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(S/NF) Summary: Saif al-Islam al-Qadhafi told the Ambassador
November 27 that Libya had halted the shipment of its final HEU
stockpiles because it was "fed up" with the slow pace of
bilateral engagement. Saif claimed that Libya had not received
the "compensation" it was promised in exchange for an end to its
WMD programs, including cooperation in the military, security,
nonproliferation, civilian-nuclear, and economic spheres.

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S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 04 TRIPOLI 000941

NOFORN
SIPDIS

STATE FOR NEA/FO AND NEA/MAG. STATE PLEASE PASS TO ENERGY (KELLY
CUMMINS AND SARAH DICKERSON).

E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/30/2019
TAGS: PREL, PGOV, MNUC, PARM, PINR, RS, KGIC, KNNP, KRAD, ENRG,
LY
SUBJECT: LIBYANS SEEK RENEWED COMMITMENT FROM U.S. IN RETURN FOR
PROGRESS ON HEU SHIPMENT

REF: TRIPOLI 938

CLASSIFIED BY: Joan A. Polaschik, Charge d'Affaires, U.S.
Embassy Tripoli, Department of State.
REASON: 1.4 (b), (d)
1. This is an action request; see para 13.

2. (S/NF) Summary: Saif al-Islam al-Qadhafi told the Ambassador
November 27 that Libya had halted the shipment of its final HEU
stockpiles because it was "fed up" with the slow pace of
bilateral engagement. Saif claimed that Libya had not received
the "compensation" it was promised in exchange for an end to its
WMD programs, including cooperation in the military, security,
nonproliferation, civilian-nuclear, and economic spheres. Libya
sought a high-level reaffirmation of the United States'
commitment to the bilateral relationship, in the form of a
message to Libyan leader Muammar al-Qadhafi, in order to move
forward on the HEU shipment. Saif al-Islam, who claimed that he
was "back" on the U.S. portfolio, said his father did not want
to move back to "square one" and wanted to develop a positive
relationship with the new U.S. Administration. The Ambassador
underscored the gravity of the situation and noted that the
Libyan Government had chosen a very dangerous venue to express
its pique. He also noted that many of the holdups in the
bilateral relationship had been due to Libyan political missteps
and bureaucratic bungling. The Ambassador told Saif he would
try to get some kind of statement along the lines requested, but
the HEU shipment should in no way be held hostage to any
specific actions beyond that. Saif assured the Ambassador that
once that message was conveyed to Tripoli, he would immediately
"fix" the problem. End Summary.

3. (S/NF) Once again exhibiting their flair for the dramatic,
and after almost one week of stonewalling regarding the decision
to not allow the departure of the HEU shipment to Russia, the
Libyan leadership authorized a meeting between Saif al-Islam
(accompanied by an assistant) and the Ambassador (accompanied by
Pol-Econ Counselor) as the Ambassador was departing for the
airport to travel to Washington. During the November 27
meeting, the Ambassador expressed his deep concern about Libya's
decision to halt shipment of its remaining Highly Enriched
Uranium (HEU) stockpile to Russia for treatment and disposal.
The Ambassador said that Libya's WMD commitments were the
cornerstone of the relationship, and the last-minute,
unexplained disapproval of the shipment seemed to renege on
those commitments. He emphasized that the Libyans must move
forward with the shipment as soon as possible, for security
reasons and to preserve the bilateral relationship. The
Ambassador pressed Saif to explain why the shipment was held up
and insisted that the Libyans must improve communication in
times of crisis, stating that Libyan officials cannot simply
ignore calls from high-level USG officials and refuse to explain
their decisions that negatively affect bilateral interests.
This was no way to conduct a relationship. The decision to halt
the shipment and create this crisis was intensified by the
timing and the international context, given the President's
focus on non-proliferation and the problems engendered by Iran.
By its actions, Libya was jeopardizing its relationship with the
whole international community.

4. (S/NF) Saif al-Islam explicitly linked Libya's decision to
halt the HEU shipment to its dissatisfaction with the U.S.
relationship. Saif said the shipment was halted because the
regime was "fed up" with the pace of the relationship and what
it perceived as a backing-out of commitments to bilateral
cooperation. The areas of specific concern were Libya's
purchase of military equipment (non-lethal and lethal weapons),
an update on what was being done with Libya's centrifuges,
movement on the Regional Nuclear Medicine Center, and financial
assistance for the chemical weapons destruction program,
including construction of the destruction facility. Saif
pledged to solve the HEU crisis and to allow the shipment to
move forward as early as next week if the USG expressed a
renewed commitment to the relationship and to deeper engagement.
Saif noted that the message needed to be conveyed to (or
addressed to) Libyan Leader Muammar al-Qadhafi.

5. (S/NF) Saif continued that prevailing domestic opinion and
conservative forces were critical of Libya's decision to
dismantle its nuclear weapons program. Noting that he
personally had played an important role in Libya's re-engagement
with the West, Saif asserted that "If something goes wrong,
people will blame me, whether I am in a certain official
position or not." Saif stated that Libya's decision to give up
its WMD programs was contingent upon "compensation" from the
U.S., including the purchase of conventional weapons and
non-conventional military equipment; security cooperation;

TRIPOLI 00000941 002 OF 004

military cooperation; civil-nuclear cooperation and assistance,
to include the building of a Regional Nuclear Medicine Facility;
and the end of "double taxation" and economic cooperation, such
as the signing of a Trade and Investment Framework Agreement
(TIFA).

6. (S/NF) Saif noted that Libya was a small, rich country,
surrounded by large, powerful, poorer neighbors. Yet Libya, the
only Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR) signatory in the
region, had given up all of its conventional weapons and could
not purchase replacement systems or military equipment from the
United States. He highlighted Egypt, a non-MTCR signatory, as
an example of a neighboring country that receives millions of
dollars in U.S. aid and military assistance but did not have to
share Libya's nonproliferation commitments. Relative to such
neighbors, Libya's decision to dismantle its nuclear programs
had weakened its ability to defend itself. He stated, "We share
rich natural resources -- oil and gas -- along the borders, yet
we have no capacity to defend that wealth." Saif complained
that Libya could not purchase conventional weapons from the
United States or even from Sweden or Germany due to U.S. holds
on the sale of those weapons to Libya -- "even until now, seven
years later, there is an embargo on Libya's purchase of lethal
equipment." He specifically mentioned a problem purchasing
"Tiger" vehicles outfitted with American-manufactured engines
from Jordan, due to a U.S. legal restriction on Libya's purchase
of American-equipment.

7. (S/NF) Inquiring about the status of the centrifuges Libya
gave up as part of its WMD commitments, Saif argued that the
U.S. had used the "deal" as a public relations coup for the
previous administration. He said that the fact that the
centrifuges were sent to the United States and are still there,
rather than under IAEA surveillance and control was a "big
insult to the Leader." The fact that Libya was never
"compensated" for the centrifuges added to the insult. In
addition to the centrifuge problem, he complained that Libya had
to pay for the destruction of its chemical weapons. Saif
insisted that Libya was not able to pay to destroy its chemical
weapons stock, noting that the construction of the destruction
facility alone was estimated to cost US $25 million. For these
and other reasons relating to "non-compensation" for WMD
decisions, he stated that certain voices in Libya were
pressuring the Leader to withdraw from the MTCR agreement. He
lamented that "slowly, slowly, we are moving backward rather
than forward." He told the Ambassador that in order for the
relationship to progress, the U.S. needed to make a move. "The
ball is in your court," Saif urged.

8. (S/NF) Continuing his lament, Saif said the U.S.-Libya
relationship was "not going well." Since his last visit to the
United States in 2008, Saif said that both sides had deviated
from the roadmap that had been agreed upon at that time, which
specified cooperation in the military, security,
nonproliferation, civilian-nuclear, and economic spheres. He
asserted that the roadmap had gotten "lost" due to his own
"disappearance" from the political scene and "preoccupation with
other issues overseas." He acknowledged that he was
disconnected for a long time but that he was back on the
political scene -- although he was careful to caveat that he had
not yet accepted an official role in the regime.

9. (S/NF) Saif raised a few recent incidents that he argued
illustrated how things were going wrong. First, he pointed to
Muammar al-Qadhafi's recent trip to New York, which in Saif's
opinion had not gone well, because of the "tent and residence
issues and his [pere Qadhafi's] inability to visit ground zero."
He said that all three issues had been complicated by local
U.S. authorities and had humiliated the Libyan leader -- "even
tourists can see ground zero without permission, but a Head of
State cannot?" Secondly, Saif believed that his father's UNGA
speech had been misinterpreted by U.S. audiences; he
specifically focused on statements involving moving the UN
Headquarters outside of the United States and various
assassination investigations (JFK, Rafik al-Hariri, etc.). Saif
stated that the elder Qadhafi meant no offense by his
statements, but was merely trying to "pave the way" for any
future decisions that POTUS might make related to those issues.
Lastly, Saif noted that the Libyan leader was worried about U.S.
intervention in Africa. The elder Qadhafi was also against the
linguistic and political division of Africa into "North" and
"Sub-Saharan" Africa and wanted countries such as the United
States to treat Africa as a single entity rather than two blocs.

TRIPOLI 00000941 003 OF 004

10. (S/NF) Saif said that Muammar al-Qadhafi was serious about
deepening engagement with the United States and establishing a
relationship with the Obama Administration. Saif said that his
father did not want to "go back to square one," but wanted to
move the bilateral relationship forward. Saif emphasized the
Libyan leader's interest in meeting POTUS in a third country if
a meeting in the United States was not possible. Such a meeting
would help overcome the negative history that our nations
shared, would support the rebuilding of trust, and might even
help with U.S. Embassy operations and activities in Libya,
according to Saif.

11. (S/NF) The Ambassador noted that the relationship had seen
several advancements and several serious setbacks since Saif's
last visit to the United States, including the August 20 hero's
welcome accorded to Lockerbie bomber Abdel Basset al-Megrahi by
Saif himself. Megrahi's return had severely offended American
sensitivities and renewed tensions that set the relationship
back. Until that point, there had been significant progress,
with a military-to-military agreement signed in January and the
positive April visit of National Security Advisor Mutassim
al-Qadhafi and his meeting with the Secretary. Although the
death of Fathi el-Jahmi had been a setback to the relationship,
the U.S. and Libya had found a productive way forward through
the establishment of a bilateral Human Rights Dialogue.
Regarding concerns about U.S. intervention in Africa, the
Ambassador reminded Saif that Colonel Qadhafi and General Ward
had had what we believed to be a very productive meeting several
months ago, which we had hoped would have dispelled any concerns
the Libyans had about U.S. intentions in Africa. The Ambassador
explained that Americans were hoping for a more forward-leaning
statement by Muammar al-Qadhafi in New York but instead heard a
series of remarks that were not agreeable to the American
public. As a result, the relationship has been placed on a
"low-burner" since August.

12. (S/NF) In spite of these issues, the Ambassador said the
U.S. had managed to keep moving ahead in the areas of security,
military, political, civilian-nuclear, and economic cooperation.
However, many of the delays in implementation were due to
Libya's opaque bureaucracy. The Section 505 end user agreement,
for example, had languished in the GOL for months, as had
Libya's response on TIFA. Libya's slow-rolling on visa
approvals for official American travelers had delayed movement
in areas such as civilian-nuclear cooperation and on the
Regional Nuclear Medicine Facility.

13. (S/NF) Saif acknowledged that he was disconnected for a long
time from the bilateral relationship and recognized that the
hero's welcome for Megrahi had set engagement back. He
reiterated that he was "back" on the scene and could serve as
the "trouble-shooter" for any future problems. He urged the
Ambassador to contact his office directly in times of crisis.
He also promised to resolve the visa issue, stating that he
understood the importance of a transparent and reliable system
of issuance. In their one-on-one discussion afterwards, the
Ambassador asked Saif to explain his actions when he accompanied
Megrahi back to Tripoli. Saif said he knew what the reaction in
the West would be, but that it did not constitute an "official"
welcome. He had worked on the release for a long time, he was
not a public official, and there were no international media
like Al Jazeera present. In addition, Saif claimed that the
Libyans would someday find a way to show that Megrahi was
innocent. The Ambassador reiterated the damage the welcome had
done and said no amount of justification could undo that. Saif
nodded his understanding. Saif also replied that if he is
confirmed in his new position, he was as yet not sure whether he
would retain his current position as head of the Qadhafi
Development Foundation.

COMMENT AND ACTION REQUEST

14. (S/NF) The Libyan Government has chosen a very dangerous
issue on which to express its apparent pique about perceived
problems in the bilateral relationship, a point the Ambassador
underscored with Saif al-Islam. If Saif is to be believed, it
appears we might have a way forward. If the Department is
willing, we would urge a phone call from the Secretary to Musa
Kusa with a message for Colonel Qadhafi comprising a general
statement of commitment to the relationship, a commitment to
work with the Libyans to move the relationship ahead, and a

TRIPOLI 00000941 004 OF 004

strong point insisting that the HEU shipment be allowed to go
forward immediately and not be held hostage to any further
actions.

BIO NOTE

15. (S/NF) Saif met the Ambassdor in an office on the Bab
Al-Aziziya compound. The office was filled with books,
including a high stack of art and interior design books and
several brochures distributed by the Embassy's Public Affairs
Section. Saif conducted the meeting in English. He was
accompanied by his personal assistant, Mohamed Ismail Ahmed (DOB
07/06/1968), who said that he was born in Alexandria, Egypt, and
spent his childhood years traveling abroad with his diplomat
father, including in Afghanistan in the late 1970s, where he
attended the American School. Ahmed was soft-spoken and spoke
fluent English. He asked Pol/Econ chief to provide him with
additional information on the status of Libya's military
procurement requests and Letters of Offer and Assistance (LOA's).
POLASCHIK