From: Aftenposten
Date: 07.05.2009

Dette dokumentet er omtalt i følgende artikkel:


 

C O N F I D E N T I A L KABUL 001178
SIPDIS
E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/07/2019 
TAGS: PGOV, PINS, PREL, AF 
SUBJECT: SPANTA AND CHARGE DISCUSS ELECTION POLITICS AND 
UPCOMING TRILATERAL MEETINGS

Classified By: Acting DCM Alan Yu for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d)

1. (C) Summary. During a 4/30 meeting with Foreign Minister 
Spanta, the Charge reiterated U.S. impartiality in the 
current election cycle. Spanta was not happy with Karzai,s 
choice of Marshall Mohammed Fahim but could not offer a 
better candidate of his own. The Charge expressed U.S. 
disappointment with the Fahim choice. Spanta had encouraged 
Karzai to look to a new generation and break from the past. 
The Charge and Spanta agreed the two Vice Presidents must be 
qualified individuals who had the trust and confidence of the 
President. End summary.

2. (C) Charge and FM Spanta discussed election politics at a 
meeting at the Foreign Ministry on April 30. After noting 
the importance of the personal relationship between the 
President and his running mates, Spanta questioned the 
tentative selection of Mohammed Fahim. Spanta asserted that 
Fahim, then Defense Minister under the interim government 
headed by Karzai, was corrupt and untrustworthy. Spanta did 
not support Fahim and had told Karzai so. Karzai,s response 
was that Fahim `is clean now.' Either way, Spanta said, 
`We cannot have a united country with Fahim as Vice 
President.'

3. (C) The Charge repeatedly assured Spanta the U.S. was not 
picking favorites or taking sides - the most important factor 
was finding the most qualified VP candidates who had earned 
Karzai,s trust. Karzai had asked for Spanta,s thoughts on 
former Foreign Minister Dr. Abdullah and current NDS Chief 
Amrullah Saleh, but Spanta simply told Karzai to choose 
someone in whom he had confidence.

4. (C) The Foreign Minister declared that once Karzai makes 
up his mind, he doesn,t change it. Discussions on potential 
VP candidates started within the Cabinet 5 to 6 months ago. 
Spanta encouraged Karzai to consult outside the Cabinet as 
well, while warning that certain constituencies such as civil 
society organizations and urban voters would be against the 
Fahim choice. Spanta pointed out that Abdullah has his 
downsides as well: Pashtuns think he is Tajik and Tajiks 
think he is Pashtun, in addition to the fact that he is ¬ 
clean.8 Other names that came up as potential VP candidates 
were former Finance Minister Ashraf Ghani and former Interior 
Minister Ali Ahmad Jalali. But Spanta said that Karzai 
needed to `break the circle of forces of the past,' calling 
it a `vicious circle.' Afghanistan continues to look to 
the past for its leaders of the future, and many of those 
individuals are corrupt and human rights violators. It,s 
time to look for the `young and dynamic.' The Charge 
heartily agreed, saying he had told Karzai exactly the same 
thing. Ultimately, though, Spanta said he could offer no 
solution to the VP problem.

5. (C) The Charge then passed on a message to the Foreign 
Minister from POTUS and the Secretary, noting that choosing 
Fahim would have a serious effect on and potential negative 
consequences for the bilateral relationship. He asked that 
Spanta pass that message to President Karzai.

6. (C) On the topic of other Presidential contenders, Spanta 
said he had received a call from Zalmay Khalilzad earlier in 
the day. Khalilzad not only told him he would not run 
against Karzai in the current election, he said he would 
never run against Karzai. Spanta noted that Karzai believed 
USG representatives who met with opposition leaders and other 
potential Presidential contenders were showing favoritism 
through a lack of support for his own reelection. The Charge 
stressed that the U.S. did not support any individual 
candidate, including Karzai.

7. (C) The last topic concerned protocol on proposed meetings 
at the White House between POTUS and Presidents Zardari and 
Karzai. Spanta made the point that if the two Presidents 
were to meet with POTUS individually, he argued Karzai not 
have to wait. Spanta suggested either a joint meeting or 
separate meetings at prearranged times. He was concerned 
about the perception that Karzai would wait outside while 
POTUS met with his Pakistani counterpart. 

RICCIARDONE