ID:176136
    Date:2008-10-31 09:42:00
    Origin:08MADRID1132
    Source:Embassy Madrid
    Classification:CONFIDENTIAL
    Dunno:
    Destination:VZCZCXRO9897
PP RUEHAG RUEHROV RUEHTRO
DE RUEHMD #1132/01 3050942
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P 310942Z OCT 08
FM AMEMBASSY MADRID
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 5492
INFO RUEHXK/ARAB ISRAELI COLLECTIVE
RUCNMEM/EU MEMBER STATES COLLECTIVE
RUCNMGH/MAGHREB COLLECTIVE
RUEHLA/AMCONSUL BARCELONA 3620
    
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 05 MADRID 001132 
 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPARTMENT FOR EUR/WE, NEA/RA, AF/RA 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/30/2018 
TAGS: PGOV, PINR, PREL, IR, IZ, SY, SP, MR 
SUBJECT: NEA A/S WELCH MEETINGS WITH SPANISH OFFICIALS 
OCTOBER 23 
 
MADRID 00001132  001.2 OF 005 
 
 
Classified By: DCM Arnold Chacon for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d) 
 
1. (C)  SUMMARY.   NEA A/S Welch, accompanied by DCM, met 
with FM Moratinos, Director General for the Mediterranean, 
Magreb and Near Orient Fidel Sendagorta, and Policy Planning 
Director Andres Ortega on October 23 to discuss a wide range 
of issues including the Middle East Peace Process (MEPP), the 
Magreb, and Western Sahara, Syria, Lebanon, Iran, Iraq and 
Mauritania.  In response to Welch's overview on the MEPP and 
the importance of a coordinated approach based on Quartet 
principles, Moratinos offered to help with keeping the 
process on track and said, "after her next trip, tell 
Secretary Rice to call me so I can reinforce her points." 
Policy Planning Director Ortega said that President Zapatero 
planned to travel to the Middle East in the near future to 
push for solutions, although he could not offer details on a 
possible itinerary.  GOS officials, most likely Deputy 
Secretary-equivalent Angel Lossada, plan to visit Baghdad 
soon and Welch welcomed efforts to help integrate Iraq into 
the international community, adding that a Moratinos visit 
would be helpful. Spain believes Syria will move in a 
positive direction over the next few months, and that 
Moratinos' consistent outreach to the Syrian regime creates 
opportunities for it to align with the West rather than Iran. 
 
 
2.  (C)  Presented with our views that the democratic process 
should be restored in Mauritania,  Sendagorta argued that 
since its military gave the country form, we must work with 
the military to accomplish our goals. Spain's priorities in 
Mauritania were counter-terrorism, immigration, and to a 
lesser extent, fishing rights, and Sendagorta urged a quick 
solution that would prevent a political vacuum or armed 
conflict.  He said Spain wants to engage with USG officials, 
especially the AF bureau, on the issue of Mauritania.  Welch 
encouraged additional cooperation, since the US and Spain 
have different approaches, and reinforced that point with 
Ortega as well. END SUMMARY. 
 
3.  (C)  NEA A/S Welch, accompanied by DCM, met with FM 
Moratinos, Director General for the Mediterranean, Magreb and 
Near Orient Fidel Sendagorta, and Policy Planning Director 
Andres Ortega on October 23 to discuss a wide range of issues 
including the Middle East Peace Process (MEPP), the Magreb, 
and Western Sahara, Syria, Lebanon, Iran, Iraq and 
Mauritania.  Moratinos' staff had warned in advance that 
scheduling issues would allow only a brief meeting, but 
Moratinos, effusive in his welcome, devoted 45 minutes to 
reviewing multilateral issues. Sendagorta, accompanied by his 
Deputy Director Alberto Ucelay, hosted Welch for a two-hour 
lunch meeting at the MFA.  Ortega, accompanied by two other 
members of President Zapatero's policy planning team, met 
with Welch at the Moncloa Presidential Complex. Ortega was 
more in "receive mode" but asked many thoughtful questions 
about U.S. policy developments, eager to take advantage of 
the discussion.  Welch also conducted a well-attended press 
roundtable that resulted in several articles in the local 
press and coverage by the wire services. 
 
------------- 
PEACE PROCESS 
------------- 
 
4.   (C)  A/S Welch shared information about next steps in 
the peace process and appealed for European regional 
cooperation in support of Quartet principles to create, "a 
reality both sides can't back away from."   FM Moratinos 
agreed that the Arab community had not fulfilled its 
potential to positively influence the situation and that it 
was important to avoid a vacuum while a new Israel government 
was being formed.  In response to A/S Welch's point that Abu 
Mazen needed to, "play it smartly," Moratinos said that the 
EU wanted to engage with Arab states to encourage them to 
explore new options; reconciliation efforts by Egypt could be 
constructive.  Welch noted that it was becoming difficult to 
gauge the level of seriousness of the many proposals floating 
around and it was essential to maintain coordination through 
the Quartet Process to keep the focus on results.  Moratinos 
offered to help with keeping the process on track and said, 
"after her next trip, tell Secretary Rice to call me so I can 
reinforce her points."  In response to Sendagorta's question 
about the formation of a new Israeli government and its 
impact on the process, Welch said that it was important to 
show progress in the new year, e.g., slowdown in settlement 
construction, fewer roadblocks, improved security, and 
enhanced economic activity.  He noted that is was important 
to query the new Israeli government privately, without hard 
 
MADRID 00001132  002.2 OF 005 
 
 
stances that would force its hand.  During the November 
Quartet meeting, the Parties should address the structure and 
goals of the full peace process, with a focus on expected 
results by the end of the year.  There should be no public 
characterization of positions.  Policy Planning Director 
Ortega said that President Zapatero planned to travel to the 
Middle East in the near future to push for solutions, 
although he could not offer details on a possible itinerary. 
 
--------- 
SYRIA 
--------- 
 
5. (C)  On Syria, Moratinos said, "we call it as we see it, 
despite France thinking that we are too optimistic."  When 
Welch commented that we agreed with the results-based 
approach contained in the EU letter to Syria, Moratinos said, 
"I have taken risks reaching out to the Syrians, but I know 
the personalities and the issues."  He continued, "Syria 
wants to be part of the West, rather than aligning with Iran 
they want to be welcomed in Paris, and moreover, we need them 
to conclude any comprehensive peace plan."  "Walid 
(al-Muallem) wants to normalize with the U.S.," Moratinos 
emphasized.  The other factor Moratinos noted was that 
drawing Syria closer to the West would serve to marginalize 
Iranian efforts to exert influence.  A/S Welch remarked on 
the Moratinos/EU letter on Lebanon that was sent to Syria, 
spelling out benchmarks for improved behavior. He emphasized 
that if Syria seeks further engagement with the international 
community, it must take specific, demonstrable actions. 
 
6.  (C)  Sendagorta claimed that Moratinos, engagement with 
Syria paying off; others in the EU have come around to 
Spain's position.  Welch amplified his point, saying that 
while the U.S. agrees with an approach based on quantifiable 
results, a fuller assessment of Syrian actions is needed, 
particularly with regard to Lebanon and foreign fighter 
flows.  Sendagorta thought that Syria would be more careful 
in the future, given the dramatic, positive evolution of 
situation in Iraq.  He agreed foreign fighters can do the 
Syrians lots of harm.  Sendagorta added that Spain worried 
for safety of its UNIFIL troops. In response to Welch's query 
whether Spain talked to Syrians regarding border camps, 
Sendagorta said "not recently," but that in July 2008 Spain 
had secured a commitment from Syrian President al-Asad. 
Welch said that Syria needed to hear more on this issue from 
the international community.  Overall, Sendagorta summarized, 
Spain thinks Syria will move in constructive ways in the next 
few months, in contrast to Iran. Welch reiterated to all 
Spanish interlocutors that a vigilant UNIFIL was essential to 
prevent Hizballah from reasserting itself and that Syria 
shouldn't be allowed to dabble to gain concessions without 
implementing real reform. 
 
------- 
IRAN 
------- 
 
7. (C)  In response to Sendagorta's question, Welch said 
there was no decision on opening an US Interests Section in 
Iran.  An Interests Section idea, especially if it was 
empowered to issue visas, could be useful, but it must also 
serve a broader purpose.  Welch appealed for more effective 
political approach/policy on Iran; the EU must be tougher on 
Iran if our approach of calibrated response was to work. 
Welch reviewed Iran's counterproductive efforts in Syria, 
Lebanon and Iraq with all his interlocutors.  He asked the 
Spanish to consider if there are any creative options to add 
to a coordinated set of incentives and disincentives for the 
Iranian regime.   He also called for more coordinated 
financial actions, and ensuring that Iran would not benefit 
from any new international financial instruments, e.g., 
excluding Iran from bank deposit protections. 
 
------- 
IRAQ 
------- 
 
8.  (C)  On Iraq, Sendagorta said GOS officials, most likely 
Deputy Secretary-equivalent Angel Lossada, would visit soon 
and Welch welcomed efforts to help integrate Iraq into the 
international community, adding that a Moratinos visit would 
be helpful.  Sendagorta said Spain was ready to start a new 
chapter in Iraq, focusing on commercial activity and CT 
cooperation, issues that they had discussed with Iraq's 
ambassador to Spain. Ortega also said that while it was 
difficult for the PSOE administration, Spain would engage 
 
MADRID 00001132  003.2 OF 005 
 
 
with Iraq, in a non-military way, if it could protect its 
personnel and address security concerns.  Spain wants to do 
its part to stabilize Iraq within the current political 
context.  Welch briefed on the pending Iraq SOFA, which needs 
to be concluded before year's end, and explained that Russian 
FM Lavrov's public remarks that Russia might consider renewal 
of UN Iraq mandate were unhelpful because they served to 
reduce pressure on Iraqi leaders to deal with SOFA issue. 
The UN mandate was not ideal since it limited Iraqi 
sovereignty and had negative financial implications. He 
explained that the US SOFA was very forward leaning, aimed at 
giving Iraq jurisdiction and room to maneuver. Welch also 
noted that political involvement by Spain had its own merit 
and might help protect against Iranian intrusions in Iraqi 
domestic politics.  Alberto Ucelay asked to be kept informed 
of the date of the upcoming Iraq Neighbors Conference, as it 
might be the logical point to arrange a Lossada visit to 
Baghdad. 
 
------------------------ 
MAGREB & WESTERN SAHARA 
------------------------ 
 
9. (C)  With regard to the Magreb, Welch described the recent 
Libya settlement that would take the US-Libya bilateral 
relationship to a new level, in addition to increasingly 
strong cooperation with Algeria and Morocco.  Recognizing 
Spain's efforts, he said that given worrisome trends toward 
violent extremism in the Magreb, it was ever more important 
to encourage broader political reconciliation and foster 
significant improvements in intra-Magreb cooperation.  Welch 
and Moratinos recapped counter-terrorism and stabilization 
efforts in the Magreb.  Moratinos said Spain believed former 
Ambassador Ross could be an effective UNSYG Special 
Representative on Western Sahara and that, "we are telling 
the Moroccans to give him support."  He acknowledged Moroccan 
unhappiness with the dismissal of Van Walsum and said that 
Ross would need to facilitate communications and build trust 
among all parties to the negotiations.  Moratinos suggested a 
coordination meeting including Spain, France, Algeria, 
Morocco and the U.S. on the margins of the NATO ministerial. 
Welch replied that Secretary Rice had attempted a similar 
meeting during her trip to the region but the Moroccans and 
Algerians did not respond positively; timing would be a 
factor for another attempt during the NATO Ministerial. 
 
10.  (C)  Welch and Sendagorta reviewed Moratinos' idea of 
arranging meetings of for Secretary Rice and her French and 
Spanish counterparts with Morocco and Algeria to breath life 
into Western Sahara issue.  Welch encouraged the Spanish to 
develop the initiative for further consideration.  Ortega 
related Spain's view that the Manhasset process itself was 
critically important, apart from whether or not there were 
any near-term chances of achieving an accord.  While Spain 
would officially support a referendum, a referendum would 
only be useful it validated a solution rather than calling 
for end results.  Ortega suggested that the Algerians could 
be moved forward in their thinking by engaging them 
indirectly through the Union for the Mediterranean mechanism. 
 In addition, he agreed with Welch that the Western Sahara 
dispute would not be solved while the border was closed.  If 
Morocco and Algeria could integrate their tourism sectors and 
enhance economic ties, it would build a foundation of trust 
that would facilitate other discussions.  However, Ortega 
admitted that the Barcelona Process had never been able to 
impact the intra-Magreb or Morocco-Algeria dynamics. 
 
------------- 
MAURITANIA 
------------- 
 
11. (C)  According to Sendagorta, Spain views Mauritania as 
part of the Magreb, in contrast to the US and France who 
manage the relationship within an African context.  Asking 
Welch to convey Spanish views that Mauritania was a fragile 
country and therefore, a target for al-Qaeda, Sendagorta 
argued that since its military gave the country form, we must 
work with the military to accomplish our goals. Spain's 
priorities were counter-terrorism, immigration, and to a 
lesser extent, fishing rights, and Sendagorta urged a quick 
solution that would prevent a political vacuum or armed 
conflict. He opined that it would be ideal if the military 
stepped back and allowed a "Turkish model" to emerge.  Spain 
doesn't want a failed state a few miles from its territory in 
the Canary Islands. 
 
12. (C)  In response to Welch's points on the need to 
 
MADRID 00001132  004.2 OF 005 
 
 
reinforce the democratic process, Sendagorta clarified that 
Spain was not weak on democracy, but wanted to find the right 
balance to bring long term solutions. Sendagorta claimed 
France was coming around to Spain's views on this matter. 
Given ongoing consultations in Mauritania regarding the 
presidential powers and the parliament's role, Sendagorta 
believed an agreement was possible by year end.  Also, Spain 
thought there should be movement to liberate the ex-president 
without putting him back in power.  Spain's Ambassador in 
Mauritania reported the ex-president was well treated and the 
Parliament was still operational; hence there was a measure 
of freedom of expression.  Sendagorta said Spain wants to 
engage with USG officials, especially the AF bureau, on the 
issue of Mauritania with USG officials.  Welch encouraged 
additional cooperation, since the US and Spain have different 
approaches, and reinforced that point with Ortega as well. 
 
------------------------- 
MULTILATERAL COORDINATION 
------------------------- 
 
13. (C)  Sendagorta said the GOS was impressed with USG 
administration's management of many interconnecting foreign 
policy issues in the second Bush term.  Welch reiterated our 
desire for European cooperation across the board. Sendagorta 
said the EU working toward an integrated approach to foreign 
policy, despite many difficulties as decreasing sovereignty 
among EU countries engendered competition among them, leading 
to uncoordinated foreign policy initiatives (as Welch had 
noted during his presentation on the MEPP). 
 
------- 
COMMENT 
------- 
 
14.  (C)  Sendagorta's insights on the competition among EU 
countries to gain some sort of foreign policy prestige 
certainly applies to Spain's efforts to position itself as a 
key player in the Middle East.  Spain has already announced 
that it plans to initiate a major Middle East initiative 
during its January-June 2010 EU Presidency.  Apart from 
Foreign Minister Moratino's long-term personal interest in 
the issues, Spain also views itself as the most influential 
Mediterranean country, serving as the primary link beween 
Africa and Europe based on geography, population flows and 
history.  With Spain actively campaigning for support to have 
Barcelona designated as the headquarters of the Union for the 
Mediterranean, it is seeking broad support for its candidacy. 
  Spain emphasizes to Muslim countries that, given the 
history of Andalusia, it can serve as an important bridge 
culture and it has a unique understanding of Islam that 
allows "strong fraternal ties."  For example, King Juan 
Carlos offered to host the Saudi-sponsored 2008 World Muslim 
League Inter-Faith Conference.  King Juan Carlos and Spanish 
officials make regular swings through the Middle East to 
promote commercial ties and investment opportunities. 
Moreover, Spain "markets" itself to Gulf countries and other 
states with funds to invest as the natural link to Latin 
America, claiming that it has the special understanding and 
technical skills necessary to successfully expand commercial 
ties in Latin America.  Apart from Spain's quest for foreign 
policy prestige and commercial opportunities, it also 
recognizes the potential challenges and opportunities of 
increasing Muslim immigration to Spain, from the Magreb and 
other regions as well. 
 
------------- 
SENDAGORTA BIO 
------------- 
 
15.  (U)  Fidel Sendagorta is a new contact for the Embassy 
since he took over his portfolio in August 2008.  This was 
our first opportunity to hold an extended meeting with him. 
His unclassified biographic information follows: 
 
Sendagorta was born in 1956.  He has a degree in Law.  He 
joined the Spanish Diplomatic Corps in 1984 and served in the 
embassies in Japan (1984), Cuba (1988), and Morocco (Cultural 
Counselor in 1996).  Between 1993-96, Sendagorta was Advisor 
to the Secretary of State for International Cooperation and 
Latin America, and to the Foreign Affairs Minister.   In 
1999, as Counselor in the Spanish Permanent Representation to 
the EU, he coordinated planning for the April 2002 EuroMed 
Summit held in Valencia.  In 2002 he served as MFA's Deputy 
Director General of the Policy Planning and Analysis Bureau. 
In October 2007 he was appointed Special Ambassador for 
Mediterranean Affairs.  In August 2008, he was appointed 
 
MADRID 00001132  005.2 OF 005 
 
 
Director General for the Mediterranean, Magreb and Near 
Orient. 
 
16.  (C)  Sendagorta was thoughtful in his comments on issues 
in his portfolio, and did not present an ideological view. 
He seemed to be trying to creater a better dialogue with us 
on Middle Eastern issues, given strains in the past. 
 
17.  (U)  Assistant Secretary Welch cleared this cable. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
AGUIRRE