S/NF)
Soltanovskiy reportedly told Bisogniero that Russian
Ambassador Rogozin had decided to interrupt his summer
vacation and return to Brussels. Soltanovskiy said that
Rogozin would likely seek a meeting with Bisogniero this
weekend. D/SYG said he awaited further Russian NATO Mission
calls on the subject. (Note: The IS official said that it was
likely Rogozin would ask for a meeting of the NATO-Russia
Council (NRC). If that occurs, the IS would ask the NRC
PrepCom to meet, perhaps as early as the afternoon of August
11, to prepare the meeting. The IS also intends to hold a NAC
discussion before moving to any "at 27" Ambassadorial
discussion within the NRC format. The IS said that if an NRC
is held, they will recommend that Allies also offer a "26 plus
1" meeting to Georgia.)

Who Makes a Threat Regarding NATO-Georgia Relations
---------------------------------------------------

4. (S/NF)
According to the IS official, Soltanovskiy said that he
assumed the North Atlantic Council's scheduled trip to Georgia
would now be cancelled. Bisogniero pushed back, noting that
NATO had already made a decision to visit Tbilisi and that the
focus of any NATO-Russia dialogue should be on the priority
matters at hand, namely calming the situation down, and not on
a travel schedule. Soltanovskiy warned that if NATO moved
Georgia "forward" -- including if NATO went ahead with the
visit--the NATO-Russia relationship would be "called into
question."

AWACS Deployment Raised
-------------------------------

5. (S/NF)
The IS official reported that SACEUR's Chief of Staff had
raised the posibility of AWACS forward deployment to Izmir,
Turkey. The official had said that the IS position was that
this action might be perceived as being provocative. The IS
intended to recommend that the AWACS "lead time" be shortened
from its usual 48 hours instead. Should the AWACS deploy to
Izmir, it would use a track it uses routinely over Turkey, per
NATO Military Staff. Still, the D/SYG postponed any such
step, pending further developments in the region.

IS Prepared to Call Weekend NAC, but Prefers Not to Do So
---------------------------------------------------------

6. (S/NF)
According to the IS official, the International Staff have put
in place a mechanism to call a NAC meeting over the weekend if
required. He made clear, however, that the IS would prefer not
to do so unless absolutely necessary. He said that Latvia was
the only Ally which had been pressuring the IS to call an
emergency meeting of the NAC.

Georgia Mission Provides Their Thoughts
---------------------------------------

7. (C/NF)
On August 8, Poloff met with Mikheil Darchiashvili, First
Secretary at the Georgian Mission to NATO to discuss
developments in South Ossetia. Darchiashvili said that Georgia
was consulting with NATO International Staff and Allies on the
idea of requesting an urgent meeting with NATO PermReps. He
said that FM Eka Tkeshelashvili would travel to Brussels for
such a meeting. Darchiashvili said Georgia would like do this
quickly, because it fears Russia's ability to use the
NATO-Russia Council mechanism to seize the initiative by
making the first presentation to NATO Allies about the events
leading to the current fighting and the real situation on the
ground. Darchiashvili shared that advice so far from NATO
staff had been to steer the Georgians towards seeking
consultations at a lower level and on a less expedited basis.
(Note: According to the IS official cited above, the IS has
counseled Georgia to clearly think through what it wanted out
of such a meeting and then prepare accordingly.) He
acknowledged that not all NATO Allies would listen to a
Georgian presentation with a non-critical ear and that Georgia
would have to be extremely well prepared for such a meeting.

8. (C/NF)
In regard to the fighting, Darchiashvili said Georgia now
holds 90 percent of South Ossetia. He had heard from Tbilisi
that President Saakashvili was considering trying to involve
the international community in a new conflict resolution
process based on this new de facto situation on the ground. He
said President Saakashvili was reaching out to world leaders
to seek support for this approach.

French Charge Urges Caution on NATO Role in the Crisis
------------------------------------------------------

9. (C/NF)
FR Charge Duchene contacted A/DCM 1730 L time to explain that
Paris was concerned about NATO becoming too prominent a part
of the dynamic on S.Ossetia and was also eager to keep the EU
on the fringe of the conflict as well. She said that NATO,s
earlier Friday public statement had been "enough of a NATO
role for now." She asked whether the U.S. supported reported
calls by NATO Baltic delegations to hold a NAC at the soonest
possible moment. A/DCM said that we were in contact with the
D/SYG, who already had conveyed a SYG decision not to hold a
near-term NAC, and that we were focused on efforts to get
Russia to disengage from hostilities. Duchene said this
approach dovetailed with Paris, emphasis as well. She said
that Paris saw the OSCE and bilateral efforts as the lead
channels to achieve this goal. She added that she had heard
that Russian NATO AMB Rogozin was returning from vacation this
weekend and predicted that he would want visible NATO-Russia
meetings early in the week. Furthermore, she anticipated
Georgian requests for 26 plus one meetings. A/DCM concurred
that we could anticipate these calls and it was important that
Georgian voices be heard as Moscow sought NATO hearings of its
views. We agreed that both the NATO-Russia framework and the
Partnership for Peace and EAPC frameworks offered Russia and
Georgia, respectively, the opportunity to talk with NATO in
times of heightened tensions. Duchene noted Rogozin,s
proclivity for grandstanding in the media and agreed that NATO
needed to manage the conduct of the meetings, public
expectations for what they might produce in NATO follow-on
steps, and related public diplomacy so as not to inadvertently
contribute to any destabilization of the situation.

WEINROD