ID:128307
    Date:2007-11-01 15:40:00
    Origin:07MINSK915
    Source:Embassy Minsk
    Classification:CONFIDENTIAL
    Dunno:06MINSK641 07MINSK336
    Destination:VZCZCXRO5530
RR RUEHDBU RUEHFL RUEHKW RUEHLA RUEHROV RUEHSR
DE RUEHSK #0915 3051540
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
R 011540Z NOV 07
FM AMEMBASSY MINSK
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 6612
INFO RUEHZL/EUROPEAN POLITICAL COLLECTIVE
RUEHVEN/USMISSION USOSCE 1711
RUEHBS/USEU BRUSSELS
RHMFISS/HQ USEUCOM VAIHINGEN GE
RUFOADA/JAC MOLESWORTH RAF MOLESWORTH UK
    
C O N F I D E N T I A L MINSK 000915 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/01/2017 
TAGS: PGOV, PHUM, PINR, BO 
SUBJECT: FORMER PRESIDENTIAL AIDE ON LUKASHENKO AND CRONIES 
 
REF: A. MINSK 336 
     B. 06 MINSK 641 
 
Classified By: Ambassador Karen Stewart for reason 1.4 (d). 
 
Summary 
------- 
 
1. (C) Former Presidential Administration Press Advisor 
Aleksandr XXXXXXXXXXXXX told Pol/Econ Chief on October 23 that 
Lukashenko has not decided whether to run again in 2011.  The 
dictator's inner circle does not fear a managed transition, 
but still wants to avoid significant steps toward 
democratization.  End summary. 
 
Lukashenko: "Should I Stay or Should I Go (in 2011)?" 
--------------------------------------------- -------- 
 
2. (C) XXXXXXXXXXXXX argued that Lukashenko feared losing power, but 
was nonetheless contemplating the installation of his son 
Viktor as president in elections scheduled for 2011.  For 
such a succession to be possible, opined XXXXXXXXXXXXX, Lukashenko 
must start now building his son's political credibility.  The 
first stage in such a plan, according to XXXXXXXXXXXXX, could be 
Viktor's emergence as a power player in parliament following 
2008 elections.  Lukashenko's inner circle would accept a 
managed transition with limited political and economic 
changes.  Even if Viktor forced some insiders to leave power, 
they have amassed enough wealth to retire comfortably, 
according to XXXXXXXXXXXXX. 
 
Support for Better Relations with the West 
------------------------------------------ 
 
3. (C) XXXXXXXXXXXXX reasoned that several important groups favored 
improved relations with the West to ward off increasing 
Russian influence.  Viktor Lukashenko and his supporters 
understand that just like democratic reforms, any real 
movement toward union with Russia would strip them of their 
privileged position.  Belarusian business and financial 
elites such as Yuriy Chizh (reftels) and Aleksey Vaganov (ref 
B) understand that they cannot compete against Russian 
business in open privatizations.  In non-transparent deals 
they could use their connections with European partners to 
buy up property.  Finally, Prime Minister Sergey Sidorskiy, 
his first deputy Vladimir Semashko and others in the Council 
of Ministers such as Energy Minister Aleksandr Ozerets feared 
losing influence. 
 
Lukashenko: A Soviet-Style Ruler Sans Mass Executions 
--------------------------------------------- -------- 
 
4. (C) XXXXXXXXXXXXX described Lukashenko as a product of his 
upbringing -- a Belarusian Soviet peasant turned ideology 
officer.  Raised in the Soviet Union, Lukashenko naturally 
believes that the state rules the people, but as a Belarusian 
he wants to develop the country apart from Moscow. 
Lukashenko, like any peasant, relies first and foremost on 
craftiness to achieve his objectives.  As a former Soviet 
Army political officer, the dictator understands the use of 
ideology as a veneer to mask the true intentions of one's 
actions. 
 
5. (C) Lukashenko can make decisions, including harsh ones, 
said XXXXXXXXXXXXX, but he knows to stop short of allowing opponents 
to tie him to extra-judicial executions.  Murder is the only 
sin a ruler could commit that the Belarusian people would 
never forgive.  XXXXXXXXXXXXX said that the MFA had advocated the 
release of political prisoner Aleksandr Kozulin in the event 
his wife neared death to avoid the backlash likely if Kozulin 
was kept from seeing her before she passed away.  Lukashenko 
has taken no action, however, according to XXXXXXXXXXXXX. 
 
Comment: Keep Driving a Hard Bargain 
------------------------------------ 
 
6. (C) Lukashenko would like the West to think that he can 
always turn toward Russia rather than face continued 
isolation.  In fact, options for improved relations with 
Moscow are limited.  Many of those around the dictator seek 
to resist Moscow's gravitational pull.  Unfortunately, 
Lukashenko's Soviet instincts have not allowed his underlings 
to appease the West with even minor democratic reforms.  If 
XXXXXXXXXXXXX's assessment that the dictator may hand over power as 
early as 2011 is correct, his son may seek to make new 
overtures to the West in order to curb Russia's perceived 
power to derail his succession. 
STEWART