C O N F I D E N T I A L BAKU 000768 SIPDIS FOR EUR/CARC E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/13/2018 TAGS: PREL, PGOV, PHUM, GG, AJ SUBJECT: AZERBAIJAN'S LOW-PROFILE RESPONSE TO RUSSIAN-GEORGIAN CLASH Classified By: Charge d'Affaires Donald Lu for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d). 1. (C) Summary: Presidential foreign policy advisor Novruz Mammadov told the Charge on August 13 that Russia's military operations against Georgia are consistent with Russia's desire to regain its "empire" in the South Caucasus. Mammadov reiterated the point many GOAJ officials make with Embassy officers: Azerbaijan's more cautious approach to Russia is more sensible than Tbilisi's confrontational style. The GOAJ's public response largely has been quiet, with Ministry of Foreign Affairs spokesperson Khazar Ibrahim briefly highlighting Azerbaijan's support for Georgia's territorial integrity and the need to solve the conflict according to the principle of territorial integrity in an August 8 public statement. Among the general public, the prevailing sympathy is with Georgia; many locals interpret Russia's recent military actions as part of a broader attempt to reassert its influence in the South Caucasus. The volume of people crossing from Georgia into Azerbaijan reportedly has returned to pre-conflict levels. End Summary. President's Advisor: Caution Over Confrontation ------------------------------------------------ 2. (C) Presidential foreign policy advisor Novruz Mammadov told the Charge on August 13 that Azerbaijan needed to react very carefully to the Russian military operation against Georgia. He began the discussion by showing a map with Georgian cities circled in red where Russian planes had bombed. The pattern of bombing, according to Mammadov, made it clear to him that the target was Georgia's oil and gas infrastructure -- both the pipelines themselves but also the perception that this route is safe and reliable. Mammadov also noted that Russia's main objective is to block Caspian basin energy from reaching western markets. He emphasized that Azerbaijan's numerous energy facilities, including the Sangachal oil and gas terminal, would be easy targets for a similar Russian attack. 3. (C) Mammadov emphasized that Azerbaijan's cautious Russian policy is more sensible than Tbilisi's penchant for confrontation. According to Mammadov, Russia views the South Caucasus as a lost empire and took advantage of tensions with Georgia to assert its military strength. He noted that Russia is launching a full court press in the Russian language media concerning its position on the conflict. He advised the U.S. and Europe to work together to counter this Russian propaganda. He believes that the Russian attack was premeditated and is the long-awaited response to Kosovo independence and Georgia's aspiration for NATO membership action plan status. GOAJ Keeping a Quiet Public Line -------------------------------- 4. (C) The official GOAJ response has been muted. On August 8, Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) spokesperson Khazar Ibrahim gave a short public statement expressing support for Georgia's territorial integrity and the need to solve the conflict within the framework of Georgia's territorial integrity. On August 12, when Ibrahim was asked about Georgia's decision to withdraw from the Commonwealth of Independent States, Ibrahim only stated, "This is Georgia's decision." Public Sympathizes with Tbilisi ------------------------------- 5. (C) Despite the GOAJ's limited public response, the general public overwhelmingly sympathizes with Georgia over Russia. Although some criticize Georgian President Saakashivili for an "emotional" decision to take Tskhinvali, Russia's military actions against Georgia reinforce the strongly-held Azerbaijani perception that Russia is an aggressive power seeking to reassert its influence in the South Caucasus. Reflecting the prevailing negative view of Russia, an article in the independent Zerkalo newspaper referred to Russia's military operation as a "fascist" undertaking. In the past several days, there have been several small attempted rallies in front of the Russian Embassy to show solidarity with Georgia. The police have broken up each of these demonstrations. Limited Outflow from Georgia ---------------------------- 6. (C) UNHCR Director William Tall told the Embassy a UNHCR team deployed to the Azerbaijan-Georgia border on August 10 to monitor the potential refugee flow. Thus far, the UNHCR team reported a significant amount of people crossing the border into Azerbaijan, but the processing was stable and orderly. The majority of people leaving Georgia were foreign citizens living in Georgia, not Georgian citizens. The number of ethnic Azeris and Turks crossing into Azerbaijan was low, according the Tall. 7. (C) U.S. Emboffs at the Red Bridge border crossing in northeastern Azerbaijan on August 13 reported that border crossing were back down to their normal level, which are approximately 300 per day. Local Azerbaijani customs officials reported that during the peak of the conflict, there was a maximum flow of 1,000 people per day. An MFA consular officer deployed to the Red Bridge border checkpoint to facilitate individuals seeking an Azerbaijani visa reported that he only issue 20 visas on August 12. Comment ------- 8. (C) While it is summer and many GOAJ officials are on vacation, the GOAJ's limited public stance concerning the conflict tracks with the broader GOAJ preference for caution in dealing with Russia. Presidential Foreign Policy Adviser Mammadov told us that it was convenient to have the President in Beijing and the other ministers on holiday as it reduced the expectation of a government response to this crisis. LU