From: <a href="http://www.aftenposten.no/spesial/wikileaksdokumenter/article3956300.ece">Aftenposten</a><br>
Date: 2.4.2006

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S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 MUSCAT 000503
SIPDIS
SIPDIS
STATE FOR T, NEA/ARPI THE HAGUE PASS TO AMSTERDAM
E.O. 12958: 
DECL: 03/29/2016 
TAGS: PREL, MARR, KNNP, OTRA, IR, MU, Terrorism 
SUBJECT: SCENESETTER FOR U/S ROBERT JOSEPH'S VISIT TO MUSCAT
REF: STATE 51999
Classified By: Ambassador Gary A. Grappo. Reason: 1.4 (b, d).

1. (C)
Embassy Muscat warmly welcomes you to Oman. We are seeking
high-level meetings with senior Omani foreign policy and
security personnel with key roles on Iran policy, the
Proliferation Security Initiative, and nonproliferation
concerns. Your visit comes at a key moment in Oman's efforts
to win Congressional ratification of our historic Free Trade
Agreement, signed this past January. Our long-standing defense
relations remain excellent. The Sultanate was the first Arab
state in the region to sign a base access agreement with the
U.S. back in 1980. It has been a critical partner in the GWOT,
and in Operations Enduring Freedom and Iraqi Freedom. Oman has
so far received the first three of its 12 purchased F-16 Block
50 aircraft, with the remainder due to arrive over the next
year. U.S. investment in Oman's energy and industrial sector
has exceeded $5 billion over the past two years of booming
Omani economic growth.

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Proliferation Security Initiative 
---------------------------------
2. (S)
Minister Responsible for Foreign Affairs Yusuf bin Alawi
informed then-Ambassador Baltimore on February 27, 2005, that
Oman "agrees 100 percent" with the principles and voluntary
arrangements embodied in PSI. In typical Omani fashion,
however, the Minister was adamant that Oman would not declare
its support for PSI principles publicly. Also in February
2005, Oman participated in a PSI-related flight interdiction
exercise with U.S., UK and French forces as part of wider
military exercises. This marked the first (and thus far only)
PSI activity involving Omani military forces.

3. (S)
Oman's cooperation with PSI was tested in a real scenario in
April 2005 when a German-produced crane of dual-use concern
was inadvertently loaded on a Norwegian freighter for Iran. As
the vessel was due to transit an Omani port prior to arrival
in Iran, Germany and Norway sought Oman's help in halting the
cargo. The effort was aborted, however, when Germany and
Norway could not come to agreement on how to indemnify the
parties for any action taken. The Omani Foreign Ministry was
resentful at having been asked by Germany and Norway to take
action against the vessel and its cargo that the German and
Norwegian governments had been unwilling to do themselves. How
to address economic and legal consequences of halting
commercial cargoes of potential proliferation concern under
the PSI or other system remains unresolved.

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Iran 
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4. (C)
As international tensions over Iran's nuclear program have
risen in the past year, Oman's diplomatic engagement with
Tehran has likewise intensified. Oman has received Iranian
ministerial, security and trade delegations, and responded
with those of its own. FM Yusuf bin Alawi and the Sultan's
special Iran envoy, former Information Minister Abdul Aziz
al-Rawas, are Muscat's principle policy interlocutors with
Tehran, though military and security personnel have a
long-standing dialogue on maintaining maritime security and
cooperation in the Strait of Hormuz and littoral waters. The
Sultanate, just 35 miles from Iran at the nearest point,
believes that engagement with Tehran is the way of tempering
its unpredictable foreign policy and folding it into the
international community and treaty regimes. The Sultanate also
seeks to reinforce economic and trade bonds with its northern
neighbor, including studies to purchase or even jointly
develop Iranian natural gas. Oman opened a trade mission in
Bandar Abbas in 2004, and has invited Iran to reciprocate.
Oman enjoys a $500 million trade surplus with Iran, fed mainly
be re-exports from Oman's Musandam Peninsula. Iran often
complains that "smuggler" boats are avoiding Iranian customs
duties, while Oman complains of Iranian boat captains who
transport to Omani shores economic migrants from Pakistan and
Afghanistan (who mainly seek jobs in the UAE).

5. (C)
The Omanis have no illusions about the erratic and provocative
President Ahmadinejad, but retain hope that those they
consider to be more sober-minded -- such as veterans like
former president Rafsanjani, perhaps in league with Ayatollah
Khamenei -- may succeed in reining him in. Oman has suggested
direct dialogue between the U.S. and Iran, and will be keen to
hear reiterations of USG policy on pursuing a diplomatic
resolution to the current nuclear impasse. A confrontational
approach, Oman believes, will solidify political support for
Iranian hard-line policies and diminish young Iranian
liberals' admiration for Western examples. (Note: Yours will
be the first visit by a senior Department official since the
start of the Secretary's initiative to open a strategic
dialogue with our GCC allies on Iran. End note.)

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CWC Host Country Agreement 
--------------------------

6. (C)
Efforts five years ago to cement a Host Country Agreement with
Oman under the Chemical Weapons Convention foundered when the
Foreign Ministry failed to win Ministry of Defense support or
even interest in the agreement. When the agreement was brought
up again to MFA in 2005, FM Bin Alawi suggested a number of
amendments in text and format, to many of which the USG
readily agreed. Having won MFA's support, the agreement text
is once again with MOD, which controls virtually all of the
installations housing USG equipment that might be of CWC
demand inspection interest. While MFA fully understands the
confidentiality of CWC HCAs, they frequently inquire as to the
status of HCA negotiations with other GCC and Arab states.

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Export Control and Border Security 
----------------------------------

7. (C)
A number of USG agencies actively cooperate with Omani
authorities to improve its control of land and maritime
borders, as well as export and nonproliferation controls.
Lying outside the Strait of Hormuz and its higher insurance
fees, Oman's leading ports (Salalah for containers, Muscat for
general commerce, and soon Sohar for industry and bulk
commodities) are rapidly growing in interest to international
shippers and witnessing tremendous expansion. At the same
time, with a coastline greater than the U.S. West Coast and a
population of just 2.4 million, Oman faces tremendous
challenges in providing adequate security against human and
contraband smuggling (Iran, Pakistan, Yemen, Somalia,
Afghanistan) and possible transit by terrorists.

8. (C)
To help meet these security needs, Oman and USDH agreed in
November 2005 to cooperate in the Container Security
Initiative, which has already opened a U.S. Customs-manned
facility in Port Salalah to screen certain cargo containers
destined for U.S. ports. Under the same agreement, DOE
enrolled Oman in the Megaports Initiative, which will place
USG-funded radiation detection portals in Oman's main ports
(likely by 2007). State DS's ATA program has channeled
training and resources, including explosive detection canines
and forensics training, to Omani security services to better
equip them to handle terrorist incidents. State's Export
Control and Border Related Security (EXBS) program has been
training Omani customs enforcement and trade regulators on
developing a national export control regime, which Oman still
lacks. Omani customs agents are eager for practical, hands-on
training at detecting WMD and articles of proliferation
concern. DOD's Foreign Military Financing (FMF) program ($20
million in FY05, $14 million in FY06) concentrates on
improving Oman's interdiction capability, including fast
boats, radars, communications networks and night vision
goggles. The Royal Oman Police (ROP), which includes Oman's
customs, immigration, and coast guard services, is a key
partner in virtually all of these USG programs.

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New Arrival 
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9. (U)
Having assumed the Chief of Mission mantle in Muscat on March
28 after a five-year hiatus (I previously served here as DCM),
I look forward to receiving you and reacquainting myself with
senior Omani contacts. I am confident you will find your Omani
interlocutors thoughtful, frank, and forthcoming with their
assessments of bilateral and regional concerns, and firmly
committed to our two countries' strategic partnership.

GRAPPO 
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