ID:46333
    Date:2005-11-29 17:14:00
    Origin:05LIMA5061

This record is a partial extract of the original cable.
The full text of the original cable is not available.
    
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 LIMA 005061 
 
SIPDIS 
 
WHA FOR MONSERRATE, FRIEDMAN 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/21/2020 
TAGS: PGOV, PINS, PTER, PHUM, ASEC, PE 
SUBJECT: FORMER INTERIOR MINISTER ROSPIGLIOSI WORRIED ABOUT 
OLLANTA HUMALA 
 
REF: A. LIMA 4854 
     B. LIMA 4132 
     C. LIMA 3267 
 
Classified By: Political Counselor Alexander Margulies for Reasons 1.4 (d)
 
1.  (C)  SUMMARY.  Former Interior Minister Fernando 
Rospigliosi and ex-Director of National Defense Ruben Vargas, 
in an 11/18 lunch with Poloffs, expressed concern over 
prospects that ultranationalist Ollanta Humala is 
establishing himself as a political force to be reckoned 
with.  They had few ideas on how to arrest Humala's rise, 
suggested that the USG review its options, and proposed that 
the Embassy should expand the role of its communications 
contractor NEXUM to monitor coverage of Humala and promote 
anti-Humala news and commentary in the coca regions.  (Note: 
Rospigliosi works for the Human Social Capital (CHS) 
consultancy, which has been contracted by NAS to provide 
communications support in anti-narcotics efforts and 
anti-trafficking in persons (TIP) services.  Vargas also 
works for CHS and is a frequent traveler to the coca regions 
and other areas in turmoil).  END SUMMARY. 
 
3.  (C)  According to Rospigliosi and Vargas: 
 
--  The failed New Years' rebellion by Ethnocaceristas in 
Andahuaylas, led by Ollanta Humala's brother Antauro, has 
helped Ollanta in two ways:  the radicals and Ethnocaceristas 
who supported the rebellion have lined up behind him, while 
Ollanta, by distancing himself from his brother, has been 
able to portray himself as the "moderate" of the two Humala 
brothers and thus broaden his appeal to less radical 
anti-system elements.  So long as he doesn't have to define 
himself, Ollanta could continue to make progress with both 
sectors. 
 
--  Ollanta's political base is in the south and the southern 
highlands, in areas like Puno, which have a large population 
of isolated and impoverished small farmers. 
 
--  He also enjoys significant support in the southern border 
city of Tacna, where Ollanta feeds on anti-Chilean sentiment, 
and in the northern jungle department of Loreto, where he 
appeals to anti-Ecuadorian feelings. 
 
--  Opinion polling, which has Ollanta running at 11 percent, 
may understate his support, since opinion polls are carried 
out in urban areas (Ref B). 
 
--  Ollanta will not/not obtain enough votes to win the 
presidency, but a sizable congressional slate (10-20 
legislators) could ride into office on his coattails, thereby 
making him a political force to be reckoned with for the 
future. 
 
--  Should Evo Morales win the presidency in Bolivia, it 
would have a dangerous "demonstration effect" that would help 
Ollanta.  Should Morales not win the Bolivian election 
outright, but simply came close enough to allege fraud and 
then take his campaign to the streets, a successful "street 
veto" of Bolivia's electoral results by Morales and his 
followers would encourage Ollanta's supporters by showing 
them "what is possible." 
 
--  Ollanta's wife, Nadine, exercises considerable influence 
over her husband.  Rospigliosi got to know her well in 2001, 
when Ollanta was seeking amnesty for his rebellion against 
former President Alberto Fujimori.  Ollanta is "a typical 
military man" in his thinking and has little understanding of 
political nuances.  In contrast, his wife, the product of a 
middle class family and a journalism major from the 
University of Lima, has a much better sense of how to 
communicate with the public. 
 
4.  (C)  Despite their evident concern over Ollanta Humala, 
Rospigliosi and Vargas had few suggestions as to how he could 
be contained.  One possibility, they asserted, was to try and 
divide his following, though they had no strategy for doing 
so.  They warned against making direct attacks on him, 
opining that these would be counterproductive and only make 
him stronger.  In the end, the former Interior Ministry 
officials threw the problem into the USG's lap, suggesting 
that the Embassy expand the duties of its coca zone 
communications-monitoring contractor, NEXUM, to include news 
and commentary on Humala to better track Ollanta's 
influence/popularity in these regions, since much of his 
support flies under the radar of the major media and 
urban-based polling.  They also suggested that the Embassy 
consider supporting an anti-Humala communications program. 

------- 
COMMENT 
------- 
 
5.  (C)  We share many of Rospigliosi's concerns regarding 
Ollanta Humala's rise in the polls and the possibility that 
the latter will establish a strong pro-Evo pro-Chavez 
political base following the 2006 elections.  That said, we 
have no/no intention of involving the Embassy in anti-Humala 
information or commentary campaigns: that is a task for the 
competing political parties.  We agree with Rospigliosi's 
suggestion that we expand NEXUM's monitoring functions to 
include Humala, given his pro-coca policies and the 
likelihood that he will form alliances with cocalero 
organizations.  END COMMENT. 

STRUBLE