From:
Der
Spiegel
6/14/2008 6:50 08BAGHDAD1784 Embassy Baghdad SECRET//NOFORN
O 140650Z JUN 08 FM AMEMBASSY BAGHDAD TO SECSTATE WASHDC
IMMEDIATE 7781 INFO GULF COOPERATION COUNCIL COLLECTIVE
PRIORITY IRAN COLLECTIVE PRIORITY IRAQ COLLECTIVE PRIORITY CDR
USCENTCOM MACDILL AFB FL PRIORITY CDR USSOCOM MACDILL AFB FL
PRIORITY CIA WASHDC PRIORITY DIA WASHDC PRIORITY IRAN RPO
DUBAI PRIORITY 0063 JOINT STAFF WASHDC PRIORITY MNF-I C2X
BAGHDAD IZ PRIORITY MNF-I HUMINT OPS BAGHDAD IZ PRIORITY REO
BASRAH PRIORITY 2333 REO HILLAH PRIORITY 2275 REO KIRKUK
PRIORITY 2272 SECDEF WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY USMISSION UNVIE
VIENNA PRIORITY USCENTCOM INTEL CEN MACDILL AFB FL//CCJ2//
PRIORITY USMISSION USUN NEW YORK PRIORITY WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY USSTRATCOM OFFUTT AFB NE PRIORITY TAGS:
IZ, IR, PREL, PGOV, PINR SUBJECT: PM MALIKI RECOUNTS HIS JUNE
7-9 VISIT TO TEHRAN
S e c r e t baghdad 001784
Noforn
E.o. 12958: decl: 06/12/2018 Tags: iz, ir, prel, pgov, pinr
Subject: pm maliki recounts his june 7-9 visit to tehran
Classified By: Charge d'Affaires Patricia A. Butenis
for reasons 1.4 (b), (c) and (d).
1. (S/NF)
Iraqi Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki's June 7-9 visit to
Tehran featured meetings with all of Iran's senior leadership,
but Maliki told S/I Ambassador Satterfield that he went to
visit Supreme Leader Khamenei, agreeing to the other meetings
solely out of protocol. The Ministers of Defense, Finance,
Water Resources, and Electricity joined the Prime Minister for
the visit. Maliki noted that Khamenei was strongly opposed to
SOFA/SFA agreement on both political and religious grounds,
but had suggested that it was Maliki's decision to make.
Maliki claimed he confronted the Iranians about lethal
assistance to extremist groups. While Supreme Leader Khamenei
denied this support, he did pledge to look into issue of
Iranian weapons entering Iraq and to speak with Muqtada
al-Sadr about SG activities. IRGC-QF Commander Soleimani told
PM that Iranian lethal assistance had stopped as promised, but
Al Maliki was dismissive of Soleimani,s assurances. Minister
of Defense al-Mufraji concluded an MOU to resolve lingering
issues from the Iran-Iraq War period. Septel reporting will
address economic and other aspects of visit, as well as local
and regional media reaction. End summary.
2. (S/NF)
Iraqi PM Maliki and MOD Abd al-Qadr al-Mufraji briefed S/I
Satterfield and PM MinCouns Ries June 11 on the PM's just
concluded visit to Iran. Prime Minister Maliki had been
accompanied on the trip by Minister of Defense Abd al-Qadir
Mufraji, Minister of Water Resources Abd al-Latif Al-Rashid,
and Minister of Finance Bayan Jabr al-Zubaydi. Maliki told
Satterfield that his purpose in going to Iran was to see
Khamene,i. He agreed to see others, including Ahmadinejad and
some ministers under pressure from his staff who argued it was
necessary for protocol, but he considered these other meetings
irrelevant.
SOFA/SFA: Iran Unalterably Opposed, But PM Must Decide
------------------------------------------------------
3. (S/NF)
Khamenei, he said, was unalterably opposed to the SOFA/SFA on
political and religious grounds. Nonetheless, Khamenei
reminded Maliki of his exile in Iran as a member of the
anti-Saddam opposition. The Iranian government had never stood
in his way then when he sought to attend conferences in
Western countries. Likewise, Khamenei concluded, Maliki would
need to make his own decision on this matter, leaving the
impression that it was "on the PM,s head" regarding his choice
to continue negotiations with the U.S. The Iranians said the
SOFA/SFA would ultimately prove damaging to Iraq, as the
Americans would use Iraq as a platform to attack other
countries in the region. Maliki said he countered that Iraq
"had no choice" but to seek continued assistance from the
U.S., as Iraq needed U.S. support to develop its armed forces
and thus achieve greater stability and security in the
country. The PM said he had made a measured, "logical"
presentation to Khamene,i and to IRGC-QF head Soleimani ) but
had not moved them, although other Iranians with whom the
delegation met had shown greater understanding. Amused, the PM
said he had challenged Khamene,i to "give us 17 of the
Ilyushins Saddam sent to Iran" if Iran really wanted to be
such a good friend to Iraq. There had been no response.
PM Presses on Iranian Arms and Sadrist "Gangs"
----------------------------------------------
4. (S/NF)
The Prime Minister portrayed himself as taking a very tough
stance with the Iranians on their support for Shia extremists
in Iraq. He said he told Khamenei that relations with Iran
could be quite positive if Iran ceased interfering in Iraq's
internal affairs. Iran's support for JAM "Special Groups" was
"hurting the image of Iran among Iraq,s Shia population" and
Iran needed to change its behaviors. The PM said he had
brushed aside discussion of the one billion USD soft loan Iran
was offering (see septel on discussion with Finance Minister
Jabr) and other economic issues saying that only what Iran did
on the problem of the Sadrist &gangs8 counted. He pointed to
the trouble they caused, between Iraq and Iran and amongst the
Shia in Iraq as well and asked why the Iranians were
persisting in providing support for these groups.
5. (S/NF)
Maliki said that he had presented "Iraqi evidence) not
U.S.-provided evidence" to Soleimani and Khamenei on Iranian
training and equipping of the JAM Special Groups. Confessions
by JAM personnel "and others," photos of weapons ("I told them
labels said made in Iran, and other "Iraqi" information had
all been laid out to the Iranian leader. Unlike on past
occasions, Maliki said the Iranian response had not/not been
denial. Soleimani had asserted that the training and weapons
supply must have been done "without authorization" and would
be investigated. The Supreme Leader had sworn "by every oath
he knew" (Maliki said he attached no credibility whatsoever to
all this) that he had issued a fatwa against any activities
that could harm the security of Iraq. Therefore, he was
shocked, shocked to learn that "someone must be violating my
orders" and would investigate what had happened. He also
undertook to talk to Moqtada al-Sadr about the activities of
the Special Groups. Commenting on the relationship between
Soleimani and Khamene,i, Maliki said that it was a "mistake"
to see Soleimani as an independent actor. "He follows
Khamenei,s line completely and without Khamene,i he would be
nothing."
Basrah Campaign: The "Magic Key"
--------------------------------
6. (S/NF)
The PM characterized his campaign in Basrah as the "magic key"
which changed the dynamic with the Sadrists and, he implied,
with the Iranians. The GOI,s successes in Basrah and Sadr City
had created an image of a stable, capable government that
others should respect. The PM said he had read through with
Khamene,i and Soleimani the "14 points" that constituted the
GOI,s conditions put forward in Basrah and Sadr City to the
JAM. He had made clear to the Iranians that if the JAM abided
by the GOI,s demands a peaceful resolution ) which ultimately
would have to be the "dissolution of the JAM as a military
force" ) would be possible. But if the JAM continued to
challenge the authority of the state, Maliki said he had told
the Iranian leader that the GOI "would strike, would strike,
would strike" at the groups involved until they were
"destroyed." "If Iran is helping them, then Iran must
understand we will not exercise restraint." Maliki said the
Iranians claimed to support the GOI,s position and would press
Sadr to announce his intentions publicly. The PM said that he
had declined to meet Moqtada al-Sadr while in Iran (although
others in his party had attempted and failed to make contact).
He did this deliberately to avoid the perception that he was
willing to negotiate.
7. (S/NF)
The PM told Satterfield that he had demanded that the Iranians
cease referring in public statements to Iraq as an "occupied"
country or to MNF-I as an "occupier." Neither was correct and
the assertions were damaging to the GOI. The Iranians had
promised to act; the PM said, "we,ll see." Finally, the PM
said there had been a long conversation on the Mujahedin-e
Khalq (MEK), noting that the Iranians were adamant that MEK
were committing violent acts in Iran from their base in Iraq.
The Iranians said that they knew that the Americans have MEK
on the terrorist list, but they also protected them. Maliki
reiterated to Satterfield his long-standing request that the
U.S. "do something" to end the presence of the MEK in Iraq,
which he argued provided a pretext for Iran to engage in its
own unhelpful activities.
xxxxxxxxxxxx Offers Views of Visit
-----------------------------------
8. (S/NF)
In a separate meeting on June 12 xxxxxxxxxxxx that the primary
goal of Maliki's visit to Iran earlier this week was to
persuade the Iranians to stop arming and training Sadrists.
xxxxxxxxxxxx admitted that he was not sure the Iranians got
the message: even though the atmospherics were warm, the
Iranians claimed that they had already ended their support of
Sadrist militants. "I'm not sure they gave the Prime Minister
a real commitment to stop," xxxxxxxxxxxx. He assessed that it
was too early to tell whether the visit was a success (he
deemed it 50/50 for the moment) and said we would need to
watch carefully over the next few days to see whether there is
any indication of a change in Iranian behavior.
Defense Minister Abdul Qader al-Mufraji
---------------------------------------
9. (S/NF)
In a separate meeting June 11, DefMin al-Mufraji offered his
views on the visit to Satterfield and Ries. Corroborating the
PM,s account of events, Al-Mufraji said the atmosphere of the
meetings overall was positive with respect to the strength of
the GOI presentation. In his meeting with Iranian Defense
Minister Mostafa Najjar, he said that he had mirrored the PM,s
challenge (above) to Khamene,i for Iran to provide concrete
assistance to Iraq,s armed forces ) raising the "Ilyushin"
request. The Iranians had not responded.
10. (S/NF)
In reference to the purported "defense/security agreement"
signed during the visit, al-Mufraji confirmed that the
agreement was in fact a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU). The
MOU covered land and sea border issues, (updating border
agreements reached in the 1975 Algiers Accord), mine clearance
in border regions, and recovery of remains of soldiers from
the Iran-Iraq war of 1980-1988. Referring specifically to mine
clearance, Al-Mufraji noted that many of the remaining mines
were in the mountainous border region, and were slipping down
mountains onto the Iraqi side, threatening local farmers and
shepherds. The two governments are reportedly planning to
establish bilateral working groups to address the various
aspects of the MOU.
Butenis