Excerpt from document
(C) Summary: U.S. Charge d'Affaires, a.i., in Nouakchott
Dennis Hankins had productive consultations in Rabat on
January 28 and 29. His most interesting exchange was with
Director General of the external intelligence service Yassine
Mansouri, who reiterated Moroccan concerns about stability
and terrorism, and, for the first time, warned that
Mauritania could become a narco-state like Guinea-Bissau.

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DE RUEHRB #0094/01 0331250
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FM AMEMBASSY RABAT
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 9604
INFO RUCNMGH/MAGHREB COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
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RUEHDK/AMEMBASSY DAKAR PRIORITY 0477
RUEHNK/AMEMBASSY NOUAKCHOTT PRIORITY 3827
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S E C R E T RABAT 000094

SIPDIS
NOFORN

STATE FOR AF/W AND NEA/MAG

E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/02/2019
TAGS: PREL, PINS, PTER, PHUM, SNAR, KDEM, MR, MO
SUBJECT: CDA HANKINS PROMOTES DEMOCRACY DURING MOROCCO
STOP; GOM HIGHLIGHTS CONCERNS ABOUT NARCOTICS AND TERRORISM
IN MAURITANIA

Classified By: CDA Robert P. Jackson for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d).

1. (C) Summary: U.S. Charge d'Affaires, a.i., in Nouakchott
Dennis Hankins had productive consultations in Rabat on
January 28 and 29. His most interesting exchange was with
Director General of the external intelligence service Yassine
Mansouri, who reiterated Moroccan concerns about stability
and terrorism, and, for the first time, warned that
Mauritania could become a narco-state like Guinea-Bissau.
Hankins also met with former Moroccan Minister of Human
Rights Mohamed Aujjar, who has attempted to mediate between
General Abdel Aziz and President Abdallahi. Aujjar
underscored the need for an outside mediator or facilitator
to offer a transition plan that would be acceptable to the
major players. Hankins also briefed diplomats from Canada,
Italy, Japan, the Netherlands, Spain and the UK -- many of
whom cover Mauritania from Morocco. End summary.

2. (S/NF) Director General for Studies and Documentation
(DGED) Mansouri thanked Hankins, Charge Jackson and RAO
Officer for the opportunity to exchange views on Mauritania.
He insisted that Morocco was not supportive of the coup, but
stability and counterterrorism remained paramount concerns.
Mansouri indicated that Morocco is especially concerned by
rising criminality in Mauritania. He said the Moroccan
Government had warned Mauritanian counterparts about the
terrorist threat years ago, adding that Mauritania has since
become "the region's weak underbelly." Mansouri considered
that President Abdallahi had been soft on radicalism that
had, in part, emboldened AQIM.

3. (S/NF) Turning to the present situation, Mansouri said he
thought a compromise was possible and that too much outside
pressure could backfire. Morocco firmly supports a return to
constitutionality, but Abdallahi had left General Aziz with
no choice when he &blocked institutions from fulfilling
their roles and pandered to Islamists.8 Hankins responded
that the USG firmly condemned the coup. He noted the U.S.
and Mali have been the most forceful advocates for President
Abdallahi's return. We support serious negotiations but
based on the final exit of the military. He added that Col.
Vall, the former head of state, was not an obvious savior
given his record of corruption.

4. (C) Underscoring that the military has yet to consolidate
the coup and faces a financial crisis in February or March
when it likely will be unable to pay salaries, Hankins said
coup opponents have grown stronger and more outspoken since
the Estates General on Democracy. He noted that Abdallahi,s
recent policy statement shows a willingness not to complete
his mandate if the military leave the field. He added that
the June election proposed by the junta is not technically
feasible according to the UN. In fact, one cannot envision a
fair election with General Aziz as a candidate.

5. (C) Hankins noted that many of Mauritania's fundamental
challenges -- growing radicalism, the terrorist threat from
Al-Qaeda in the Lands of the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) and
narcotics trafficking -- began during previous military
regimes. While political machinations continue in
Nouakchott, these problems are not being addressed. Nor is
it likely that the type of &democratic transition8 proposed
by Aziz will effectively address these issues; on the
contrary it is likely to aggravate them.

NARCOTICS
---------

6. (S/NF) Mansouri warned that drug trafficking from
Guinea-Bissau and Senegal through Mauritania is becoming a
preoccupation. While smuggling is not a new phenomenon, an
unstable Mauritania could become another Guinea or
Guinea-Bissau. In addition, countries with crumbling
economies generate migrants, and Morocco and Spain had both
received Mauritanian migrants in years past.

COUNTERTERRORISM
----------------

7. (S/NF) In response to Charge Jackson's question about the
terrorist threat, Mansouri's deputy counterterrorism oficer
said that the Mauritanian Government had disrupted AQIM.
However, AQIM is developing new tactics, including the use of
snipers and car bombs. Moroever, there is a sort of
competition between AQIM groups that could create a dangerous

dynamic. Mauritania is a country that could be destabilized
by terrorist acts.

OUTSIDE HELP NEEDED
-------------------

8. (C) When Hankins and Jackson met with former Minister
Aujjar on January 29, he explained that he had spent a week
in November attempting to broker a compromise. He felt that
the only way ahead at present was for a neutral mediator to
offer a compromise that was palatable to all parties. He did
not believe the French would be trusted by anyone as a
mediator and suggested the U.S. play a role. He was sure
Morocco would be willing to play a role but recognized they
would not be seen as credible given the opposition view of
Aziz as &the Moroccan.8 One element of that could be
Abdallahi's return for a short period, but a June election
was not a solution.

COMMENT
-------

9. (C) Morocco's provision of counterterrorism and military
assistance to the junta underscores GOM concern about what
happens in Mauritania. The Moroccan line may have softened a
bit since Secretary Rice's September visit to Rabat, perhaps
out of recognition that Morocco cannot keep General Aziz
afloat indefinitely. End comment.

10. (U) Charge Hankins has cleared this message.

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Visit Embassy Rabat's Classified Website;
http://www.state.sgov.gov/p/nea/rabat
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Jackson