S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 04 ALGIERS 000948
SIPDIS
NOFORN
EO 12958 DECL: 10/20/2029
TAGS PREL, PTER, PGOV, MCAP, MOPS, SNAR, AG, ML, MR, NG,
UV, US
SUBJECT: ALGERIA SAYS BAMAKO SUMMIT KEY TO REGIONAL
CAMPAIGN AGAINST AQIM
ALGIERS 00000948 001.2 OF 004
Classified By: Ambassador David D Pearce; reasons 1.4 (b) and (d).
¶1. (S/NF) SUMMARY: Algerian Minister Delegate for Defense
Guenaizia told visiting Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense
(DASD) Ambassador Vicki Huddleston October 19 that the
Algerian, Mauritanian, Nigerien and Malian chiefs of staff had
agreed to set up a regional command for joint counter
terrorism operations at Tamanrasset in southern Algeria. He
indicated the command could eventually be expanded to include
Libya, Burkina Faso and Chad. For its part, Algeria was
determined that terrorists not be allowed to set up logistics,
training and supply bases along its frontiers, i.e., in
neighboring countries, with the intent of delivering weapons
and explosives to Algeria. Algeria has taken the lead in
sensitizing its southern neighbors to the nature of the threat
and the need for combined action. Huddleston asked how the
U.S. and others could support this effort. Guenaizia replied
that intelligence-sharing was fundamental. So was provision of
certain technical means, like IED jammers. A delegation from
Northrop Grumman was coming to Algeria this week to discuss
the capabilities of a Boeing 737 aircraft with a modified
AWACS array. But the U.S. could perhaps assist most before the
impending Bamako summit by helping secure the requisite
top-level political will among Sahel countries that would make
the summit a success and facilitate effective military
cooperation. Here, he contended, the biggest problem was the
Malian political leadership. The U.S. could help by talking to
Mali and others with influence in Mali to ensure the necessary
level of political will was there. Huddleston said she
expected the U.S. would indeed be engaging Mali and its
neighbors to help make the summit a success. Guenaizia
welcomed the expected visit of General Ward of Africa Command
in late November. END SUMMARY.
U.S. RECOGNIZES ALGERIA’S LEADING ROLE
--------------------------------------
¶2. (C/NF) Visiting Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense
(DASD) Ambassador Vicki Huddleston met October 19 with
Algerian Minister Delegate for Defense Abdelmalik Guenaizia
and other senior generals, including Defense Ministry (MND) SG
Major General Ahmed Senhadji, MND Director of External
Relations and Cooperation General Mekri, MND Director of the
Directorate of Documentation and External Security (DDSE)
Major General Lallali and Colonel Mohamed Benmousset, Project
Manager for Major General Senhadji. She told Guenaizia that
the United States recognized Algeria’s leadership in Africa,
including Algeria’s history of support to Africa’s
independence movements, promotion of economic and social
development, and on security matters. Huddleston acknowledged
Algeria’s own experience in combating terrorism and
underscored USG appreciation for Algeria’s lead on efforts to
secure the Sahel region and prevent terrorism from taking root
in neighboring countries. She recalled her cooperation with
Algeria when she was ambassador in Mali to confront the
Salafist Group for Preaching and Combat (GSPC), forerunner of
al-Qa’ida in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM), after the GSPC
captured European tourists and brought them to northern Mali
from Algeria in 2003. Algeria’s commitment to combat GSPC in
the region was clear, she said, and its engagement with Mali
was impressive. The U.S. played its part through training to
increase Mali’s military planning capacity. In the end,
Huddleston concluded, we were successful. GSPC fled Mali to
Niger and then to Chad, where GSPC leader “al-Para” was
captured and returned to Algeria. Huddleston noted the
regional military chiefs of staff meeting held in Tamanrasset
in July and the planned regional heads of state summit in
Bamako demonstrated that Algeria understood once more the
importance of a coordinated regional response to combat
terrorism in the Sahel. The U.S. recognized Algeria’s
commitment to working with the countries of the region, she
stressed, and Algeria’s leading role in that effort. She
explained the goal of her visit was to learn how the U.S. can
support Algeria’s effort.
¶3. (C) Guenaizia thanked Huddleston for focusing her
discussion on counterterrorism. Terrorism, he emphasized, was
not a local phenomenon in the region. It was brought from
outside with all its horrors, he said, and it is a phenomenon
the people of the region reject. When the threat
ALGIERS 00000948 002.2 OF 004
first emerged in Algeria, the international community
misunderstood the scope of the problem and left Algeria alone
to fight in the 1990s. Algeria faced an international embargo
in its time of need, he said. Despite this embargo and the
challenge of protecting an area of 2.3 million square
kilometers and a population of 34 million, he said, Algeria
became self-reliant and prevailed with the overwhelming
support of the Algerian people the security services and the
army.
MUST MAINTAIN PRESSURE
----------------------
¶4. (C/NF) Guenaizia said today the situation had improved
considerably, but terrorism remains a serious threat, and
Algeria will maintain the same level of pressure and
dedication to its counterterrorism efforts. He stressed,
however, that terrorism was not only a threat to Algeria, it
threatened the entire region and beyond. AQIM, he argued,
wants to embed itself in the region and, therefore, Algeria
intended to take the fight beyond Algeria’s borders. Like a
skilled boxer, he said, the key is to keep pressure on your
opponent and increase your room for maneuver. Guenaizia made
it clear that Algeria will not tolerate a situation in which
AQIM or other armed groups are able to establish camps for
logistics and training along Algeria’s frontier in neighboring
countries with the intent of facilitating the entry of trained
insurgents, weapons and explosives into Algeria.
¶5. (C/NF) Guenaizia said the situation in northern Mali
presented the greatest obstacle to combating terrorism. The
nexus of arms, drug and contraband smuggling in northern Mali
created an enabling environment, Guenaizia argued, and
provided a source of logistical and financial support.
Guenaizia added that terrorists will use any means available
to finance their activities, including corruption and
hostage-taking. Thus, he underlined, fighting terrorism
requires “implacable” political will to neutralize all avenues
of support terrorists can exploit. Guenaizia asserted that
increased drug trafficking represented a critical problem in
this regard. Thousands of tons of drugs now cross through the
region, he said. Based on clashes with Algerian security
forces, Guenaizia assessed that those involved in drug
trafficking were well organized and had military training.
Guenaizia said that Morocco was a major smuggling route for
cannabis and hashish and was not doing enough to interdict
traffickers. Huddleston told Guenaizia the U.S. was equally
concerned with drug trafficking in northwest Africa,
particularly Colombian drugs transiting west Africa and the
Sahel en route to Europe. The drug trade added another source
of finance for terrorists, and its destabilizing effect on
local populations could expand the geographic scope of
terrorist recruitment efforts, she said, citing the example of
the Boko Haram in Nigeria.
¶6. (C) Guenaizia cautioned that the terrorist network in the
Sahel is a sophisticated organization. “These are not simple
warlords we are facing,” he emphasized. They use the best
explosives, have honed their bomb-making expertise and use
sophisticated means to deploy explosives against their
targets, Guenaizia underscored. He added that information to
build highly sophisticated IEDs is easily obtainable from the
Internet. No country is safe, he went on; “We need to remain
vigilant.”
TAMANRASSET REGIONAL COMMAND
----------------------------
¶7. (C/NF) Guenaizia noted that regional chiefs of staff met
in the southern Algerian city of Tamanrasset in July to create
a mechanism to allow militaries in the region to coordinate
efforts against terrorist threats while at the same time
respecting each country’s sovereignty. Military leaders of
Algeria, Mali, Mauritania and Niger, he said, agreed to
establish a regional command in Tamanrasset that will host
military representatives from each country and coordinate
joint operations against AQIM targets. Joint military efforts,
Guenaizia elaborated, are necessary to prevent AQIM from
implanting itself in the region. He called this the
fundamental challenge. Regional military leaders are
ALGIERS 00000948 003.2 OF 004
now sensitized to the problem, he asserted, and are willing to
wage a common CT campaign. He indicated that the command could
eventually be expanded to include Libya, Burkina Faso and
Chad. For its part, Algeria will provide resources to optimize
the command center’s capacity. “What we can’t obtain among
ourselves,” he added, “we will seek from our friends.”
¶8. (C/NF) Guenaizia cautioned that, although the regional
command in Tamanrasset was an important first step, he didn’t
expect immediate results. The meeting in Tamanrasset, he
noted, concerned military coordination, but successful action
hinged on two operational aspects: military readiness and
political will. Guenaizia said regional military leaders had
done their job, now it was up to the civilian leaders of the
region to demonstrate the political will to act. “We are
waiting for the Bamako summit,” Guenaizia stressed.
HOW THE U.S. CAN HELP
---------------------
¶9. (S/NF) As to how the U.S. and others could support the
regional effort, Guenaizia emphasized (repeating himself three
times to make the point) that sharing intelligence was
fundamental. Guenaizia reminded Huddleston that Algeria once
agreed to U.S. surveillance overflights years ago, but the
experience yielded few positive results for Algeria even
though the intelligence collected related directly to
Algeria’s national security and used Algeria’s sovereign
airspace. Huddleston replied that the U.S. and Algeria were
already sharing a lot of intelligence. There would be a
willingness to conduct overflights, but she underlined that
any overflight mission would have to be linked to direct
action on the ground. The cost of one mission, she emphasized,
was around USD 50,000, so we had to be sure of the result.
Huddleston suggested Guenaizia could raise this matter during
AFRICOM Commander General Ward’s expected visit in November.
¶10. (S/NF) The provision of technical means was also key.
Guenaizia complained that in many ways Algeria still faced an
embargo in regards to the provision of technical equipment,
including counter-IED measures and sensors for intelligence
gathering. He informed Huddleston that a Northrop Grumman
delegation will arrive in Algeria this week to discuss the
capabilities of an AWACS-type platform based on a Boeing 737
airframe. Algeria also needed sophisticated IED jammers, he
said. Insurgents use cell phones to detonate IEDs remotely, he
stressed, resulting in huge casualties for Algerian forces.
Guenaizia lamented that despite this critical need, Algeria’s
partners had been slow in responding to Algeria’s request to
purchase jammers. He did not refer directly to U.S.
end-use-monitoring rules, but he shared an anecdote about
Algeria’s difficulties purchasing jamming technology from
Portugal, a request, he continued, that has been pending for
more than a year with no response.
¶11. (S/NF) He said the U.S. and others could perhaps assist
most before the Bamako heads of state summit by helping secure
the requisite top-level political will among Sahel governments
needed to make the summit a success and facilitate effective
military action. DDSE Major General Lallali said the key to
securing commitment for effective cooperation rested with
top-level leaders in Bamako. Lallali said Mali’s political
leadership was the biggest problem. “We need a signal from
Bamako that shows their commitment,” Lallali stated. Malians
are suffering from terrorism, he said, yet when local
populations try to fight back, the authorities crack down on
those populations.
¶12. (S/NF) Lallali complained that Malian officials have
alerted insurgents that their cell phone calls were being
monitored and leaked sensitive intelligence. Lallali also
accused Mali of facilitating ransom payments for hostages. He
called Mali a favorable business environment for terrorists
and believed many wealthy and powerful families in Mali
benefited from illegal trafficking. He termed the XXXXXXXXXXXX
the “Terrorist Bank” and said, “we need to suppress that
bank,” noting the connection between drug trafficking and
support for terrorist finance and logistics. Lallali commented
that Algeria’s effort in the UN to criminalize
ALGIERS 00000948 004.2 OF 004
ransom payments aimed to curb corruption’s role in
facilitating terrorism. He implored DASD Huddleston to “please
do something with them.”
¶13. (S/NF) Guenaizia agreed that trust was an issue with
Mali. Although Algeria has provided materiel and training
support to Mali to help resolve the Tuareg issue, it was not
inclined to give Mali weapons and communications gear because
of concerns that such equipment might be trafficked to Ivory
Coast or Guinea. Guenaizia said there was a “double language”
in Mali-- its political leadership did not share the
commitment Mali’s military leaders demonstrated. In order to
succeed in the fight, Guenaizia affirmed, Mali had to
cooperate fully. The Bamako summit has to deliver a clear
political commitment. The U.S. could help by talking to Mali
and others with influence in Mali to ensure the necessary
level of political will was there. Huddleston agreed that
complicity in Mali regarding the desire to share in the spoils
of illegal trafficking seemed to have become worse since her
tenure as ambassador. She concurred that Mali’s cooperation
was essential but said that engaging Mali was a task for the
entire region, not only Algeria. Huddleston cited the
potential role of other partners in the region with influence
in Mali, like Libya and Burkina Faso. She also suggested
involving the AU to press for a general statement on fighting
terrorism in the Sahel that would not single out Mali but
rather deliver a broad message that countries in the region
should act in concert and not allow terrorists to operate with
impunity. The U.S., she said, will engage Mali and others in
the region to play a constructive role in the region’s fight
against terrorism.
BETTER COMMUNICATION
--------------------
¶14. (S/NF) Huddleston told Guenaizia that U.S. military
assistance in the region aimed to improve the capacity of
militaries in Mali, Mauritania and Chad through training and
equipment. President Tandja’s bid for a third term in office,
she regretted, probably meant the U.S. will not be able to
assist Niger, but we will extend our assistance to Burkina
Faso soon. It was important, she stressed, that U.S. efforts
were in step with regional efforts already underway. In this
regard, Huddleston emphasized that communication among
regional governments and other partners, like the U.S., was
essential. Huddleston referred to recent talks between the
U.S. and European allies on security in the Sahel, during
which the European Commission and France mentioned plans for
assistance. Guenaizia noted Europe’s interest in getting
involved and said that some European governments had tried to
insert themselves into the Tamanrasset meeting. He bluntly
stated that Africa had already endured a period of
colonialism. Lallali interjected that European participation
could complicate matters.
¶15. (S/NF) Huddleston clarified that outside partners did not
have to be involved directly but needed to be apprised of
future steps and planning in order to provide support.
Huddleston suggested regular meetings by the MOD with the
Ambassador and DATT in Algiers. Guenaizia said he had no
objection, both with the U.S. and others. The threat concerns
all. But cooperation had to advance gradually. We should
review progress in stages, he added. Immediate efforts, he
reiterated, should focus on pressuring Mali and achieving a
successful summit in Bamako. The next step was to allow time
for standing up the regional command in Tamanrasset and
determining equipment needs. He suggested in two to three
months we might be able meet and take stock of that effort. In
this regard, Guenaizia welcomed the expected visit of General
Ward of Africa Command in November.
¶16. (U) DASD Huddleston did not clear this cable.
¶17. (U) Tripoli minimize considered. PEARCE