العدد ١٢٨٧ الخميس ٩ كانون الأول ٢٠١٠


10BAGHDAD405 Date16/02/2010 01:19 OriginEmbassy Baghdad

Excerpt from document
(S/NF) SUMMARY: Prime Minister Maliki, through the Office
of the Commander in Chief head General Faruq, directed
February 12 that the PM must authorize all U.S. combined
operations following a February 11/12 U.S.-Iraqi operation in
the southern Iraqi province of Maysan.



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Content
S E C R E T BAGHDAD 000405

NOFORN
SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/17/2020
TAGS: PGOV, PREL, KDEM, MOPS, PTER, IZ
SUBJECT: PRIME MINISTER INSERTS HIMSELF INTO AUTHORIZATION
OF JOINT SPECIAL OPS

Classified By: Charge d'Affaires, a.i., Robert S. Ford for reasons 1.4
(b) and (d).

1. (S/NF) SUMMARY: Prime Minister Maliki, through the Office
of the Commander in Chief head General Faruq, directed
February 12 that the PM must authorize all U.S. combined
operations following a February 11/12 U.S.-Iraqi operation in
the southern Iraqi province of Maysan. The operation was
aimed at disrupting the Iranian-backed Kata'ib Hezballah (KH)
network, which has been linked to indirect fire (IDF)
smuggling and attacks in southern Iraq. The operation was
fully coordinated with GOI authorities and in compliance with
the Security Agreement. However, it generated significant
backlash among Iraqis, particularly in Maysan province, when
reports of eight Iraqis killed, including one woman, hit the
press. Reacting to the Prime Minister's February 12
directive, Iraqi forces countrywide sought further clarity
from the PM's office on the scope of their future combined
U.S.-Iraqi operations. USF-I Acting Commanding General (CG)
and Charge met with the PM Chief of Staff Tariq Abdullah
February 15 to clarify the PM's intent. They raised
specifically earlier discussions between Embassy/USF-I and
Iraqi senior leadership in which the GOI stated that combined
operations involving helicopters and airplanes will require
PM approval from now on, but that all other operations could
continue as per the Security Agreement. In a second
conversation, Tariq Abdullah told Acting CG that the PM had
directed a return to normal operations with some caveats on
the use of air-to-ground strikes. U.S. Divisions (USD)
reported late February 15 that the GOI lifted the combined
operations ban for special operations missions for Sunni
targets, and expected that the GOI would authorize Shia
targets on February 16/17. Embassy and USF-I will continue
to press GOI officials on the details but predict a return to
normal operations. END SUMMARY.

2. (S/NF) Iraqi police forces, supported by U.S. Forces,
carried out the Maysan operation, known as Steel Curtain, to
"degrade the lethal aid smuggling" capabilities of
Iranian-backed Kata'ib Hezballah (KH), a group with ties to
Lebanon's Hezballah. According to U.S. military sources, the
targeted individuals were pivotal members in the KH lethal
aid smuggling ring in the Ali ash-Sharqi area in the
northwest of Maysan province. Recent surveillance revealed
that the movement of weapons and material through this area
is possibly directly connected to the recent increase in IDF
attacks, including the recently conducted improvised rocket
assisted munition (IRAM) attack in southern Iraq. The
firefight during operation Steel Curtain began when the
insurgents engaged the U.S. and Iraqi forces as they moved
into position. The operation resulted in eight Iraqis
killed, including one armed female who was maneuvering on the
reconnaissance team, and 22 arrested. (NOTE: The female was
pronounced dead on arrival after being evacuated to a local
hospital following the mission. END NOTE.)

Iraqi Press Blames U.S. for Loss of Iraqi Lives
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -

3. (SBU) Initial Iraqi press reports described operation
Steel Curtain as a unilateral U.S. mission. The reports
QSteel Curtain as a unilateral U.S. mission. The reports
blamed U.S. forces for killing "ten innocent people" and
killing "villagers from one family." Iraqi Vice President
Adel Abd al-Mahdi, for example, called publicly for an
investigation into the operation, which "cost the lives of
innocent civilians" in Maysan province. VP Abd al-Mahdi's
advisor told Poloff February 14 that the VP's statement was
"just politics," and that Abd al-Mahdi would have contacted
the Ambassador and Commanding General directly if he had
suspected the U.S. of violating the Security Agreement. On
February 13, the military base in Maysan where our PRT is
located took seven rockets, but no Americans were injured.
In addition, the PRT reported February 12/13 that their local
contacts were reluctant to meet them. However, by February
15, they reported that the situation had cooled off and
contacts were returning to normal. The Defense Minister
spokesman clarified the combined operation for the press,
stating "the Iraqi-U.S. troops were fired on by wanted
persons, forcing the troops to return fire." U.S. military
press releases also addressed the incident, stating that a
total of 22 suspected KH terrorists were arrested February
11/12 in a series of combined security operations targeting
an Iranian-backed lethal aid smuggling and rocket attack

network operating in rural villages near the Iranian border.

ISF Response Varies as Clarity Trickles Down
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -

4. (S) The initial lack of clarity in PM Maliki's order led
to its differing implementation throughout Iraq. In
USD-South, the Basrah Operations Commander erred on the side
of caution and called off partnered operations with the
exception of support to the PRTs. One report from USD-North
indicated that there would be no partnered operations with
police forces or other MOI forces unless they were approved
by PM Maliki. Another USD-North Brigade reported that the
directive did not reach their partners and had not had any
impact on operations over the past two days. The PRTs in
Babil and Diwaniya, which rely on ISF escort, reported that
their movements were canceled February 14, but noted the next
day that they were able to resume movements. The Anbar
Operations Center issued a temporary prohibition, which was
then lifted, on all partnered operations, while the Baghdad
Operations Center was reinforcing the message that the Prime
Minister's directive does not change the standard procedures
for U.S.-Iraqi missions in and around Baghdad. Combined
Joint Special Operations Task Force-Arabian Peninsula Polad
commented that they ran one partnered operation February
14/15. However, it was an al Qaeda in Iraq (AQI) target that
had been approved by the Prime Minister's office. Late on
February 15, the GOI notified USF-I that the longstanding
approval process for operations involving Sunni insurgent
group AQI/Islamic State of Iraq targets in northern/western
Iraq had been restored. Shia targets are expected to be
authorized within the next day.

5. (S/NF) COMMENT: Prompt follow-up with the Prime
Minister's office and Defense Minister has narrowed the scope
of these Iraqi restrictions, resulting in what appears will
be a manageable way forward for continued joint
counterterrorism operations. Senior Embassy and USF-I
leadership will press GOI officials, including PM Maliki, but
predict a return to normal operations. Meanwhile, in the
charged pre-election atmosphere, Maysan provincial
authorities and political leaders were quick to condemn the
"civilian" casualties. The strongly worded statements
against "unilateral" U.S. operations went unchallenged by the
GOI and ISF, which chose not to correct the misinformation
for days. The PM is likely highly mindful of the political
liability of civilian deaths, particularly a female, shortly
before an election. The fallout in the local press
underscores the importance of immediately expressing regret
for loss of life in strategic communications and press
releases following an operation that results in reported
"civilian" casualties, while working the operational aspects
with the GOI leadership. END COMMENT.
FORD