From: <a href="http://www.aftenposten.no/spesial/wikileaksdokumenter/article3960388.ece">Aftenposten</a><br>
Date: 18.06.2009

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NORWAYS RUSSIA POLICY: WISHFUL THINKING

1. (C)
Summary. Norwegian politicians like to brag about their good
relations with Russia, even suggesting that Norway Russia
policy should be a model for other neighbors of Russia to
follow. This public positivism masks a growing nervousness
over developments in Russia and a definite split in Norwegians
views on Russia. This angst and Norways unsymmetrical
relationship with Russia also has the effect of strengthening
the U.S.-Norway bilateral relationship and could be the basis
of a future strategic dialogue.

2. (C)
Norwegian security, business and environmental leaders are
much more skeptical (and worried) about Russian motivations
and actions than official statements would suggest. Their
viewpoint is mostly held quietly, leaving the public arena
primarily to Norways government officials (especially the PM
and FM) and think tankers who choose to stress the strong
cooperative relationship with Russia and the potential for
further cooperation. However, even the most positive
acknowledge that relations with Russia are not easy and Norway
has purposely maintained a core of Russia experts
(particularly in the intelligence and defense fields).
Increased Russian military activities, the growing strategic
relevance of the Arctic, problems with Norwegian investments
in Russia all make it clear that Norways relations with Russia
will continue to be one of Norways prime foreign policy
considerations. Strongly supporting increased U.S. engagement
with Russia, Norway can be convinced to be more supportive in
those cases where the U.S. or NATO believe firmness is
required...but we must ask. END SUMMARY

Russia: Public Positivism and a Focus on the Bilateral
------------------------------------------------------

3. (C)
The GONs official Russia policy has been characterized by a
consistent stress on the positive and a reluctance to publicly
criticize Russia actions (the Georgia war was one exception
but the GON shows little public solidarity when Russia
pressures the Baltics, Poland or other allies). Norway has
chosen to prioritize the bilateral aspects of its relations to
Russia, working to achieve greater cooperation in the Barents,
defending its interests in a quiet manner and stressing the
benefits of greater Russian integration into the European
economic and political regimes. The GON works to maintain
steady and positive contacts with Russia as evidenced by the
recent meetings of PM Stoltenberg with President Medvedev and
PM Putin, FM Stoeres meetings with FM Lavrov and other
meetings between Ministers of Energy and Industry. (Reftel A
and D)

4. (C)
As a member of the wider European community, Norway has been
much more passive, at times criticizing Russian actions, but
primarily arguing for dialogue and inclusion. Norways focus on
the bilateral relationship has resulted in cooperative and
well-functioning relationships in environmental cleanup,
nuclear safety, fisheries management and people-to-people
exchanges. It also has led to a greater potential for
cooperation in the development of energy resources in the
Barents (StatoilHydros share of the Shtockman Development
Company is the prime example).

5. (C)
These achievements impact the wider relationship as the GON
does not want to throw away the hard earned progress in
bilateral relations (or damage the potential future
cooperation on energy development or agreement on a maritime
border) for events elsewhere. GON priorities were illustrated
by a recent meeting between the Deputy Foreign Minister and a
high-ranking USG official. When speaking about Russia the
Deputy Minister choose to focus on a recently concluded
fishing agreement with Russia, ignoring any other wider
concerns.

Norways Strategy: Partly a Free Rider?
--------------------------------------- 

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6. (C)
The GON preference for bilateral issues does not mean that the
GON is unaware of negative trends in Russia or that it is
completely unwilling to press Russia. Increases in Russian
military activity in the area as well as the growing
uncertainly regarding investments in the Russian economy (the
Telenor investment the most prominent) have made the
challenges of working with Russia clear. FM Stoere has said
that Norway is concerned about Russian activities but does not
want to pick the wrong fights. (Note: A reliance on others to
confront Russia when needed is also a clear factor. End Note)

7. (C)
The "right fights" for the GON appear to be any issue which
has an economic impact on Norway or actions such as the
Georgian war where Russia uses force. FM Stoere and PM
Stoltenberg both raised the Telenor investment issue with
their counterparts at recent meetings and the GON has enforced
its fishing laws and its sovereignty over Svalbard despite
Russian opposition. Also the GON has been unwilling to accept
the Russian position on the maritime border, given that it
would exclude Norwegian rights over a sub sea area thought to
be rich in energy resources.

8. (C)
The general GON policy towards Russia is to increase Norwegian
(and other countries) presence in the High North, create new
tools to deal with the regions challenges, and increase the
level of knowledge about the Barents region within Europe and
with allies. The GONs initiative on this front has taken
several shapes, including pushing to expand the Arctic
Council, proposing a NATO focus on the alliances core areas,
increasing Nordic cooperation and activities, and holding
bilateral dialogues with the U.S., UK, France, Germany and
Canada on High North issues. Norway hopes increased attention
to the High North will make it harder for Russia to obtain its
objectives on Svalbard or elsewhere in the region with the use
or threat of brute force. (Reftel B and C)

Quiet Concerns 
--------------

9. (C)
The GONs strategy of public positivism and increases in
international attention to the region is not satisfactory to
all in Norway. The leaders of the two biggest opposition
parties have criticized the GONs approach as too weak on
Russia, especially regarding negative developments in its
democracy and economy. They point to the dismissal of the
governor of Murmansk, known for his close cooperation with
Norway, as evidence that the GONs soft touch has not resulted
in any changes in Russian behavior. Security policy experts
have always kept a wary eye on Russian activities and remain
very concerned about the limited ability of the Norwegian
military to respond to any threat. They would like to see
increased NATO attention and planning in the region.
Environmental and Human Rights leaders in Norway including the
influential heads of Bellona (an environmental group with
offices in Norway and Russia) and the Helsinki Human Rights
Committee have been very critical of Russia and the GONs
policy. Business leaders also are becoming more concerned
given the problems that even state-owned telecommunications
firm Telenor has faced with their investment in Russia. For
these disparate groups, the positive rhetoric used by the GON
is increasingly not matched by the reality in Russia.

10. (U)
These criticisms were echoed by well-known Russian
environmental activist Alexander Nikitin in a June 12 speech
in Oslo. Nikitin criticized what he called FM Stoeres guiding
principle "not to provoke, but to collaborate." Nikitin
expressed disappointment that the GON fails to take advantage
of its strong positions (not dependent on Russian energy,
secure due to NATO) to speak out about Russias democratic
failings, the reluctance of Russia to take responsibility for
the environment, Russias aggressive behavior in the Arctic, or
the overarching control of the Kremlin over local authorities.
Nikitin said that local cooperation in the Barents is good but
this is an unstable structure on which to base a bilateral
relationship. He challenged Norway to ask difficult questions
of Russia.

Test Cases-Will the Kid Gloves Pay Off
--------------------------------------

11. (C)
According to the GON, the bilateral Norway-Russia 

OSLO 00000399 003.2 OF 003 

relationship has never been so good. The Norwegian Embassy in
Moscow believes that the Kremlin needs to show that it can
cooperate with a NATO country and has decided that Norway is
the best candidate. Both sides point out the cooperative
relationship on fisheries, the visa-free travel border zone,
growing border crossings and cultural exchanges and the
potential for economic cooperation offshore. The close
cooperation that Norway and Russia enjoy is admirable and
real.

12. (C)
However, Norway has precious little to point to as concrete
results of its positive Russia policy:

--The decision to grant StatoilHydro participation in the
Shtockman development company is often mentioned as the prime
example of how the GON policy pays dividends. However this
joint project is only now in the beginning stages of
development with the investment decisions to be made later
this year. Other foreign energy companies have had similar
positive beginnings with joint projects with Gazprom only to
see them fall apart later. How this joint project develops
will be a key test of the claim that the Norwegian
relationship with Russia is somehow better than others.

--The resolution of the Telenor case will be another. Telenor,
the GON state owned telecommunications firm invested with the
oligarch-controlled Alfa Group to establish a mobile phone
company in Russia. After disagreements over the joint companys
future, the Alfa Group succeeded in freezing Telenors shares
in the company and threatened to sell them at a huge loss to
Telenor. This action was raised by all Norwegian Ministers
during their recent meetings with Russian counterparts. PM
Stoltenberg received promises from PM Putin that the Telenor
shares would not be sold before all appeals processes were
exhausted. How this case is resolved will be illustrative.

--Svalbard and the Maritime Boundary are also key test cases.
Russia disputes Norways interpretation of the Svalbard treaty
regarding the exploitation of resources in the waters around
Svalbard. At present this primarily involves fish but could in
the future include sub sea energy resources. Russia also has a
very different interpretation of where the maritime boundary
should be drawn. Development of potential energy resources in
the disputed area has been put on hold until a border is agree
upon. If Russia gives ground on either of these two issues it
would be strong evidence of the success of Norways gentle
approach.

Comment 
-------

13. (C)
Norway has succeeded in creating a low tension relationship
with Russia with real and functioning cooperative agreements
in the Barents. This is positive but it is unclear that this
is a result of GON policy or simply of Russian disinterest.
Some are wondering if this is worth the price of GON
reluctance to show solidarity when Russia pushes allies or
other states. Despite GON claims that other nations should
follow their lead, it appears to us that Norways relationship
is unique and a model Russia might favor, but not other
allies.

14. (C)
Norways underlying concerns over Russia will however continue
to be an important piece of the continued close U.S.-Norway
bilateral relationship. Close intelligence and military
connections have continued despite the end of the cold war,
and Norway had maintained its Russian expertise when others
scaled back. Norways desire for increased attention to the
High North is a healthy impulse and one which should
compliment increasing U.S. interest in the Arctic. Norway has
expressed a desire to re-start the dormant U.S.-Norway High
North talks and discussing ways to combine our Russian
expertise may be a topic of mutual interest for this
initiative. Norway strongly supports U.S. determination to
increase engagement with Russia and "reset" the relationship.
We should ask Norway to also support the firm U.S. and NATO
positions on Russia when necessary, rather than relying on
others to do so.

WHITNEY
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