From: Aftenposten
Date: 18.8.2005
8/18/2005 9:13
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 COLOMBO 001453
SIPDIS
E.O. 12958:
DECL: 08/18/2015 
TAGS: PTER, PGOV, NO, CE, LTTE - Peace Process 
SUBJECT: SRI LANKA: NORWEGIAN FACILITATORS SEND LETTER TO
LTTE LEADER PRABHAKARAN VIA LONDON, GSL ASKS EU TO LIST LTTE
AS TERRORIST ORGANIZATION
REF: COLOMBO 1440 AND PREVIOUS
Classified By: Charge´ d´Affaires, a.i. James F. Entwistle
for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d).

1. (C)
Summary. In their August 17 meeting with LTTE theoretician
Anton Balasingham in London, Norwegian FM Petersen and DFM
Helgesen passed a letter to LTTE leader Prabhakaran (text
below). At GSL request, EU missions in Colombo will recommend
to Brussels that the EU designate the LTTE as a terrorist
organization. End Summary

2. (C)
Norwegian Ambassador Hans Brattskar called on Charge´ August
18 to follow up on Norwegian Deputy Foreign Minister
Helgesen´s August 16 meeting with Colombo co-chair
representatives. Brattskar confirmed that Norwegian Foreign
Minister Petersen and Helgesen had called on LTTE theoretician
Anton Balasingham August 17 in London and had given
Balasingham a letter to be passed to LTTE leader Prabhakaran
(text below).

3. (C)
Brattskar noted that he was not sharing a copy of the
Prabhakaran letter with the GSL since that was not normal
practice. Moreover, the contents of Petersen and Helgesen´s
Monday night meeting with President Kumaratunga had clearly
been leaked to the Colombo press ("Vidar is hopping mad!"), so
passing a copy to the GSL would be "like giving it to the
Sunday papers," Brattskar mused. He asked that the U.S. not
share the letter.

4. (C)
Brattskar said that Balasingham had promised Petersen and
Helgesen he would translate and transmit the letter to
Kilinochchi immediately. Balasingham had expressed concern
over recent LTTE actions in the North and East but had danced
around the question of responsibility for Kadirgamar´s
assassination (and disavowed any prior knowledge).
Balasingham, Brattskar said, had been pleased at the prospect
of receiving the Norwegian FM and at the idea of more direct
Norwegian contact with Prabhakaran (although Balasingham said
he would want to be present at any such meetings as he usually
has in the past - Brattskar said the Norwegians have only met
Prabhakaran once when Balasingham was not present).
Balasingham did not discuss travel plans to Sri Lanka but
Brattskar noted that when he had seen Balasingham in London in
July, the LTTE theoretician had said he was thinking about
travel to Kilinochchi in October.

5. (C)
Brattskar undertook to advise Charge´ as soon as the
Norwegians had some reaction to the Prabhakaran letter. He
noted that as far as he knew a Petersen/Rice conversation was
still scheduled to take place this week. The Norwegians,
Brattskar concluded, continue to like the idea of a September
co-chairs meeting in New York although, given Japanese
sensitivities about their standing invitation to host the next
meeting in October, the New York meeting should perhaps be
billed as something like a preparatory meeting.

6. (C)
On a related topic, the British DCM told Charge´ August 18
that the GSL had just convoked her High Commissioner (as
holder of the EU Presidency in Colombo) and the EC Charge´ to
ask that the European Union list the LTTE as a terrorist
organization (apparently there is a mechanism through which
the EU can designate terrorist organizations on a union-wide
basis in addition to whatever procedures individual EU members
states may have). The EU missions in Colombo plan to endorse
the idea strongly to Brussels. The British DCM said she is
familiarizing herself on the details of the procedure and the
potential timeline for such listing.

7. (C)
Text of Norwegian letter (please protect closely) to Prabhakaran follows:

Begin text Letter from Royal Ministry of Foreign Affairs 
Minister of Foreign Affairs
To Mr. Velupillai Prabhakaran Leader Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam
Oslo, 16 August 2005

Dear Mr. Prabhakaran
As I am sure you realize, the peace process is now in a
critical situation. The killings and counter-killings over the
last few months have been watched with mounting concern by
Norway and the international community. Along with the
continued recruitment of children to the LTTE, this has
created distrust about the LTTE´s intentions as regards the
peace process. The assassination of Foreign Minister Lakshman
Kadirgamar has exacerbated the situation. It is not up to
Norway to draw conclusions about the criminal investigations
now under way in Colombo, or on any other judicial matter in
relation with the killings. However, public perception both in
Sri Lanka and internationally is that the LTTE is responsible.
This public perception is a political reality. The LTTE needs
to respond to this situation in a way that demonstrates
continued commitment to the peace process. I see it as my
obligation to make clear to you the political choice now
facing the LTTE. If the LTTE does not take a positive step
forward at this critical juncture, the international reaction
could be severe. Against this backdrop I would ask you
urgently to consider the following steps:
1. To accept the Norwegian Government´s invitation to
participate in a review of the implementation of the Ceasefire
Agreement in order to find practical ways of ensuring full
compliance by both parties.
2. To establish direct communications between the LTTE and the
Sri Lankan Army in the east, in order to improve security.
3. To accept without delay the Sri Lanka Monitoring Mission
proposal for transportation of LTTE cadres.
4. To collaborate in a practical way with government
initiatives to speed up reconstruction in the north and east.
The LTTE´s continued commitment to the P-TOMS agreement is
vital in this regard.
5. To take effective steps to halt killings and to cease the
recruitment of underage combatants. I trust that you
appreciate the gravity of the present situation and will take
steps to demonstrate to the international community that the
LTTE is committed to the peace process.

Yours sincerely,
Jan Petersen
End Text 

ENTWISTLE