ID:99667
    Date:2007-03-08 19:33:00
    Origin:07MADRID449
    Source:Embassy Madrid
    Classification:CONFIDENTIAL
    Dunno:07MADRID432
    Destination:VZCZCXRO0119
PP RUEHAG RUEHROV
DE RUEHMD #0449/01 0671933
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P 081933Z MAR 07
FM AMEMBASSY MADRID
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 2048
INFO RUCNMEM/EU MEMBER STATES COLLECTIVE
RUEHRB/AMEMBASSY RABAT 6004
RUEHLA/AMCONSUL BARCELONA 2516
RUEAWJA/DEPT OF JUSTICE WASHDC
    C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 MADRID 000449 
SIPDIS 
SIPDIS 
FOR EUR/WE CLEMENTS AND CERVETTI 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/07/2017 
TAGS: PREL, SP 
SUBJECT: SPANISH INTERIOR MINISTER RUBALCABA ON DE JUANA 
CHAOS DECISION; ETA TERRORISM; KEY BILATERAL ISSUES 
REF: MADRID 432 
 
MADRID 00000449  001.2 OF 003 
 
Classified By: AMBASSADOR EDUARDO AGUIRRE FOR REASONS 1.4 (B) AND (D) 
 
1. (C)
Summary: During a March 7 lunch with Spanish Minister 
of Interior Alfredo Perez Rubalcaba, Ambassador Aguirre heard 
the Spanish government's defense of its recent controversial 
decision to allow convicted ETA assassin Inaki De Juana Chaos 
to serve out the rest of his sentence under house arrest (see 
REFTEL for Embassy analysis on this issue).  De Juana was 
close to death due to a 4-month hunger strike, and Minister 
Rubalcaba said that the decision was the correct one because 
it allowed the GOS to prevent De Juana from becoming a 
"decades-long martyr for radical ETA youth."  He said the GOS 
was solely responsible for the decision, without any 
discussion with or pressure from ETA.  Rubalcaba also said 
that ETA had the power to put the opposition Partido Popular 
(PP) "in the driver's seat" by assassinating one or more 
individuals of consequential PP rank or position, but was 
unsure if ETA leaders would want to do this.  The Interior 
Minister said, responding to our request, he was closely 
following developments on the Couso case and the CIA flights 
issue, and was eager to see a cooling of Spanish emotions in 
both cases.  Finally, Rubalcaba asked the Ambassador for 
further reasons behind the postponement of the proposed March 
visit to Madrid by Secretary Rice.  The Minister expressed 
appreciation for his meetings with the Ambassador, as 
opportunities to exchange ideas and gain perspective.  End 
Summary. 
 
//GOS Decision Saved Lives// 
 
2. (C)
Rubalcaba told the Ambassador that the decision to 
allow convicted ETA assassin Inaki De Juana Chaos to serve 
the remaining 18 months of his sentence at home under house 
arrest was the correct one.  (Embassy Note:  On March 1, 
incarcerated ETA member Inaki De Juana Chaos was released 
from the Madrid hospital where he was being treated for a 
hunger strike and was transferred to a hospital in San 
Sebastian.  When he has recovered from the affects of the 
4-month hunger strike, he will be allowed to complete his 
sentence at home under police surveillance.  De Juana had 
almost completed 17 years of a 30-year sentence for the 
murder of 18 individuals when he became eligible for early 
release in 2005.  A National Court magistrate blocked De 
Juana's release in 2005 by charging him with writing letters 
threatening prison officials, and De Juana was later 
sentenced to an additional 12 years behind bars.  The Supreme 
Court in February 2007 reduced that sentence to 3 years, 
leaving only 18 months remaining due to time already served, 
and setting the stage for the government's decision to 
release him).  Minister Rubalcaba said that his government 
knew the decision would be controversial, but that government 
officials had not done a good job explaining to the Spanish 
people that De Juana had already served his time for the 
murders, and remained in prison only on the lesser charge of 
making threatening statements.  Rubalcaba confided to the 
Ambassador that as the end of De Juana's murder sentence drew 
near in 2005, the Minister of Justice at that time did not 
want to see the convicted assassin go free.  He thus sought 
to slap on an additional charge--albeit an obscure one with 
flimsy merits--that would continue the ETA member's 
incarceration.  Rubalcaba said that in hindsight, it would 
have been better to allow De Juana to go free in 2005 and 
that now the Zapatero Government was "paying the price" for 
that decision. 
 
3. (C)
Rubalcaba said that at the time of De Juana's release, 
the ETA member was just hours away from suffering medically 
irreversible damage due to his hunger strike, and would have 
died in a short time if the GOS had not acted.  Rubalcaba's 
view is that the decision to release De Juana saved Spanish 
lives by avoiding his transformation into a "decades-long 
martyr for radical ETA youth."  Rubalcaba said the GOS was 
solely responsible for the decision, without any discussion 
with or pressure from ETA.  The Minister told the Ambassador 
that despite the De Juana case becoming a rallying cry for 
ETA members in recent weeks, current ETA leaders have no use 
for him in the organization and will not want anything to do 
with him once he is freed.  Rubalcaba posited that De Juana 
will likely retire to Morocco upon his release. 
 
//ETA Could Put PP in Driver Seat// 
 
4. (C)
Turning to broader ETA issues, the Minister discussed 
the virulent reaction to the De Juana decision by the main 
opposition Partido Popular (PP).  Rubalcaba told the 
 
MADRID 00000449  002.2 OF 003 
 
Ambassador that the GOS knows ETA could "put the PP in the 
driver's seat" in advance of regional elections in May and 
national elections in early 2008 by assassinating one or more 
individuals of important PP rank or position.  Rubalcaba 
quickly said his government is unsure whether current ETA 
leaders would risk taking this step, but the fear is that any 
ETA sympathizer would have the power to change the political 
calculus in Spain with one rash act.  In discussing the 
December 30 ETA bombing at Madrid's Barajas airport that 
killed two individuals, Rubalcaba said that act proved the 
ETA hard-liners had won out over those favoring moderation, 
and derailed the peace process.  Rubalcaba said that ETA's 
political front group Batasuna is still working every angle 
to try and gain permission to run in Basque municipal 
elections in May, but the Barajas bombing has made that 
scenario even more problematic. 
 
//Bilateral Issues// 
 
5. (C)
The Ambassador expressed his appreciation to Minister 
Rubalcaba for the strong level of counterterrorism 
cooperation, specifically the development of the Bilateral 
Counterterrorism Working Group.  He said the working group is 
an effective vehicle to improve judicial efforts against 
terrorism in both countries.  The Ambassador also reiterated 
USG support for Spain's efforts in fighting terrorism and 
said that the ongoing trial of individuals allegedly involved 
in the March 11, 2004 Madrid train bombings highlights the 
continued threat facing both of our countries.  When the 
Ambassador conveyed continued Department and National 
Security Council interest in the possible terrorist 
designation of Barakat Yarkas, Rubalcaba replied that he was 
aware that this was still a pending issue between our 
governments and knows that it needs to be addressed.  The 
Minister told the Ambassador that responding to our request, 
he was also following developments on the Jose Couso case 
(the Spanish TV cameraman killed in the Palestine Hotel 
incident in Iraq) and the CIA flights issue that have been 
the subject of much sensational press coverage in Spain in 
recent weeks.  Rubalcaba said that although the Spanish 
judiciary was fiercely independent and would do what it 
thought was right, Rubalcaba had instructed his staff to 
avoid any inflammatory rhetorical comments in an attempt to 
lower the temperature on these issues. 
 
//S Visit to Madrid// 
 
6. (C)
Minister Rubalcaba pressed the Ambassador for the 
"real reason" why the Secretary postponed her proposed March 
visit to Spain.  The Ambassador replied that the postponement 
was purely for scheduling reasons due to the Secretary's 
planned travel and had nothing to do with any problems in the 
bilateral relationship.  Ambassador Aguirre noted that the 
Secretary's recent phone call with Foreign Minister 
 
SIPDIS 

Moratinos, informing him that she needed to testify in 
Congress on March 28, confirmed what the Ambassador had said. 
 Rubalcaba seemed satisfied with the answer.  The Ambassador 
reminded Rubalcaba that if sectors of the Spanish Government 
continue to insist that there are signs of a deteriorating 
bilateral relationship when no signs exist, they run the risk 
of reversing some of the improvements made in the 
relationship over the past two years.  Although the GOS has 
not confirmed the Secretary's new proposed visit date of June 
1, Rubalcaba raised the possibility of the GOS eventually 
making some kind of statement confirming the visit.  The 
Ambassador suggested to Rubalcaba that for security and 
logistical reasons, it was probably not wise to confirm the 
exact date of such a visit three months out, and the Minister 
agreed with the reasoning.  (Note: Embassy is working with 
Washington, at the request of the Spanish MFA, to develop 
some kind of public statement indicating that S had planned 
to visit in March, is committed to coming to Spain, and that 
dates are being worked out.  MFA would like to publicize a 
precise date for a rescheduled visit, but this issue is under 
discussion between the Embassy and Washington.) 
 
7. (C)
Comment. Rubalcaba said he was weighed down with the 
issues currently facing him and remarked that he "felt the 
weight of Spain on his shoulders."  He is currently living 
above the Ministry due to repairs and refurbishment occurring 
at his house and said that living so close to the office made 
it hard to "disconnect": that he is having trouble sleeping 
at night.  Although he shows no outward signs of stress, the 
events since the December 30 ETA bombing have clearly taken a 
toll.  The Minister said that he appreciated opportunities 
such as these to exchange ideas and gain perspective and 
hopes they will continue. 
 
MADRID 00000449  003.2 OF 003 
 
AGUIRRE