ID:171424
    Date:2008-09-25 09:42:00
    Origin:08MADRID1021
    Source:Embassy Madrid
    Classification:CONFIDENTIAL
    Dunno:08MADRID1006 08MADRID738 08STATE100149 08STATE100758 08STATE100790 08STATE97395 08STATE97991 08STATE99701 08STATE99726
    Destination:VZCZCXYZ0000
RR RUEHWEB

DE RUEHMD #1021/01 2690942
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
R 250942Z SEP 08
FM AMEMBASSY MADRID
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 5364
INFO RUEHXP/ALL NATO POST COLLECTIVE
RUEHGB/AMEMBASSY BAGHDAD 0198
RUEHBUL/AMEMBASSY KABUL 0184
RUEHNK/AMEMBASSY NOUAKCHOTT 1172
RUEHBS/USEU BRUSSELS
RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHDC
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC
RHMFISS/CDR USEUCOM VAIHINGEN GE
RHMFISS/COMUSNAVEUR NAPLES IT

    
C O N F I D E N T I A L MADRID 001021 
 
SIPDIS 
 
FOR EUR/WE, ALSO FOR PM/PPA, EUR/RPM, AND AF/RSA, KABUL 
PLEASE PASS TO CSTC-A 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/23/2018 
TAGS: PREL, MARR, NATO, SP 
SUBJECT: DEPUTY CHIEF OF MISSION'S SEPTEMBER 23, 2008, 
MEETING WITH SPANISH MOD SECRETARY GENERAL FOR POLICY LUIS 
CUESTA 
 
REF: A. STATE 100790 
     B. STATE 100758 
     C. STATE 97991 
     D. STATE 97395 
     E. STATE 99726 
     F. STATE 99701 
     G. STATE 100149 
     H. MADRID 1006 
     I. MADRID 738 
 
Classified By: DEPUTY CHIEF OF MISSION ARNOLD A. CHACON, REASONS 1.4B,D 
. 
 
1. (C) Summary:  Deputy Chief of Mission Arnold Chacon paid a 
courtesy call on MOD Secretary General for Defense Policy 
Luis Cuesta September 23.  They discussed NATO and Russia, 
Afghanistan, Iraq, Somali piracy, Mauritania, U.S. military 
flights to Guantanamo, and U.S. ship visits to Gibraltar. 
Cuesta advised that Spain would formally request a meeting in 
Budapest next month for MOD Chacon with SECDEF.  End summary. 
 
NATO-Russia 
----------- 
 
2. (C) Cuesta reviewed Spain's position on Georgia, noting it 
had called on Russia to comply with the cease-fire document 
and condemned Russia's recognition of the breakaway regions. 
He said the solution must be political, not military.  He 
noted the economic losses Russia was suffering, the damage 
they had done to their WTO and OECD membership bids, and the 
harm to Russian business interests.  Cuesta said the 
challenge was to help Russia out of the dead end street it 
had entered.  He compared Russia to an adolescent who had not 
learned to control his own strength.  Russia, he said, did 
not understand that the use of force brought negative 
consequences.  Nevertheless, Cuesta cautioned against 
confrontation with Russia.  The DCM said that neither could 
it be business as usual and drawing on refs a and b, 
explained the U.S. view that now was not the time to resume 
the NRC Prep Com meetings.  He added that A/S Fried had 
advised the Russians of the postponement of the CFE meeting. 
Cuesta said Spain did not view this as a return of the Cold 
War.  The threats of the 21st Century were asymmetric and 
Russian cooperation would be needed to defeat them.  He said 
the challenge would be to find a way to "encapsulate" the 
Georgia problem while we continued to work with Russia on 
other issues such as WMDs or Afghanistan. 
 
Afghanistan 
----------- 
 
3. (C) The DCM congratulated Spain on its contributions in 
Afghanistan, including the project to stand up an Afghan 
National Army unit, but noted that although the ANA had made 
great progress, it was clear that sustainment and enlargement 
of the ANA were key to success in Afghanistan.  The DCM noted 
the U.S. was expanding its own efforts both in terms of 
troops and funding, and asked that Spain likewise look at how 
it could make a greater effort.  Specifically (as requested 
in ref c), the DCM asked Spain provide $50 million per year 
from 2010-1014 as well as deploy more troops and trainers and 
ease caveats.  The DCM also asked that Spain support the 
amendment of the ISAF OPLAN to expand CN authorities, 
emphasizing the direct link between the drug trade and the 
insurgency and the military advantages of amending the OPLAN 
(drawing from talking points in ref d). 
 
4. (C) Cuesta said Spain would maintain its current 
commitment for the medium to long term.  However, he said 
Spain wanted to consolidate its current effort before taking 
on any new commitments.  He noted that Spain already ran a 
PRT, had contributed two OMLTs, was standing up an ANA 
company.  He added that support for the ANA unit might be 
extended beyond the two years contemplated in the MOU signed 
with the GOA.  Cuesta noted Spain was working to improve the 
quality of its forces in Afghanistan, saying Spain had 
fielded more capable helicopters, deployed UAVs, and was 
sending improved armored vehicles (he said the first shipment 
was heading out that day).  Cuesta added that before 
 
 
committing to further contributions, Spain would want to see 
progress on the pol-mil plan agreed to at Bucharest and signs 
of greater "Afghanization" of the effort.  He noted that $50 
million a year was a large sum and would be difficult for 
Spain.  Nevertheless, he said Spain was willing to study ways 
in which it might improve training and assistance for the 
ANA; however, he reiterated that at the end of the day it was 
the Afghans who had to fight and win the war.  He also 
expressed concern over the growing alienation of public 
support resulting from civilian casualties.  On the CN 
mission, Cuesta said it was fundamentally an Afghan 
responsibility and required a two-pronged approach of 
alternative development and law enforcement.  He said the 
allies could help with intelligence and training but it was 
preferable for Afghanistan to shoulder the main effort. 
 
5. (C) The DCM again acknowledged Spain's contribution to 
date but insisted a greater effort was clearly going to be 
required by all concerned.  Countries such as the U.S. and 
France were making that greater effort.  He noted the 
essential point with respect to the CN mission was not 
whether it was appropriately an Afghan or an ISAF 
responsibility but that success or failure had direct 
consequences in the fight against the insurgency. 
"Afghanization," he said, depended greatly on international 
support for the sustainment and enlargement of the ANA. On 
the subject of civilian casualties, the DCM drew from the 
points in ref e, emphasizing that the U.S. regretted the loss 
of innocent lives and was taking every possible measure to 
minimize civilian casualties. 
 
 
NATO Training Mission - Iraq 
---------------------------- 
 
6. (C) Drawing on ref f, the DCM noted that the Bucharest 
summit had produced a declaration urging member states to 
give favorable consideration to Iraqi requests to enhance 
NTM-I.  He pointed out that Spain's Center for Excellence on 
Countering IEDs was a splendid resource that could make an 
important contribution.  Cuesta noted Spain had provided some 
training for Iraqis and was willing to consider concrete 
proposals for additional training. He added that the 
stability of Iraq was important to Spain. 
 
Somali Piracy 
------------- 
 
7. (C) The DCM raised the issue of Somali piracy, noting it 
was much in the news in Spain (Spain has a tuna fleet off 
Somalia, operating mainly out of the Seychelles, which has 
been preyed upon by Somali pirates).  He noted the U.S. 
interest in escort assistance for World Food Program 
shipments to Somalia (ref g).  Referring to Spain's decision 
to deploy a P-3 patrol aircraft to Djibouti, the DCM urged 
that the various national and EU efforts be coordinated with 
NATO.  Cuesta explained the EU had just created a 
coordination cell in Brussels (headed by a Spanish naval 
officer) which he said would work with concerned 
international organizations (e.g., WFP), receive 
intelligence, and then establish contact with the countries 
who had forces in the region to pass on that intelligence. 
He acknowledged that coordination of the various efforts was 
essential and said the EU would be coordinating with NATO 
regarding alliance assets that might be transiting the region 
and able to help.  He reiterated what we had already been 
told (ref h):  Spain could not contribute escorts vessels for 
WFP shipments because their focus had to be protecting their 
own fishing fleet. 
 
Mauritania 
---------- 
 
8. (C) The DCM raised Mauritania and the issue of NATO 
training activities with that country, noting with concern 
that Spain had been reluctant to join consensus in the NAC in 
favor of suspending training activities in September.  Cuesta 
said Spain's condemnation of the coup in Mauritania had been 
unequivocal (Note:  the Spanish MFA issued a statement August 
6.  End note.); however, it was important for Spain to 
preserve Mauritania's cooperation in the fight against 
illegal immigration.  He noted Spain provided security 
assistance to Mauritania for just that purpose.  Cuesta added 
that the history of Mauritanian juntas was to stay in place 
for a time and then convoke elections.  (Note:  Gregorio 
Martinez, Chief of Staff to the Spanish Minister of Interior, 
was even more explicit, telling us September 23 that while 
Spain condemned the coup, it was vital to Spain's national 
security to maintain cooperation with the Mauritanians on 
illegal immigration and counter-terrorism.  He argued that al 
Qaeda in the Maghreb was trying to make inroads Mauritania, 
and this was a serious long-term threat for all of Europe and 
the U.S.  He noted other European countries and the U.S. 
could afford to take a more detached view of Mauritania and 
focus exclusively on the democracy issue because they were 
not on the front line in coping with the effects of illegal 
immigration from Mauritania.  End note). 
 
Guantanamo Flights, Gibraltar 
----------------------------- 
 
9. (C) Cuesta mentioned a Spanish judicial investigation into 
so-called CIA flights to Guantanamo.  The presiding judge in 
that case subpoenaed MOD records relating to U.S. military 
flights that passed through Rota and Moron, allegedly 
carrying detainees to Guantanamo.  The media reporting on the 
case is a hopeless muddle of innuendo and outright 
misinformation.  Cuesta explained that the MOD was complying 
with the judge's subpoenas, but he hoped the case would be 
eventually be filed away and forgotten.  He stressed that the 
GOS had no reason to doubt that the U.S. had fully complied 
with the bilateral agreement on defense cooperation 
regarding.  However, he noted for the record that the GOS did 
not consider military flights carrying prisoners to 
Guantanamo to be covered by the blanket flight clearances in 
effect and expected to be informed regarding the details of 
any flight that could prove controversial in Spain. 
Nevertheless, he repeated the GOS had no reason to believe 
the U.S. had ever failed in this regard. 
 
10. (C) Cuesta raised the issue of Gibraltar, noting Spanish 
sensitivities to U.S. warships, particularly nuclear 
submarines, visiting that port.  He recognized that 
operational considerations might sometimes make it necessary 
for U.S. warships to call there, but asked our understanding 
in minimizing such visits as much as possible.  See ref i for 
additional background on this issue. 
 
MOD Request for Meeting with SECDEF 
----------------------------------- 
 
11. (C) Cuesta advised that Spain would be requesting 
formally through NATO channels a meeting for MOD Chacon with 
SECDEF on the margins of the NATO Defense Ministers meeting 
in Budapest in October. 
 
Comment 
------- 
 
12. (C) Post strongly recommends the proposed appointment for 
MOD Chacon with SECDEF in Budapest.  Chacon has impressed us 
in her first months as MOD as a serious person who wants to 
work with the U.S.  Immediately after taking the job and 
heavily pregnant, she visited Spanish troops in Afghanistan, 
praising their work there.  While still on maternity leave, 
Chacon made a point of inviting the Ambassador to breakfast, 
we believe her first meeting with a foreign envoy as MOD and 
the only one she held while still on maternity leave.  Doubts 
about her that were voiced by some of our Spanish military 
contacts at the outset (too young, too inexperienced) have 
disappeared, and she is getting high marks from our contacts. 
 She handled the rotation of the CHOD and service chiefs 
smoothly, and the new picks were well-received here.  She 
also made a point of arranging for opposition leader Mariano 
Rajoy to meet the new military chiefs, an unusual grace note 
in Spanish politics and one that stresses the message that 
Spanish defense policy should be state policy.  Chacon (and 
her husband -- a former communications director for Zapatero) 
 
 
are close to the President.  An appointment with SECDEF would 
be one of the strongest signals we could send of the 
importance we place on our military relationship with Spain, 
a relationship that among other things provides us the use of 
two key military bases in southern Spain, midway between the 
continental U.S. and Afghanistan and Iraq. 
Aguirre