From: Aftenposten
Date: 12.02.2008
C O N F I D E N T I A L OSLO 000072 
SIPDIS 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/11/2018 
TAGS: MARR, PGOV, PREL, NO 
SUBJECT: NORWAY STANDING ALONE AGAINST MISSILE DEFENSE 
REF: A. OSLO 57 B. 2007 OSLO 177 
Classified By: Deputy Chief of Mission Kevin M. Johnson,
for reasons 1.4b and d 

1. (C)
Summary: Norway remains opposed to U.S. plans for missile
defenses and was the only NATO ally to publicly express
skepticism over these plans during the recent Defense
Ministerial in Vilnius. Defense Minister Anne-Grete
Strom-Erichsen told the media that Norway doubts the need for
missile defense and believes it could lead to an arms race.
Responding to Ambassador Whitneys observation that it is
unusual for Norway to block consensus in NATO, Strom-Erichsen
stated that the GON has not yet decided on its approach to
this issue (including whether to use its veto) at the Foreign
Ministerial or the NATO summit in Bucharest. In a February 11
meeting with Ambassador Whitney, MFA State Secretary Raymond
Johansen said that the GON is constrained on this issue but
wants to frame the issue in such a way that they can keep from
having to block it in NATO. The USG should point out that GON
persistant and public support for Russias line on missile
defense is troubling even if Norway eventually allows U.S. and
NATO goals. End Summary

Alone in NATO: Public Opposition to Missile Defense 
------------------------------------------------------------ 

2. (SBU)
The Norwegian Defense Minister, Anne-Grete Strom-Erichsen, was
the only Defense Minister to publicly oppose the U.S. plans
for missile defenses against long-range missiles during the
Vilnius Defense Ministerial. Repeating oft stated doubts over
the threat and claiming that this system would create an arms
race, Strom-Erichsen appeared surprised that the GON was alone
in this public skepticism.

3. (SBU)
Missile defense has been a hot issue for the GON, primarily
because of the Socialist Lefts (SV) presence in the governing
coalition. SV succeeded in inserting a commitment to oppose
missile defense plans in the coalitions government platform
(the Soria Moria document). Reluctant to break this commitment
(and risk splitting the coalition) and generally skeptical of
U.S. policies and goals (reftel A), the GON has been vocally
opposed to missile defense plans, despite strong USG efforts
to present information on the threat and the system, including
visits by Ambassador Nuland, General Obering, journalist
tours, and extensive outreach by Ambassador Whitney and other
embassy officials.

Isolation in NATO Awakens Opposition 
--------------------------------------------

4. (SBU)
Opposition figures, long quiet on this issue, have seemingly
been shocked by Norways isolation in NATO and were very
critical of the government. The leader of the Conservative
Party, Erna Solberg, stated &outside of Russia itself, no
other nation claims that the missile defense system will cause
an arms race. Russia knows that the missile defenses are not
against them but they use these arguments as a domestic
political symbol to show that Russia is a great power. It is
dumb for Norway to legitimize these arguments.8 Solberg called
for Norway to avoid being the only opponent of missile defense
in NATO. Jan Petersen, leader of Parliament,s defense
committee and fellow Conservative member, criticized the GON
for not knowing that it stood alone on this issue and
predicted a shift in policy. In statements to the press,
Ambassador Whitney also expressed disappointment that Norway
would even consider blocking consensus in NATO and that any
claim that the missile defenses were against Russia is not
credible.

Possibility of Change? 
---------------------- 

5. (SBU)
In comments after Vilnius Strom-Erichsen took pains to stress
that the GONs position on missile defense would be
re-evaluated before any upcoming NATO meetings. This was
echoed by FM Jonas Gahr Stoere before Vilnius. Both Ministers
have consistently stressed the GONs skepticism but also have
hinted that if the U.S. concludes agreements with Poland and
the Czech Republic, the basic facts would have changed,
leading to the need for new discussions in the GON on this
issue. Adding some credence to this theory is statements from
the Center Partys (the third coalition member) defense
spokesman in which he claims the Soria Moria statements on
missile defense need to adjust to current realities.

6. (C)
Despite a clear desire to keep its current objections, the GON
realizes it will have a hard time defending its position if
the issue shifts to one of alliance solidarity. Conclusion of
the U.S. agreement with Poland and the Czech Republic will
negate the main issue and force Norway to defend a situation
where half the alliance is covered by missile defenses
(including Norway) and the other half is vulnerable. State
Secretary Johansen confirmed during his February 11 lunch with
Ambassador Whitney that this situation would allow a policy
shift. Johansen said that the GON is aiming to frame the
discussion in these terms to allow change, stressing that the
U.S. agreements with Poland and the Czech Republic are
bilateral and that Norway can not influence them and
describing the NATO decision as ensuring that all allies are
protected.

Comment: Seeking an Escape Hatch....? 
---------------------------------------------- 

7. (C)
If the GON is not able to find any other allies on this issue
in NATO (Germany is the main hope for support) PM Stoltenberg,
not a strong ideologue or leader, will wish to avoid the
unpleasant experience of being alone in opposition to missile
defense at Bucharest and will attempt to follow the model laid
out by Johansen to escape. Whether this policy will succeed
depends on several factors, including how SV would accept such
an explanation for the shift in policy. After taking such a
strident and public stanse in opposing missile defense it is
also unclear how the GON could justify a potential about face
to the public.

Broader Implications 
----------------------- 

8. (C)
Ref A noted the need to counter negative trends in bilateral
relations. Missile defense is a good place for us to continue
to stress the potential cost of Norways policies. Even if
Norway eventually accomodates U.S. and NATO priorities on
missile defense, the long, public campaign parroting Russias
arguments has been damaging, something increasingly noted in
Norway and the U.S.

WHITNEY