C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 BERLIN 001130 SIPDIS E.O. 
12958: DECL: 08/14/2018 TAGS: MOPS, PREL, PHUM, OSCE, UN, GG, RS 
SUBJECT: TFGG01: MERKEL "WILL TALK TOUGH" IN SOCHI; FOREIGN OFFICE AND 
BUNDESTAG DISPLAY MIXTURE OF RESOLVE AND SKEPTICISM REF: A. STATE 87254 
B. BERNSTEIN/RATHKE - HODGES EMAILS Classified By: Acting DCM Jeffrey 
Rathke for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d). 

1. (C) SUMMARY: The Ambassador 
August 14 delivered the points in reftel separately to Deputy National 
Security Advisory Rolf Nikel and to MFA State Secretary Ammon (with 
Special Envoy to the Caucasus Hans-Dieter Lucas). Nikel agreed with the 
U.S. points and said the Chancellor would take a tough stance in her 
August 15 meeting with President Medvedev in Sochi. Nikel strongly 
agreed that it was important for the U.S. and Europe to work together to
hold Russia to its commitments. The Foreign Office agreed with the 
points as well but demonstrated greater skepticism about the ability of 
the West to exert influence. A/DCM and PolOff also met with the foreign 
policy spokesmen of the government caucuses in the Bundestag, Eckart Von
Klaeden (CDU/CSU) and Gert Weisskirchen (SPD). Both spokesmen shared 
U.S. priorities on holding Russia to its word. END SUMMARY Chancellery 
Says Merkel Will be Tough 

2. (C) Ambassador and Acting DCM met with 
Deputy National Security Adviser Rolf Nikel and 
senior-director-equivalent Geza von Geyr. Nikel said he agreed 
completely with reftel points. It was important for the six-point plan 
to be implemented as soon as possible; any other actions by Russian 
forces were unacceptable and must stop. That included Russian withdrawal
from Gori, which was outside South Ossetia but represented a strategic 
line of communication in Georgia. A Russian presence on that line could 
strangle the Georgian economy. Germany had received reports of 
irregulars from the northern Caucasus, wearing no insignia. It was 
Russia's responsibility to get them out, in the Chancellery's view. 

3. (C) Nikel underscored Germany's view that Russia had to pull back 
quickly in line with the agreement. An increase in the OSCE contingent 
was needed as soon as possible. Germany and the U.S. shared the aim of 
delivering humanitarian assistance to the Georgian population -- Nikel 
said the Chancellor would be active on this in Sochi. "We will talk 
tough -- no question." He asked for further information about the 
humanitarian mission announced August 13 by the President. Would naval 
transports arrive soon in Georgia, and at which ports? Nikel said the 
Chancellor might be able to assist in warning the Russians not to 
interfere with humanitarian assistance -- including U.S. assistance -- 
and requested any information the U.S. could share about when our 
vessels might enter Poti or other ports. We subsequently shared with 
Nikel information in ref (b) emails about U.S. assistance planning. 
Nikel thanked us for the information and said he would inform the 
Chancellor. Nikel said Germany would not back down on the principle of 
the territorial integrity of Georgia, despite recent public statements 
by Russian FM Lavrov that one could "forget" Georgia's territorial 
integrity. 

4. (C) Nikel asked about Secretary Rice's travel schedule and
said that Chancellor Merkel would visit Georgia, not during her Russia 
trip, but "soon afterwards." 

5. (C) Asked whether Russia was in contact 
with Prime Minister Putin through any channels, Nikel said Merkel 
believed emphatically that Medvedev was the appropriate interlocutor. 
She believed it would needlessly increase Putin's standing if she sought
contact with him. 

6. (C) After the meeting, A/DCM asked von Geyr 
whether the Chancellery had been consulted by the Foreign Office about 
Germany's position on the role to be played by the G-7 foreign 
ministers, including the advisability of a statement. Von Geyr said the 
Chancellery knew nothing about the issue. Foreign Office Agrees with 
U.S., but Fears Russia in Driver's Seat 

7. (C) Ambassador and A/DCM met 
with State Secretary Peter Ammon (accompanied by Caucasus Special Envoy 
Lucas) and encouraged Germany to raise the issues in reftel with the 
Russians. Ammon agreed with the points and the Ambassador's statement 
that Russia should not be allowed to move the goal posts set just a few 
days ago during Sarkozy's visit. Ammon highlighted the "informal manner"

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in which the six-point plan was agreed, and the potential for
difficulty in getting the Russians to agree to a UNSCR text. 

8. (C) Lucas said EU foreign ministers were united August 13 on 
several key points: the need for humanitarian aid, the importance of 
ensuring the cease-fire was respected, and not getting distracted by a 
discussion of how the conflict had been started. FM Steinmeier spoke 
August 13 with Lavrov, who showed some openness on international 
observers, but then had made very unhelpful comments today on 
territorial integrity. 

9. (C) Lucas said that, unfortunately, "Russia is
in the driver's seat." The Ambassador said that depended on the West's 
response; if we provided political support and humanitarian and 
reconstruction assistance, we would demonstrate that we remain 
committed. Ammon agreed and emphasized that we should remain focused. 
Parliamentary Spokesmen: Forward-looking 

10. (C) FM Steinmeier briefed a
special session of the Bundestag Foreign Relations Committee August 14.
A/DCM and PolOff met in advance of that session with CDU/CSU Bundestag 
Caucus foreign policy spokesman Eckart von Klaeden. Von Klaeden ran 
through the points he planned to raise and sought U.S. views. A/DCM 
delivered reftel points and drew from recent statements by the President
and the Secretary, emphasizing that Russia risked its credibility as a 
member of 21st Century structures through its actions in Georgia. Von 
Klaeden agreed that Georgia's territorial integrity was essential and 
could not be conceded. He was especially concerned about the 
implications of Russia's actions in Georgia for Ukraine. He asked for 
any U.S. background or perspective on the legal issues surrounding 
treaties between Ukraine and Russia and whether these were a serious 
point of leverage for Moscow. 

11. (C) A/DCM and PolOff also met with SPD
Caucus foreign policy spokesman Gert Weisskirchen, who stated that the 
differences within and among the parties appeared manageable, including 
within his SPD. He thought the special committee session would help 
focus parliamentary voices on the challenges presented by Russian 
actions. Weisskirchen agreed on the need to hold Russia to its 
commitments. Weisskirchen also supported the U.S. humanitarian 
assistance and viewed humanitarian aid as a top priority. Although the 
conflict had been a disaster for Georgia, he said it might be possible 
to turn this military defeat toward political progress, if the West was 
able to get the OSCE in and the EU was able to strengthen ties with the 
Ukraine. Russia had overreacted and had much to lose. TIMKEN JR