From: <a href="http://www.aftenposten.no/spesial/wikileaksdokumenter/article3972767.ece">Aftenposten</a><br>
Date: 13.3.2007

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C O N F I D E N T I A L OSLO 000248 
SIPDIS 
SIPDIS 
STATE FOR EUR/NCE, EUR/PRA MAZEVEDO EUR/PPD 
TCORN VCI/MDSP STEVEN ROSENKRANTZ. 
NSC PASS TO MAHAYARD. 
DEFENSE PASS TO MDA NANCY MORGAN. 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/13/2013 
TAGS: PREL, PGOV, MARR 
SUBJECT: NORWAY: MISSLE DEFENSE PUBLIC DIPLOMACY AND OUTREACH 
REF: A. SECSTATE 30480 B. OSLO 177 C. OSLO 184 
Classified By: Deputy Chief of Mission Kevin M. Johnson for 
reasons 1.4 b and d 

1. (C)
Summary: As reported in ref b and c, Norway,s government
remains opposed in principle to missile defenses writ large
and skeptical of U.S. plans to base missile installations in
Central Europe. Embassy Oslo continues to engage with media,
government and think tank researchers to present the facts on
our missile defense plans and to encourage Norwegians to
rethink their reaction to missile defense plans and to speak
out against Russian mischaracterizations and complaints. Our
outreach has been successful in presenting the facts of the
issue to a limited audience but general skepticism among
political elites on missile defense combined with disinterest
from the public have hindered our efforts to have the GON make
public statements on this issue. End Summary

2. (C)
The GON,s opposition to missile defenses is clearly stated in
the policy platform forming the basis for the current
coalition. Some coalition members (from Labor) have a nuanced
position in private, distinguishing between what the U.S. has
proposed and false Russian claims. Others (Socialist Left and
some from the Labor Party) are more strongly opposed to any
missile defense plans as a threat to disarmament and
uninterested in distinguishing between types of missile
defense. There is no appetite among politicians to begin a
national debate on missile defenses, particularly as the
Norwegian public has little or no perception of a threat or
interest in missile defense plans, and partly due to desires
to avoid a new defense argument within the coalition on the
heels of a decisive debate over Afghanistan special forces
deployment. Most reactions to the issue are based on Cold War
plans and analysis. While experts in government understand the
limited nature of our plans, there is no indication that their
political leaders will risk raising an unpopular issue by
responding to Russia on missile defense plans. In addition to
arguing that merits of our case we are pressing interlocutors
within and without the GON to at a minimum counter Russian
misstatements and distinguish Norways position from Russias to
avoid damaging alliance solidarity.

3. (C)
Our outreach this far includes: 
--DCM lunch with National Security Advisor 
--Charge meeting with the Deputy Defense Minister, 
--Charge meeting with the Directors of the MOD and MFA security
policy sections, 
--Charge meeting with the chair of Parliament,s
defense committee, 
--Charge meeting with the head of the transatlantic center at
a influential defense institute, and 
--Charge publishing two opinion pieces in Norway,s largest
newspapers on missile defense, 
--briefings to working level contacts in MOD and MFA, 
--briefings to several prominent journalists and researchers
on missile defense, 
--contact with local allied embassies to coordinate approaches
on public outreach on missile defense and the larger issue of
encouraging the GON to respond to misleading and provocative
Russian statements.

4. (C)
Planned outreach includes: 
-- DCM March 14 lunch with the leader of the Conservative Party 
--DCM scheduled meetings with the President of Norway,s Parliament, 
--DCM meeting with the vice chair of the Parliament,s foreign
policy committee, 
--continued briefings for MOD and at prominent think tanks, 
--DATT brief for the Norwegian National Defense College. 
--continued engagement of leading journalists (including the
columnist whose article sparked the discussion of the issue
here in Norway) to encourage them to present a broader picture
of the issue, with equal focus on Russian attempts to
undermine alliance solidarity.
--requested visit to Oslo (or DVC) by U.S. missile defense experts. 

5. (C)
It is very unlikely that the GON will reverse its stated
opposition to missile defenses. We will continue our outreach
efforts to present the facts of the plan, encourage deeper
analysis of missile defense in government and think tanks, and
highlight the damage of not responding to Russia,s statements
threatening NATO allies. We hope to spark a deeper look at
this issue and the development of a coherent and logical
Norwegian response. A shift of the broader public opinion is
deemed not immediately likely but influencing political elites
is within reach. We believe focus on Russias threats to the
alliance will resonate with the Norwegians general wariness
towards their large neighbor.

6. (SBU)
Embassy 
Oslo POC for overall Missile Defense issues is Political/ Economic 
Officer George Noll, [TEXT REMOVED BY AFTENPOSTEN ], e-mail [TEXT 
REMOVED BY AFTENPOSTEN ]. POC for Public Diplomacy efforts is Kirk 
Samson, [TEXT REMOVED BY AFTENPOSTEN ], e-mail [TEXT REMOVED BY 
AFTENPOSTEN ]. 

WHITNEY 
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