From: <a href="http://www.aftenposten.no/spesial/wikileaksdokumenter/article3954378.ece">Aftenposten</a><br>
Date: 15.3.2004

<pre>
3/15/2004 11:33
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 COLOMBO 000456
SIPDIS
DEPARTMENT FOR SA, SA/INS 
DEPARTMENT PLEASE ALSO PASS TOPEC 
NSC FOR E. MILLARD E.O. 12958:
DECL: 03-15-14 
TAGS: PGOV, PREL, PINR, PTER, CE, NO, LTTE - Peace Process 
SUBJECT: Norwegian Special Envoy Solheim reviews latest 
on LTTE split and discusses upcoming election
Refs: (A) Colombo 446, and previous - (B) Oslo 419
(U) Classified by Ambassador Jeffrey J. Lunstead. Reasons 1.5 (b, d).

1. (C)
SUMMARY: In a March 13 meeting with the four local co-chairs
(Japan, Norway, U.S. and the EU) and again to a wider donor
group on March 15, Norwegian Special Envoy Erik Solheim
discussed his latest visit to Sri Lanka. Ambassador Lunstead
participated in the meetings. Most of Solheimīs comments
focused on the recent split in the Liberation Tigers of Tamil
Eelam (LTTE) organization and Sri Lankaīs April 2
parliamentary election. Solheimīs visit appears to have been
mainly devoted to fact gathering on the new complexities and
uncertainties affecting the Sri Lankan situation. END SUMMARY.

2. (C)
MEETING WITH LTTE OFFICIALS: In March 13 and March 15
meetings, which were attended by Ambassador Lunstead, Solheim
said he had met with S.P. Thamilchelvam, the Tiger political
chief, during a March 11 trip to LTTE headquarters in the
Vanni region. During the discussion, which centered around
rebel eastern commander Karunaīs recent break with the main
LTTE leadership (see Ref A), Solheim said Thamilchelvam had
emphasized repeatedly that the group wanted to "peacefully"
resolve the dispute with Karuna. Asserting that Karuna was
operating alone and that most eastern cadre were "against"
him, Thamilchelvam told Solheim that the Tigers would try to
undermine Karuna from within by starving Karuna financially
and encouraging defections from his ranks. Thamilchelvam also
blamed Karuna for the two recent election-related
assassinations in the east (see Ref A). (Karuna has placed
blame for these killings on the LTTEīs intelligence
apparatus.) The Tigers also told Solheim of their concern that
no one interfere in the Karuna situation. The group was
steadfast that it was an "internal matter" for the LTTE alone.
(Separately, during two meetings, Solheim said PM
Wickremesinghe made clear that the GSL would not get involved
in the situation between the LTTE and Karuna. The PM also said
that the government would avoid taking advantage of the
situation.)

3. (C)
While in the Vanni, Solheim also said that he had met with
Pathuman, a high-ranking LTTE commander from Trincomalee
District. According to Solheim, Pathuman looked "okay" and
stated that he (Pathuman) was still in command of the
Trincomalee district. (Solheimīs meeting with Pathuman
effectively rebutted recent press reports that the LTTE had
"executed" Pathuman because he was allegedly close to Karuna
-- see Ref A.)

4. (C)
In a March 11 visit to the eastern area of Trincomalee,
Solheim said that he had had a positive meeting with Sri Lanka
Army Major General Sunil Tennekoon, the general in charge
(GOC) of the district. Tennekoon stated that the situation in
Trincomalee remained calm, despite newspaper reports to the
contrary. Local Tigers officials in Trincomalee, for their
part, told Solheim they were happy that the Norwegian
delegation was visiting Trincomalee. According to the Tigers,
the visit was an important signal that the international
community remained engaged in Sri Lanka. Separately, Solheim
added that the Sri Lanka Monitoring Mission (SLMM) was
continuing its work in the east, despite press reports to the
contrary. The only change was that the SLMM was not entering
the eastern areas held by Karuna.

5. (C)
Solheim told the co-chairs that the Norwegians saw three
possible outcomes to the Karuna situation:
-- (1) the LTTE leadership undermines or kills Karuna; 
-- (2) the LTTE leadership strikes a deal with Karuna,
giving the rebel commander autonomy over the 
eastern districts of Batticaloa and Ampara; 
-- (3) Karuna becomes a GSL-supported "warlord." 
(Solheim said this last possibility would be the most
unsettling for the peace process if it came to fruition.)

6. (C)
Solheim said Thamilchelvam also had discussed donor assistance
and the need to resolve the issue of an assistance funds
delivery mechanism. To the co-chairs, Solheim stated that the
Norwegians were considering a model similar to the Afghan
Fund.

7. (C)
PARLIAMENTARY CAMPAIGN: In discussing the April 2
parliamentary elections, Solheim noted that the LTTE hoped the
government would approve polling sites either at the GSLīs
crossing points into Tiger- controlled area, or in the
"no-manīs land" between GSL- and LTTE-controlled areas. On
this point, it was not clear which alternative had been agreed
to, although the LTTE remains concerned that the Army will not
honor election plans and, in a repeat of the December 2001
parliamentary elections, would largely bar Tamils in
Tiger-controlled areas from reaching polling sites. If polling
sites were approved for either of these areas, the LTTE
expected that the Army would not be present, with the Sri
Lanka police instead providing security. According to Solheim,
Army officials in Jaffna and Trincomalee had stated that the
Tigers had agreed to polling sites at the GSLīs crossing
points. (Mission has heard reports that the Sri Lankan
Election Commissioner will support holding the polling in
"no-manīs land" areas.)

8. (C) 
COMMENT: Solheimīs visit appears to have been mainly devoted
to fact gathering. Karunaīs decision to separate himself from
the main LTTE organization has clearly made the overall
situation that much more complex. Moreover, there is great
uncertainty over how the Karuna matter will play out and over
the upcoming election. That said, the Norwegians still appear
firmly engaged, which is a significant positive. Their mettle
is clearly being tested in this confusing, volatile period,
however. END SUMMARY.

9. (U) Minimize considered.

LUNSTEAD