From: Aftenposten
7/7/2009 7:56
UNCLAS OSLO 000434 SENSITIVE FOR EUR-IO/EX, M, AND OBO 
SIPDIS E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: ABLD, PREL, AMGT, ASEC, KLIG, NO 
SUBJECT: OSLO NEC - THE HIGH COSTS OF FREEZING THE PROJECT
REF: Oslo 375 and previous

1. (SBU) Summary and Action Request:
After winning a nail-biting vote in the City Council, an appeal to the
governor, two lower court cases, and a final Supreme Court appeal,
then successfully concluding four years of negotiations over the
purchase price for the land, we at last have a clear path in Norway to
proceed with the Oslo NEC. While mindful of competing priorities, we
urge the Department to move forward with the modest funding needed for
our NEC redesign. The redesign would lead to issuance of our first
building permit, which in turn would prevent the volatile Oslo City
Council from rezoning or reducing the size of our buildable
property. This would position Oslo as a backup NEC project without
committing us to build at this time. The alternative, withdrawing our
application, would damage U.S. credibility and our bilateral
relationship and potentially leave us with no viable NEC site after
huge investments of money, time, and political capital.  Personal
interventions by the Foreign Minister and Minister of Defense in this
process at the request of the Ambassador make this a key bilateral
issue. Public revelation that U.S. urgency for a new NEC site over the
last seven years is gone would handcuff our new Ambassador immediately
upon arrival. End Summary.

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Background 
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2. (U)
The Department and Post have spent seven years seeking to address the
fact that our lack of adequate setback makes it impossible to retrofit
our aging chancery to meet blast standards. Following a two-year
search for a new property, in 2004 we identified a ten-acre site in
Huseby owned by the Ministry of Defense.

3. (SBU)
The proposal to rezone the Huseby property to allow the NEC barely
prevailed in the City Council in December 2005 after the Embassy
convinced the GON to intervene politically. Tensions were so high that
a City Councillor who switched sides to support us was later expelled
from his party. Our opponents responded by appealing to the governor,
suing in court, appealing, and appealing again to the Supreme
Court. In 2008 the City Council again threatened to block the NEC,
despite our court victories. Only the personal intervention of the
Foreign Minister, at the Ambassador´s request, stopped the Oslo Labor
Party from blocking the NEC project. In May of 2009, the Supreme Court
dismissed the plaintiffs´ lawsuit, finally clearing the way for us to
proceed, as long as the political balance in the City Council
(guaranteed by the Foreign Minister) holds.

4. (SBU)
Amid the backdrop of courtroom theatrics, negotiations quietly dragged
on for four years over the terms of sale of the NEC site. The personal
involvement of the Minister of Defense and numerous high-level
interventions in Washington eventually led to concessions on both
sides, culminating in the final purchase agreement that was signed in
December 2008.

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Where Things Stand Now 
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5. (SBU) 
Currently we have ownership of a ten-acre site. Our first building
permit, an expensive, laborious, and time-consuming process that we
began in 2008, remains pending with the Oslo Planning and Building
Authority. An estimated USD 300,000 in funds is needed to modify the
design of the NEC to meet the City´s requirements. There is one catch:
once the first building permit is approved, it will remain valid for
only three years. On the other hand, until that permit is issued, the
City Council can at any time reverse the zoning decision. With
national elections set for September, it is uncertain how long we can
rely on the intervention of national Labor Party leaders, such as the
Foreign Minister, to protect our interests in the Oslo City
Council. Any sign that the USG is prepared to wait many years to build
after we expressed urgency for years would undercut our allies and
reverse our political victories.

6. (SBU)
The Oslo City Council´s anti-NEC majority has been held in check only
by the active intervention of our friends in the GON. The Council
previously voted to suspend processing of our building permit until
all pending litigation had been settled. In June of 2009, the City
Council beat back an attempt by our opponents to reduce the size of
our approved NEC site to five acres, but only with GON pressure on
Labor Party councillors, several of whom told the media they were
against the ten-acre NEC but voted for it in this case only because of
government pressure. The City Council thus remains a wild card; it
could revote to overturn its 2005 rezoning decision at any time if we
withdraw our application. Once our first building permit is approved,
however, the City Council would no longer be able to intervene.

7. (SBU)
In December 2008, DS reprioritized the NEC building schedule, moving
Oslo from FY 2011 to FY 2020. Fortunately, that information has not
become publicly known in Oslo. While our chancery´s lack of setback
makes it literally ""unsecurable,"" we understand the arguments for
first building NEC´s where terrorist threats are higher. Since the
security need for an NEC in Oslo is clear, however, we urge the
Department to preserve flexibility and avoid damage to
U.S. credibility.
 
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Options for the Future 
----------------------

8. (SBU)
After consulting our local attorneys about the administrative and
political issues involved, post sees two approaches:

A. We could withdraw our building permit application, noting that
redesign requests have funding implications we must consider. This
would lead to negative publicity and bewilderment on the part of the
GON, the City Council, and the media as to why the proposed move of
the embassy to Huseby was so urgent and our security concerns so great
if, in fact, we can wait.  Withdrawing our permit in August or
September, or perhaps not until asked by the Oslo Planning and
Building Authority when our design would appear might buy us some
months without the revelation that we are now saying that our previous
cries of urgency, including by the Ambassador to the Foreign Minister,
were exaggerated. When it becomes evident that our urgency has
vanished, we could blame Norway, arguing that years of uncertainty had
damaged the project. The result, however, would be devastating to our
credibility and possibly lead the City Council to reverse the
rezoning. All of our allies up to now (the Foreign Minister, the
Minister of Defense, favorable city councillors, citizen leaders)
would be embarrassed and resent the political pains they caused and
suffered, only to see the USG back out, just as victory appeared. The
search for a new site or attempts to resurrect this one would be
excruciating, as virtually every USG claim would be suspect. This
would be among the first issues facing a brand new U.S. Ambassador to
Norway.

B. We could fund the NEC modifications that the City has requested and
obtain approval of the first building permit. The redesign could take
a few months or longer, with the permit granted in 2010. At that point
the City Council would be prevented from intervening politically by
the existence of a valid building permit. If the permit were allowed
to expire in 2013, we would be no worse off than we are today. On the
other hand, if another NEC project were to stall and pressures to use
building funds expeditiously were to grow (as has happened in the
past), Oslo would be prepared to fill the gap as a backup option for
NEC construction over the next three-year period.

9. (SBU) As the Department considers its next steps, post wishes to
express its gratitude to OBO Acting Director Adam Namm, EUR-IO
Executive Director Tom Tiernan, and Undersecretary for Management Pat
Kennedy for their resolve in the face of the numerous obstacles the
Oslo NEC project has overcome. We urge approval of Option B, which
offers the most advantages and flexibility to the U.S. Government.

JOHNSON