C O N F I D E N T I A L BRATISLAVA 000377 SIPDIS STATE FOR EUR/NCE, 
EUR/CARC, EUR/UMB, EUR/RPM E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/12/2018 TAGS: PREL, 
PGOVLO, GG, RU, LO SUBJECT: SLOVAK MFA EXPRESSES DEEP CONCERN REGARDING 
RUSSIAN ACTIONS IN GEORGIA REF: A) STATE 86108 B) BRATISLAVA 372 C) 
STATE 85678 Classified By: Deputy Chief of Mission Keith Eddins, Reasons
1.4 b and d 

1. (C) Summary. DCM and Pol/Econ Chief delivered ref c 
demarche to the MFA's Director for Russia, NIS and the Balkans, Stefan 
Rozkopal on August 12. Rozkopal -- recounting recent meetings with the 
Russian Ambassador and DCM -- characterized Russia's actions and 
rhetoric as unacceptable, obfuscatory and reminiscent of the Communist 
era. Rozkopal told DCM that MFA instructions to Slovakia's NATO 
delegation for the August 12 NAC closely tracked the points (ref a) in 
Ambassador's demarche on August 11, but added that he did not think the 
EU line emerging from the August 13 GAERC would be as strong as earlier 
statements by individual European leaders, e.g., Swedish FM Bildt. 
Rozkopal suggested that FM Kubis, who spoke on August 11 to Russian FM 
Lavrov, might cut short his vacation to attend the GAERC. Rozkopal 
observed that this week of meetings (NAC, GAERC, UNSC) was just the 
beginning, and wondered aloud how others in the Slovak government and 
political elite, e.g., Prime Minister Fico would approach the situation.
End Summary. 

2. (C) Rozkopal was quick to point out broad Slovak 
agreement with the U.S. points and shared his impressions of recent 
conversations at the Ministry with resident Russian diplomats. Rozkopal,
who studied in Moscow and speaks fluent Russian, noted that the 
language used by both the Russian Ambassador in his meeting with the 
State Secretary and with him made a "highly negative" impression. He 
claimed the Russian Ambassador actually referred to the "Soviet Union," 
before correcting himself and made other such verbal "slips" that 
created a very anachronistic atmosphere. In response to persistent 
questioning by State Secretary Algayerova (the highest ranking MFA 
official present in Bratislava) as to how Russia's stated aims were 
served by bombing locations deep inside Georgian territory, the Russian 
Ambassador had no answer, parroting President Medvedev and PM Putin's 
statements about "punishing the aggressors." 

3. (C) In a subsequent 
meeting with Rozkopal, the Russian Ambassador was more straightforward; 
asked how the destruction of Georgian communications and radar comported
with the mission to "protect" civilians and peacekeepers, the Russian 
diplomat noted that "this is war; and in war, one of the first 
priorities is to destroy the enemy's communications." Rozkopal agreed 
that although Russian behavior is reminiscent of past conflicts, the 
current situation is "something new" and a bold Russian gambit to change
the reality on the ground. Rozkopal noted that FM Kubis, who is on 
leave, had had a tough telephone conversation with FM Lavrov, and that 
Kubis might cut short his vacation to attend the GAERC. As for any 
statements emerging from the August 13 meeting, Rozkopal predicted 
something short of the tough rhetoric of FM Bildt and the Polish and 
Baltic leaders, but made clear that Slovakia supported a message of full
support for Georgia's territorial integrity and sovereignty. 

4. (U) On 
August 11, following Kubis's calls with Lavrov, Czech FM Schwarzenberg 
and former Chair of the Georgian Parliament Burdzanadeova, the MFA 
issued a statement that read, in part: "Minister Kubis repeated 
long-standing support for preservation of the territorial integrity and 
complete respect for the sovereignty of Georgia, and likewise rejection 
of the use of force to resolve contentious or open questions. Minister 
Kubis at the same time expressed his deep displeasure with the 
developing situation in Georgia, in particular in connection with 
military operations which have moved beyond the administrative borders 
of South Ossetia." 

5. (C) Rozkopal concluded the meeting by noting that 
the MFA continued to provide guidance and information memos -- which he 
described as "not at all pro-Russian" -- to senior GOS officials, e.g., 
PM Fico. He added that it would be "very interesting" to see how Fico 
and other key political elites, such as the Chairman of Parliament's 
Foreign Affairs Committee Boris Zala, would address the situation. 

6. (C) Comment: Rozkopal is a facile diplomat, who, like several others in 
the Slovak MFA, believes he has better insights into Russian thinking 
and tactics than most European (and certainly U.S.) diplomats. In this 
meeting, Rozkopal's main goal was to let us know how unacceptable he 
deemed Russian actions and rhetoric. Nevertheless, when the Slovak 
government returns to session next week we anticipate that PM Fico will 
likely stake out a position on the margins of the EU with respect to 
Russian actions, i.e., he will be as non-critical as possible. We also 
expect he will draw connections between Kosovo -- both the precedent of 
its independence and the NATO bombings -- and the situation in the 
Caucuses. 

7. (C) Comment continued: Post is mounting a vigorous public 
diplomacy campaign, drawing on briefings and statements by senior USG 
officials, to present to the Slovak public a balanced picture of the 
events in Georgia and to combat this flawed, but unfortunately 
prevalent, argumentation. With the 40th anniversary of the Warsaw Pact 
invasion of Czechoslovakia fast approaching, it will be interesting to 
observe to what extent these events will be seen through that prism, or,
conversely, to what extent Putin's logic and lies will be accepted. 
OBSITNIK