1/23/2006 16:10
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 COLOMBO 000137
SIPDIS
SIPDIS
STATE FOR SA/INS; PACOM FOR FPA
E.O. 12958:
DECL: 01/23/2016
TAGS: PREL, PINS, CE, NO
SUBJECT: U/S BURNS REVIEWS SRI LANKAN PEACE PROCESS WITH
NORWEGIAN FACILITATOR ERIK SOLHEIM
Classified By: DCM JAMES F. ENTWISTLE, REASON 1.4, B AND D
1. (C)
Summary. Norwegian peace facilitator Solheim told U/S Burns
that the Sri Lankan peace process is at a crossroads and that
a "major step forward" is essential. Burns expressed U.S.
support for the Norwegian facilitation effort and compared
notes with Solheim on the efficacy and vision of various Sri
Lanka politicians. Solheim will consider his visit a success
if he gets agreement on dates and locations for several rounds
of ceasefire talks but does not expect a lessening of LTTE
violence even if talks begin. Solheim and Burns agreed a late
February/early March co-chairs meeting in Colombo might make
sense if there is some tangible progress in the peace process
before then. Burns noted that President Bushīs early March
trip to India would be an opportunity for a public U.S.
statement of support for the process. Solheim and Burns held a
short "photo op" after their meeting and made joint statements
on the need to avoid a civil war and re-start peace talks. End
Summary
2. (C)
U/S Nicholas Burns met with Norwegian Minister of
International Development and peace facilitator Erik Solheim
January 23 at the Ambassadorīs residence. SA DAS Gastright,
Ambassador Lunstead and DCM (notetaker) sat in. Solheim was
accompanied by Norwegian Ambassador Hans Brattskar and several
Norwegian emboffs/staffers.
Process At a Crossroads
-----------------------------
3. (C)
Asked by Burns for his overall sense of the situation, Solheim
said "it is clear we are at a crossroads. We must make a major
step forward or it will go down the drain." The status quo was
no longer tenable. Solheim continued that his impression is
that the GSL needs to develop a strategy for war or a strategy
for peace but right now it has neither. He hoped to help the
GSL develop a strategy for peace during this visit. Burns
commented that in his meeting with President Rajapaksa
(septel) earlier in the day, the President had expressed
concern that his military was too weak to take on the Tigers
(Solheim will see the President January 24). Burns noted that
his message to the President and other senior Sri Lankans had
been threefold: the U.S. supports Norway and the Sri Lankan
Monitoring Mission (SLMM), the GSL should not rise to LTTE
provocations and the GSL should take and keep the moral high
ground by being flexible on issues such as the venue for
cease-fire talks. As Secretary Rice had noted to Foreign
Minister Samaraweera several weeks ago in Washington, the GSL
should not give the LTTE an excuse to go back to war by being
stubborn on the venue issue.
Both Sides Obsessed with Venue Issue
----------------------------------------------
4. (C)
Solheim said the U.S. position as outlined by Burns was very
helpful to Norwegian efforts. On the venue issue, Solheim said
it would have to be Oslo or Geneva in order to bring the LTTE
on board. In his view, however, the venue issue has assumed
too much importance and drawn attention from the fact that the
GSL has no real plan on how to proceed towards peace once the
short-term venue issue is settled. Solheim confirmed that he
will see reclusive LTTE supremo Prabhakaran when he goes to
Kilinochchi January 25 and noted that it is good that LTTE
theoretician Balasingham ("the heavyweight thinker") will be
there as well since Prabhakaran is completely isolated and has
no understanding of "the South," much less the broader world.
Solheim speculated that Prabhakaran has not spoken to a
Sinhalese in ten years. Solheimīs objective is to get
Prabhakaran (and Balasingham) to agree to both the venue and
principle of ceasefire talks. Ideally, he would agree to a
series of talks ("since the
COLOMBO 00000137 002 OF 002
first one will consist of a long recitation of Tamil grievances!")
5. (C)
Burns and Solheim agreed that is it imperative that the GSL
develop a strategy for peace and not leave the initiative to
the LTTE. The GSL right now, Solheim observed, is focused on
"domestic problems, but the LTTE couldnīt care less." Burns
agreed with Solheimīs observation that President Rajapaksa
means well and wants peace but has a "shallow understanding"
of the ethnic issue. Moreover, the LTTE had given him
absolutely no breathing space after his inauguration before
beginning to take out convoys and soldiers. Burns observed
that both the Foreign Minister and the opposition leader
conveyed a better sense of longterm strategy and tactics than
the President who came across as "vague and indirect."
6. (C)
Asked by Burns what would constitute a successful result to
his visit, Solheim said he would be pleased if he left with a
commitment to several rounds of ceasefire talks with agreed
dates and venues. He estimated that with willingness and
commitment from both sides, the first round conceivably could
be in 2-3 weeks. Solheim cautioned, however, that even with
such an agreement, he would have no hope that the LTTE would
scale back its campaign of violence until the talks actually
started, if then.
7. (C)
Turning to the co-chair process, Solheim said it made sense to
hold the next meeting in Sri Lanka if there is enough progress
to justify a meeting. That will depend on the success of his
efforts over the next few days. Late February or early March
could make sense. Burns noted that he could come to a Colombo
co-chairs meeting at that time. Moreover, if there is progress
on the ceasefire talks, President Bush could make a supportive
public statement while in South Asia.
8. (SBU)
After their conversation, Burns and Solheim had a "photo op"
at which Burns made clear U.S. support for the Norwegian
facilitation effort and the Sri Lanka Monitoring Mission
(SLMM). Solheim expressed his appreciation for the support for
his efforts by the U.S., the other co-chair countries and the
rest of the international community. (Burns and Solheim each
held individual press conferences later in the day.)
9. (U) U/S Burns has cleared this message.
LUNSTEAD
Maybe this text is damaged. In view of the length of the underlining, the heading before paragraph 3 could have been
Peace Process At a Crossroads -----------------------------See also
Both Sides Obsessed with Venue Issue ----------------------------------------------