ID:241557
Date:2009-12-24 03:12:00
Origin:09SEOUL2002
Source:Embassy Seoul
Classification:CONFIDENTIAL
Dunno:
Destination:VZCZCXYZ0000
OO RUEHWEB
DE RUEHUL #2002/01 3580312
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
O 240312Z DEC 09
FM AMEMBASSY SEOUL
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 6560
INFO RUCNKOR/KOREA COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUEHBJ/AMEMBASSY BEIJING PRIORITY 7080
RUEHMO/AMEMBASSY MOSCOW PRIORITY 0642
RUEHKO/AMEMBASSY TOKYO PRIORITY 7141
RUEHSH/AMCONSUL SHENYANG PRIORITY 5456
RUEKJCS/OSD WASHDC PRIORITY
RUACAAA/COMUSKOREA INTEL SEOUL KOR PRIORITY
RHMFISS/COMUSKOREA J5 SEOUL KOR PRIORITY
RHMFISS/COMUSFK SEOUL KOR PRIORITY
RHHMUNA/CDR USPACOM HONOLULU HI PRIORITY

C O N F I D E N T I A L SEOUL 002002

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/24/2034
TAGS: PREL, PINR, PGOV, ECON, SOCI, KN, CH, KS
SUBJECT: CHINESE AMBASSADOR TO ROK ON SIX-PARTY TALKS, DPRK
ECONOMICS, AND KOREAN POLITICAL CULTURE

Classified By: AMB D. Kathleen Stephens. Reasons 1.4 (b/d).

Summary
-------

1. (C) Chinese Ambassador to the ROK Cheng Yonghua told
Ambassador Stephens over dinner on December 21 that he was
optimistic the DPRK would eventually return to the Six-Party
Talks. The North's currency revaluation was a mistake and
ran the risk of further alienating the populace, Cheng said.
PRC Political Counselor Chen Hai observed that the Chinese
MFA's "Korea cadre" was experiencing a generational shift
away from those with long experience in the DPRK to a younger
generation whose Korea experience was primarily in the ROK.
Counselor Chen said rumors that Ambassador Cheng has been
tapped to serve as the PRC Ambassador to Tokyo are
"premature." End Summary.

Strategic Patience "Necessary but Not Sufficient"
--------------------------------------------- ----

2. (C) During a wide-ranging discussion of North Korea
issues during a dinner he hosted for the Ambassador on
December 21, Chinese Ambassador to the ROK Cheng Yonghua
expressed cautious optimism that U.S. patience with North
Korea would succeed in getting Pyongyang back to the
Six-Party Talks. He applauded U.S. efforts to maintain
strategic patience with North Korea, noting that China had to
exercise its share of patience with the regime over the past
year. He indicated that Beijing had sustained a dialogue
with Pyongyang over the nuclear issue through 2009 and
routinely warned that some of its actions were clearly not in
the interest of China.

3. (C) While Cheng firmly believed patience to be a virtue
for all parties involved, he expressed concern that
Washington and Pyongyang not take too long to contemplate
next steps. Cheng recalled how U.S.-DPRK negotiations during
the Clinton Administration proceeded at a relatively slow
pace until the waning days of the Administration when there
was a rush to reach agreements that ultimately failed.
Neither taking too long to engage, nor trying to rush
negotiations was desirable, Cheng suggested. Although he did
not elaborate, Cheng opined that North Korea could not afford
to take too long before resuming engagement because of Kim
Jong-il's health situation and its implication for regime
succession.

4. (C) China supported the international community's
interest in enforcing sanctions, Cheng claimed, but hoped
that the cargo plane carrying DPRK weaponry that was recently
interdicted in Bangkok would not damage prospects for
resuming Six-Party Talks. Cheng believed the DPRK understood
that there were consequences to its actions, which was why it
was so sensitive about wearing the "sanctions cap." Cheng
suggested the U.S. and the other parties think about ways to
give the DPRK &face8 to return to the talks.

DPRK Tactics Stem From Insecurity
---------------------------------

5. (C) Cheng empathized with U.S. frustrations over the
North's negotiating style, which he characterized as a result
of the regime's chronic insecurity. He said he fully
understood the U.S. stated desire to not "buy the same horse
twice," and acknowledged Pyongyang's attempts to repackage
overtures it had already agreed to in an attempt to wrest
further concessions. He suggested that Pyongyang's lack of
confidence and recognition of its limited leverage prompted
its attempts to "split poker chips to play them twice."

Currency Reform Ill-Advised
---------------------------

6. (C) Cheng characterized the DPRK's recent currency
revaluation as an ill-advised attempt to reassert the
regime's control over the economy. In his personal
experience, Cheng said, when common people start to earn
money it is very difficult to put the genie back in the
bottle. Now that people in China owned homes and cars, it
would be inconceivable to think the government could turn
back the clock to a time when property ownership was not

allowed. Political Counselor Chen Hai observed that the DPRK
still had only a primitive understanding of contemporary
economics and trade principles. He cited a conversation
about trade deficits between Vice Foreign Minister Wu Dawei
and DPRK First Vice Foreign Minister Kang Sok-ju in which
Kang, with arguably as much exposure to western economics as
any DPRK Official, appeared to have no grasp of the concept
of a trade deficit.
7. (C) Ambassador Cheng suggested the DPRK would be much
better off today if it had followed China's path to reform.
He noted that before the Cultural Revolution, North Korea had
followed China's lead, but since then had chosen to take its
own path. Commenting on reform and opening, Chairman Deng
Xiaoping had famously observed that opening a window let in
flies and mosquitoes. China chose not to shut the window on
reform just because of a few flies and mosquitoes, Cheng
said, noting that sadly North Korea lacked a Deng Xiaoping.

DPRK's Time Warp has Historical Roots
-------------------------------------

8. (C) Korea had a long history of adopting the culture of
powerful neighboring states and hanging on to that culture
until well after the neighbor's cultural had evolved.
Modern-day North Korea was like China during the Cultural
Revolution, Ambassador Cheng observed, noting that the first
time he engaged with DPRK officials in an official capacity
he had difficulty connecting with them. Once he determined
to mentally reset his personal clock by 30 years, Cheng said,
everything was fine.

9. (C) Counselor Chen commented that being behind the times
had historical roots for Korea. He noted wryly that one
hundred years after the Qing Dynasty had supplanted the Ming,
Korea insisted on sending its tributes to the Ming Court and
clinging to Ming customs and traditions. Chen opined that as
a small nation, the Korean response when confronted with a
rapidly changing environment was to hunker down out of fear
that it would cease to exist if it succumbed to change.
Counselor Chen believed that for this reason, the U.S.
message to the North that a better future was possible was
very effective. Historically speaking, emphasizing only
negative consequences for the North would only result in
further retrenchment. Conversely, he was optimistic that the
North would respond positively to the U.S. offer to seek a
better relationship.

China's "Korea Cadre" Increasingly ROK-focused
--------------------------------------------- -

10. (C) The MFA's "Korea cadre" had three distinctive
cohorts, broken down by where they obtained their education,
according to Counselor Chen. Beijing's senior Korea experts
almost all attended university in the DPRK and in most cases
had a minimum of 8-10 years studying and or working there.
Mid-level and junior officers on the "Korea track" were
divided into those who earned their degrees in Korean
language/Korean studies in China, and a third and growing
group who earned the bulk of their Korea expertise in the
ROK. While many of the senior Korea cadre had some fond
memories of their student days in the DPRK, they were not
allowed to befriend North Koreans, and had limited ties
there. Even this older generation viewed modern China as
more like the ROK than the DPRK and strongly preferred the
more substantive and dynamic work in Seoul, not to mention
the quality of life.

Rumors of MFA Personnel Shuffle "Premature"
-------------------------------------------

11. (C) After dinner, poloff asked Counselor Chen about ROK
press reports that Ambassador Cheng had been tapped as the
PRC's new ambassador. Chen described such reports as
premature, but acknowledged that it was possible Cheng would
eventually replace Ambassador Cui Tiankai in Tokyo, and that
Cui would become Vice Foreign Minister responsible for
Six-Party Talks. The 20 December report had suggested the
change could take place as early as January, a timetable Chen
dismissed as not credible. (MOFAT's China Desk told us that
Ambassador Cheng on December 22 told Deputy Minister Lee
Yong-joon that Beijing had not contacted him about the
possibility of moving to Tokyo. Cheng is a Japan expert,
having served at the PRC Embassy in Tokyo four times and as
Deputy DG for Asian Affairs in Beijing.
STEPHENS