C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 MOSCOW 002426 SIPDIS DEPT FOR EUR/RUS, FOR EEB/ESC/IEC GALLOGLY AND WRIGHT EUR/CARC, SCA (GALLAGHER, SUMAR) DOE FOR FREDRIKSEN, HEGBORG, EKIMOFF DOC FOR 4231/IEP/EUR/JBROUGHER E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/15/2018 TAGS: EPET, ENRG, ECON, PREL, GG, RS SUBJECT: TFGG01: ENERGY AND THE CONFLICT IN GEORGIA REF: A. BAKU 740 B. ASHGABAT 1039 C. YEREVAN 646 Classified By: DCM Eric S. Rubin for Reasons 1.4 (b/d) ------- SUMMARY ------- 1. (C) Pundits around the world have linked Russia's energy ambitions to its actions in Georgia. However, our contacts here largely believe energy is an afterthought. Despite various press reports suggesting Russia has targeted the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan (BTC) pipeline, absolutely none of our contacts believe that to be true. That said, there can be no doubt there are energy ramifications to this crisis. The conflict has raised uncertainty about the security of transport routes through Georgia and put Azerbaijan and Central Asia in a more delicate position with respect to Russia. Some of our contacts believe it may have also done damage to prospects for foreign investment in Russia's own energy sector. On a related note, we have heard reports that Russia has cut gas supplies to Georgia (ref C), but have not been able to verify them. End Summary. --------------------------------- SAAKASHVILI TARGET, NOT PIPELINES --------------------------------- 2. (C) From the West's view, the primary energy concern related to the conflict is the security and stability of oil and gas transit through Georgia. BTC, the most critical link, or the other pipelines in the corridor, would be obvious targets for the Russian military, if its intention were to disrupt energy supplies to global markets. There have been press reports that the Russians targeted, and either hit or missed (depending on the report), BTC. The GOR has publicly denied that it has targeted any pipelines. BP has also reportedly denied that the pipelines it operates have been targeted. Everyone with whom we have spoken about this issue believes Russia is certainly capable of damaging the pipeline and therefore discounts reports that it "missed." Most also believe that a deliberate attack on the pipeline by Russia would be counterproductive to Russian interests. 3. (C) Former Deputy Energy Minister and now opposition political activist Vladimir Milov told us August 12 that he does not believe the Russians deliberately targeted BTC. If they had, he said, they would have damaged it. Even if they missed the first time, he explained, the Russian military would have just kept bombing until they hit it. Milov also does not believe that energy considerations motivated Russia's actions in Georgia. Instead, according to Milov, the conflict was largely driven by Putin's personal and long-term animosity toward Saakashvili, stemming back to the Rose Revolution, and that this was Putin's way of advertising to regional leaders that they should not "mess with Putin." Milov added that he was surprised by Georgia's "miscalculation," noting that Russia's likely response should have been obvious. According to Milov, while energy issues were not a motivating factor, replacing Saakashvili with someone less hostile to the Kremlin, and perhaps more pliable, would certainly suit Russian energy interests. 4. (C) Jerry Rohan, long-time head of the energy practice at PriceWaterhouseCoopers in Russia and now an independent consultant, told us August 11 that if Russia were to attack energy infrastructure, it would immediately discredit its long-standing claims that it does not use energy as a political weapon. The same would hold true for other potential oil and gas infrastructure including the Baku-Tbilisi-Erzurum (BTE) gas pipeline, the Baku-Supsa oil pipeline, and relevant shipping ports. Even if the hostilities were to continue to escalate, the harm to Russia's already bruised reputation would be very great were it to deliberately disrupt one of the major oil routes through the region. 5. (C) Western diplomats with whom have discussed the issue also believe that Russia would not have missed BTC if it had MOSCOW 00002426 002 OF 003 chosen to deliberately target it. One EU diplomat who closely follows the energy sector suggested that blowing up BTC would make "absolutely no sense" given Russia's interest in securing Azeri gas. Since BTC is an economic lifeblood for Azerbaijan, a Russian attack on BTC would kill any Azeri interest in cooperating with Russia on gas transit and sales. This diplomat believes energy issues are only of derivative interest in the conflict, "not a main consideration." Another EU diplomat responsible for energy and transportation issues suggested that even if Russia did not have adequately precise bombs to hit BTC from a distance, it could have used guerrilla tactics to damage BTC or other pipelines. He also agreed that energy was not a driving factor of Russia's actions in Georgia, but that Russia would have understood that its military action could potentially be beneficial to its regional energy interests by ratcheting up risk and uncertainty. ---------- ADDED RISK ---------- 6. (C) The conflict in Georgia has clearly added uncertainty about the security and stability of future energy transport through the Caucasus corridor, which could play to Russia's advantage. Whether energy was motivation for Russia's attack or not, there is little doubt that players in the region are taking a second look at the vulnerabilities of energy transport through a region which is now directly involved in military conflict. In particular, security concerns have been thrust to the top of investors' lists in thinking about the region's energy infrastructure. Many investment house analysts have noted the added political risks to the sector regionally due to the Georgia conflict. (Note: As reported in ref B, the GOTX has already raised infrastructure security concerns related to future cooperation with Azerbaijan on energy transport through the region. End note.) 7. (C) Alf D'Souza, Vice President at Shell Russia, suggested one benefit to Russia could be that Central Asians weigh potential Russian investment in energy more favorably and western investment less favorably than before. He added that the events in Georgia could also give China a stronger hand in Central Asian energy. Another western oil and gas executive, who requested not to be identified, had predicted, prior to this episode, that an event such as the ongoing conflict in Georgia would lead Turkmenistan, for example, to be less inclined to challenge Russian energy interests. 8. (C) However, another energy-related casualty of the conflict could be investor confidence in Russia's own energy sector. Along with general oil price declines globally, the Georgian crisis has pummeled the Russian stock market in recent days. This stems partly from the fact that many investors perceive the conflict as having strengthened the hand of economic nationalists and weakened that of liberal reformers. Cambridge Energy Research Associates' Russia specialist John Webb told us August 11 that he thinks the conflict "rings alarm bells for energy investors," adding that it raises questions about policy control in Russia. If people see Putin giving the orders, they understand that Medvedev, for all his talk of reform, still must defer to Putin. -------------- GAS TO GEORGIA -------------- 9. (C) Milov said he has heard in the last few days that Russian gas supplies to Georgia have been "reduced" by as much as 75 percent. He also noted that he had recently been in Armenia, before the current crisis, and was struck at how strongly the Armenians fear that Russia would "ignore" Armenian interests in secure gas supplies in the event of hostilities between Russia and Georgia. (Note: While we have no way of verifying the volumes of gas flows to Georgia, ref C reports that supplies to Armenia from Russia through Georgia are down by up to 50%. End note.) 10. (C) Russia could use gas supplies to inflict some direct pain onto Georgia. According to Gazprom statistics, Russia's share of Georgian gas supplies dropped dramatically from 2006 MOSCOW 00002426 003 OF 003 to 2007 (73% to 41%) with new Azeri supplies through the BTE. But even at that level, Russia could cause disruptions to Georgian consumers as winter approaches, especially if, as reported in ref A, Azerbaijan doesn't have additional supplies available to fill the demand. ------- COMMENT ------- 11. (C) Russia has a long-term interest in securing Central Asian oil and gas supplies for its own consumption and to meet its export commitments. It also has an interest in controlling, to the extent possible, the transit of Central Asian oil and gas in order to minimize competition and maximize its own economic gains and political clout. However, despite various global opinion pieces to the contrary, it is not clear that Russia's energy ambitions were a significant driver in its foray into Georgia. Rather, the benefits to Russia's regional energy interests are, in the Kremlin's view, welcome by-products. We can expect Moscow to follow up strongly, especially in Central Asia, where the Kremlin probably believes energy suppliers are now less likely to seek closer ties to the West. End comment. BEYRLE