From: <a href="http://www.kp.ru/daily/25623/790207/">www.kp.ru</a><br>
Date: 2010-02-11.
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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 MOSCOW 000304
SIPDIS
E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/14/2020
TAGS: PREL, PGOV, PHUM, KDEM, RS
SUBJECT: HUMAN RIGHTS ACTIVISTS QUESTION THE RESET
Classified By: DCM Eric Rubin for reason 1.4 (d)

1. (C) Summary: A group of civil society leaders told Senior
Russia NSC Director Michael McFaul January 14 that they were
disappointed with the perceived U.S. retreat on support of
human rights in Russia. While they cautioned against returning
to what they called the "aggressive" style of the Bush
Administration, the activists requested more public criticism
of the GOR's human rights transgressions. McFaul, however,
pointed to an extensive record of public statements and
private interventions by Administration officials, including
the President. The activists also offered ideas for a new
strategy of rights promotion, including isolating Kadyrov by
improving relations with Presidents of other North Caucasus
Republics. The activists expressed doubt that anything useful
could take place in the Bilateral Presidential Commission
Civil Society Working Group as long as Vladislav Surkov was
involved, and suggested that independent Russian NGOs be
allowed to help shape the discussion. McFaul emphasized that
the Civil Society Working Group was only one small part of a
much broader approach to fostering development of civil
society and promoting democracy and human rights in Russia.
End Summary.

2. (C) In a frank exchange at the Embassy on January 14, a
group of Russian civil society leaders told Senior Russia NSC
Director Michael McFaul of their disappointment with what they
perceive as a U.S. retreat on support of human rights in
Russia. Svetlana Gannushkina of the NGO Civil Assistance (who
also works with Memorial and is a member of President
Medvedev's Council on Human Rights) said that the human rights
situation in Russia had sharply deteriorated in the past year,
especially in the North Caucasus, where people are "trembling"
with a fear that approaches that of Stalin's times. She
insinuated that the "reset" in U.S.-Russia relations was
stifling activists' ability to speak out on abuses, asserting
that after the murder of Chechen activist Natalya Estemirova
in July, Kadyrov "got the message" that no one was going to
protest, which led him to conclude that he had carte blanche
for more murders. According to Gannushkina, this in turn led
to further killings, such as the shooting of activists Zarema
Sadulayeva and Alik Dzhabrailov in August. (Note: The NSC,
State Department, and Ambassador Beyrle all issued strong
statements condemning the Estemirova killing soon after her
body had been found. End Note.)

3. (C) When McFaul asked Gannushkina if she was implying that
the "reset" meant a lack of understanding of the human rights
situation on the part of the U.S., Gannushkina answered that
"we don't see a reaction" to these abuses. McFaul refuted this
point, noting the frequent official U.S. statements responding
to such incidents. Gannushkina said that meetings addressing
civil society concerns must take place with all four sides at
the table, i.e. government and NGO representatives from both
countries. McFaul pointed out that the U.S. attempted just
such a meeting in July, only to have the GOR decide not to
participate, adding that in the end, it is up to Russian
activists to build a relationship with the GOR. Lyudmila
Alekseyeva of the Moscow Helsinki Group agreed, saying: "We
talk to Medvedev on the Presidential Council; why do we need
to involve the Americans in this?"

4. (C) Alekseyeva told McFaul that, much as she appreciated
the NSC statement protesting her brief detention at a New
Year's Eve Dissenters' March (while dressed as Snegurochka, a
Russian Christmas snowmaiden), there are more significant
problems than "four hours of detention of one old lady," and
the U.S. should not "stand by" as the other, more significant
atrocities, continue to take place in the country. According
to Alekseyeva, freedom of assembly is under siege in a
widespread sense, due to the GOR's paranoia about the
possibility of an Orange Revolution in Russia. Turn up the
heat, but don't be another Bush

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5. (C) Yuriy Dzhibladze of the Center for Human Rights and
Democracy told McFaul that Russian human rights activists hear
what Washington is saying, but that he and other activists
were skeptical regarding U.S. promises of continued support,
and that the public U.S. statements after the death of
Estemirova were "not enough." Dzhibladze said that two years
ago, when U.S. officials asked his advice, he told them to
tone down their criticism of the GOR, because their style was
overly confrontational, and because anti-Americanism was rife
among Russian officialdom (as well as in society as a whole).
Dzhibladze now felt that the U.S. should strengthen its
criticism, "not to become aggressive like Bush," but to make
sure that human rights issues remain prominent on the agenda
in bilateral relations. Acknowledging that the U.S.

MOSCOW 00000304 002 OF 002

must strike a "delicate balance" between public criticism and
private engagement, Dzhibladze nonetheless asserted that, as a
"partner" of Russia, the U.S. "has the right to demand
reforms" in exchange for trade or other concessions the U.S.
might make to Russia. Dzhibladze also asked for more frequent
opportunities to confer with U.S. officials.

6. (C) In response to McFaul's request for some creative ideas
for a more effective strategy of human rights promotion,
Memorial Human Rights Center board member and internet-based
Caucasian Knot editor Grigoriy Shvedov noted that mere
"scolding" was insufficient, and suggested that the U.S. form
a more thorough partnership with local NGOs that go beyond
mere financial support. Improving the life of average people
in the North Caucasus would go a long way toward defusing the
situation, he said. Lev Ponomarev of the NGO For Human Rights
said that Chechen President Ramzan Kadyrov should be treated
as an international persona non grata who runs a "totalitarian
regime." Alekseyeva suggested sending a delegation to visit
Ingush President Yanus-Bek Yevkurov, who "at least is trying."
Such a visit could contrast with the shunning of Kadyrov,
especially if combined with visits to other republics in the
North Caucasus. (Note: The USAID Mission Director visited
Ingushetiya December 16, and had constructive talks with
Yevkurov's Prime Minister, Aleksey Vorobyev. End Note.)
Ponomarev proposed holding an international conference on the
North Caucasus, bringing in experts on the region to pool
knowledge and resources. He added that the GOR has already
created a working group on the North Caucasus, including human
rights defenders within the GOR, such as Ella Pamfilova of the
President's Human Rights Council, Human Rights Ombudsman
Vladimir Lukin, and Public Chamber member Nikolay Svanidze.

Concerns on the BPC
-------------------

7. (C) Dzhibladze asked McFaul about the status of the
Bilateral Presidential Commission (BPC) Civil Society Working
Group. McFaul assured him that the U.S. has no plans to
capitulate to Vladislav Surkov, Medvedev's First Deputy Chief
of Staff, and head of the Russian side of the Civil Society
Working Group. (Note: As the reported architect of Russia's
notion of "sovereign democracy," Surkov is the bete noire of
the Russian human rights community. End note.) However, McFaul
did note that it is not the business of the U.S. to dictate to
the Russian side which NGOs should participate in the planned
January 27 meeting of the BPC in Washington. Activists at the
meeting differed regarding the usefulness of the planned
topics of discussion, civil society's role in anti-corruption
efforts, and protection of children from trafficking in
persons and child pornography. Alekseyeva called the latter
topic a "kasha theme" (i.e., feel-good pablum allowing the GOR
to sidestep any hard questions about civil society), while
Ponomarev asserted that children's orphanages in Russia
currently constitute an "intellectual genocide," and hence it
would be a topic worth exploring.

8. (C) McFaul explained that he envisioned that the
Civil Society Working Group meeting would involve both a
government-to-government session and a parallel NGO-NGO
session, after which the NGO representatives would speak to
the Commission. Dzhibladze suggested allowing the NGOs to
create their own agenda for their meeting, and McFaul told him
that this idea had President Obama's personal backing. While
doubting the utility of the Working Group, given Surkov's
agenda, Dzhibladze at the same time noted that joint work
against corruption could be a way to force the GOR to address
broader civil society issues, despite its plans to sweep such
issues under the rug.

Comment
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9. (C) From the critical comments by civil society activists,
many of them are unaware of the contours of the
Administration's approach to human rights and its record of
public statements and speeches. We need to do a much better
job of explaining publicly and, in particular, to Russian
civil society actors, the "reset" and our overall approach to
promoting human rights and democracy in Russia.

Beyrle
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