S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 03 RIGA 000496 NOFORN SIPDIS E.O. 12958: 
DECL: 08/15/2023 TAGS: PREL, PGOV, MARR, PHUM, NATO, EUN, RS, GG, LG 
SUBJECT: TFGG01: WHAT GEORGIA MEANS TO LATVIA REF: A) RIGA 478 B) RIGA 
472 C) RIGA 492 Classified By: A/DCM Tamir G. Waser. Reason: 1.4 (d) 

1. (C) Summary: Events in Georgia have dominated the news and discussion 
here like few other events in recent memory. Latvians, at least ethic 
Latvians, look at Georgia and think that this could easily be them. As 
the EU and NATO have been unable to respond forcefully to Russia -- and 
many members advocate for a balanced approach -- Latvians are beginning 
to worry if membership in these two organizations provides them the 
assurances of their security that they had hoped for when they joined. 
So far, the US willingness to take a tough line in opposition to Russian
actions and in support of Georgia has been well received here, but some
key figures are asking if the west is fully prepared to deal with a 
resurgent Russia. We expect that the Latvians will make additional 
requests for tangible signs of our commitment to their security in 
coming weeks and months. A wild card in Latvian thinking is how the 
personal economic ties many key players have with Russia will influence 
their thinking - and whether they continue to believe that they can 
separate politics and business with Russia. 

2. (C) Summary, cont'd. Also
influencing events is the fact that roughly one third of the country is
ethnic Russian, who receive much of their information from Moscow based
or affiliated news sources. Their perceptions of the crisis in Georgia 
and our role are diametrically opposed to those above and are a reminder
of the serious ethnic divide in Latvia. Unfortunately, while these 
events have highlighted the need for greater integration in Latvia, the 
resulting political tensions have made integration that much more 
difficult to achieve. End summary. 

3. (C) Georgia dominates here at the 
moment. Most any conversation includes some discussion of the situation,
newscasts and newspapers are covering little else, and internet 
discussions are lively and have wide participation. Among Latvians, at 
least ethnic Latvians, what you hear is a sense that this could have 
been us. Recalling their own history with Russia, Latvians have been 
visibly demonstrating their support for and solidarity with Georgia. An 
August 11 march, advertised only through mentions on newscasts and 
online posts, drew over 1,000 people in support of Georgia. Candle 
lightings outside the Georgian Embassy are well attended and Georgian 
flags can be seen around Riga. Anecdotal evidence suggests that sales of
Georgian wine and mineral water have increased. 

4. (C) In discussing 
events in Georgia, most Latvians we talk to say that they feel the value
of NATO and EU membership and believe that the possibility that the 
same thing could happen to them is greatly reduced. At the same time, 
the divisions in both organizations over how to deal with Russia worry 
Latvians. Comments by Russian Ambassador to Latvia Veshnyakov that the 
Baltics and Poland should not "rush to judgment" lest they encounter 
"unforeseen consequences" did not put any nerves at ease. We reported on
MFA views on a full re-evaluation of relations with Russia and 
frustration with NATO and EU positions (Ref A), but it is also worth 
noting some of the public comments of key opinion leaders here. Former 
President Vike-Freiberga said she was "surprised and disappointed" that 
an emergency GAERC was not convened until August 13 and that the EU 
"failed to come out with a common, coordinated and condemning stance," 
in contrast to the joint statement by the Baltic and Polish Presidents. 
Aivars Ozolins, perhaps the country's most influential columnist, wrote 
that the crisis has exposed "serious divisions" in the west on relations
with Russia and argued that Latvia must demand clear plans from NATO to
defend its territory. He concluded one recent column with the line, "We
are in a new cold war and Latvia is on the front line." 

5. (C) The 
question of what Latvia does in response is also vexing to key figures. 
PM Godmanis was widely praised for his visit to Georgia with Baltic, 
Polish and Ukrainian leaders, and for delivering a strong message of 
support (and President Zatlers has been criticized for not cutting short
his visit to the Olympics in China). The parliament adopted a tough 
resolution critical of Russia and calling on the EU and NATO to 
reconsider their approach to Moscow. Latvia has reaffirmed its strong 
support for MAP for both Georgia and Ukraine. But Latvians are 
frustrated that they cannot do more to influence the situation directly.
They want to be an active voice in debates at both headquarters in 
Brussels, but feel lost between the big powers. They see their best 
hopes as getting the Nordics on board with the Baltics, Poland and Czech
Republic and are heartened by what they view as realistic comments on a
"changed situation with Russia" coming out of Stockholm and Helsinki in
particular. Former

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FM Pabriks told the 
Ambassador that "Now it is important that Latvia works to convince the 
EU that there is no business as usual with Russia." 

6. (S/NF) In this, 
though, Latvia will face its own internal challenges. Many people in 
Latvia, including key political figures, have very lucrative business 
relationships with Russia that they fear losing. It was telling that FM 
Riekstins, asked about the future of bilateral relations, remarked that 
"business is business." (ref B) Leaders of the People's Party, to which 
Riekstins belongs, have many business deals with Russia, notably in the 
energy sector. Transport minister Ainars Slesers, who has made a fortune
off real estate and transit deals that rely heavily on Russia, stated 
at the parliamentary debate on Georgia that "although Russia clearly 
crossed a line a in its response, we need to at least consider whether 
Saakashvili does not bear some blame for provoking this crisis." From 
sensitive sources, we understand that immediately after the crisis broke
out, the Russian Ambassador to Latvia called Slesers and former PM (and
People's Party founder) Andris Skele to explain Russia's position. We 
think it is no accident that he called two of Latvia's three oligarchs 
(and while he didn't call Aivars Lembergs directly, he also called the 
parliamentary leader of the party closest to Lembergs) to try to play 
the business card to build political support for Russia. As the days 
move on, key figures in Latvia will likely find that they face much 
tougher choices on relations with Russia than just whether to cease NATO
military cooperation with Russia or end EU negotiations on visa 
facilitation. The one exception to this may be PM Godmanis. As reported 
in other channels, he immediately recognized the possibility for Russian
retaliation through the energy sector and ordered contingency plans 
drawn up. Unfortunately, we expect that the first instincts of many of 
the other political players will be to do everything they can to 
preserve their personal business deals, clinging to their naive idea 
that business and politics with Russia can be separated. 

7. (C) One area
where we do expect to see concrete actions by the Latvians is to 
increase their military preparedness. PM Godmanis was clear with the 
Ambassador that this needed to be done, even knowing the costs involved.
(ref C) The Defense Minister has stated publicly that Latvia needs to 
review its own defense posture and privately told us that he will look 
for US assistance in this project. We can expect further political calls
for a comprehensive NATO plan to defend the Baltics. Former FM Pabriks 
suggested to us that Latvia needs to look at increasing the size of its 
military forces, noting that Georgia, less than twice as large as 
Latvia, had 2,000 troops in Iraq when Latvia had a hard time finding 
even 100 to deploy. 

8. (C) The aspect of the Georgia crisis that has 
ethnic Latvian especially nervous is the Russian claim that they went in
to Georgia to protect Russian citizens. Latvia's population is nearly 
one-third ethic Russian and half of those, more than 420,000 people, are
not citizens of Latvia. While only a small number (estimated at roughly
20,000) have Russian citizenship, Russia has been taking steps to 
increase ties with these "compatriots" through steps such as waiving 
visa requirements to enter Russia and providing access to educational 
and social benefits in Russia. This population gets its information from
a completely separate media space that relies heavily on Moscow sources
for its foreign news. As a result, Russian language media here is 
talking of Georgian 'genocide' in South Ossetia, suggesting that the US 
endorsed Saakashvili's move on Tsinkvali in advance, and drawing 
parallels to Kosovo. (septel will report on this in greater detail) 

9. (C) Some Latvians recognize that the lesson of Georgia is that Latvia 
needs to do more to integrate its ethnic Russian population and have 
them view themselves as Latvian (or at least European Union) citizens 
first and Russians second. Political scientist Peteris Vinkelis, himself
married to a Russian, ended a television interview on events in Georgia
with a plea for the two communities to work together and find common 
ground so as not to become like Georgia. Other senior officials have 
told us that they would also like to see progress on this front. 

10. (C)
All of those good ideas, though, go out the window the minute politics 
is injected and there are few issues as politically divisive here as 
integration of the Russian speaking population. With a crowded political
field among the ethnic Latvian based parties, none of them are willing 
to risk the firestorm that would ensue from advocating any change to the
citizenship process. In fact, more likely is that they will take steps 
to, for example, increase the number of jobs for which certification of 
Latvian language skills are required. Logical steps on integration, such
as

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allowing everyone born in Latvia automatic 
citizenship, are rejected because they are what Moscow has been pushing 
for years and ethnic Latvians are unwilling, as they see it, to "reward 
Russia's aggression in Georgia" by easing the requirements for 
citizenship. Meanwhile, ethnic Russians are unlikely to respond to 
events by seeking Latvian citizenship and some of the more radical 
elements will hope that Russia might decide to make acquisition of 
Russian citizenship easier for this group. 

11. (C) The challenge for the
United States policy in Latvia given events in Georgia is to consider 
ways that we can bolster our relationship to both assure Latvians of our
continued commitment to their security and helps them develop the tools
needed for coping with changed relations with Russia, including in 
their domestic situation. We will be putting our heads together here and
sending in some thoughts in coming days.

LARSON